* security: harden network-exposed surface
Hardening for the network-reachable attack surface, prioritizing fixes
that are strong but do not change working local/loopback defaults.
- auth_middleware: constant-time API key comparison (secrets.compare_digest)
for the HTTP path, and gate /metrics behind auth so operational counters
are not readable unauthenticated. /health stays open.
- webhook_routes: fail closed when a channel's secret/token is unset. Twilio,
BlueBubbles, WhatsApp (verify + inbound), and SendBlue now reject (403)
instead of processing unsigned/unauthenticated input. Constant-time
comparisons for BlueBubbles/SendBlue/WhatsApp verify token.
- http_request: follow redirects manually and re-run the SSRF check on every
hop (capped at 5) so an allowed public URL cannot 30x-redirect to an
internal/metadata address.
- api_routes /v1/memory/index: restrict indexing to OPENJARVIS_WORKSPACE roots
when configured and refuse sensitive files (.env, keys, credentials).
- config.toml: default [server] host to 127.0.0.1 (loopback) with a comment
on how to safely expose to a LAN (0.0.0.0 + API key).
Tests: new fail-closed webhook tests, /metrics auth tests, and SSRF
redirect block/follow tests; updated SendBlue tests for the new
secret-required behavior. Affected suites pass (95 tests), ruff clean.
* fix(http): keep SSRF redirect-following patchable via httpx.request
The manual redirect-following loop used a private httpx.Client, which
bypassed the `http_request.httpx.request` mock seam that consumers' tests
rely on (e.g. the twitter-bot GitHub-issue tests escaped to the real
network and 401'd). Issue each hop via module-level httpx.request with
follow_redirects=False instead — same per-hop SSRF re-check, restored
testability.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Jon Saad-Falcon <jonsaadfalcon@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
