Commit Graph
20 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
2b14315f3c fix(security): detect Rust at import time + SSRF Python fallback (#467)
* fix(security): detect Rust at import time + SSRF Python fallback (#225)

RUST_AVAILABLE was hardcoded to True, so the exported flag never
reflected reality and the pure-Python fallbacks it was meant to gate
were unreachable.

- _rust_bridge: compute RUST_AVAILABLE dynamically by probing the
  compiled extension once at import time.
- security.ssrf: check_ssrf now falls back to the existing
  _check_ssrf_python implementation when the Rust extension is not
  built, instead of raising ImportError. The SSRF guard is
  security-critical and must never be silently skipped or crash just
  because Rust was not compiled.
- tools.browser: drop the `except ImportError: pass` around the SSRF
  check, which previously disabled SSRF protection entirely on installs
  without the compiled backend (internal/metadata endpoints reachable).
- tests: cover the Python fallback path (metadata IP, private IP, and
  public URL) with RUST_AVAILABLE patched False.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(security): make test_no_hostname backend-agnostic

The cherry-picked #451 fix adds a pure-Python SSRF fallback, but
test_no_hostname asserted the Rust-specific message "Invalid URL". The
Python fallback returns "No hostname in URL" for the same input, so the
SSRF suite failed on exactly the uncompiled-install path #451 targets
(in CI the Rust extension is built, masking it).

Assert the security behavior (URL blocked, non-None reason) and accept
either backend's wording, so the suite passes on both the Rust and
Python paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* test(tools): update browser SSRF test for non-bypassable check

The #225 fix removes the `except ImportError: pass` that silently
disabled the SSRF check in browser navigation. The existing
test_execute_ssrf_module_missing asserted that very anti-pattern ("skip
check and proceed"), so it failed once the swallow was removed.

Replace it with tests that assert the SECURE behavior: the SSRF check
runs unconditionally and is honored (a private-IP URL is blocked even
when navigation would otherwise succeed), and a public URL still
navigates. check_ssrf's pure-Python fallback means the import never
fails anymore, so the old skip path no longer exists.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Rahul <therahulll56@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-01 11:57:44 -07:00
caa3adbbce fix(windows): cross-platform python discovery + browser open helpers (#436)
Reimplements the useful parts of #385 cleanly.

Adds two small cross-platform helpers under `openjarvis.core.utils`:
- `get_python_executable()` — prefers `python3`, falls back to `python` for Windows / minimal distros that only ship the unversioned name.
- `open_browser(url)` — `webbrowser.open` by default; on Windows uses `cmd /c start "" <url>` to avoid console-host edge cases.

Swapped at every hardcoded `python3` / `webbrowser.open` site: `connectors/oauth.py`, `evals/scorers/livecodebench.py`, `scripts/oauth_all.py`, `scripts/install/install.sh` (adds `PY_CMD` detection block), `scripts/quickstart.sh` (adds `MINGW*|MSYS*|CYGWIN*) cmd /c start` case), and the two affected test files. Test files wrap `get_python_executable()` in `shlex.quote()` before interpolating into `shell=True` strings — Windows interpreter paths often contain spaces.

Deliberately different from #385: `openjarvis.core.__init__` does NOT re-export `DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR` (would have raised ImportError because it's in `openjarvis.core.config`, not the package `__init__`; re-exporting would also force eager import of the heavy config module at every `import openjarvis.core`). `oauth.py` keeps `from openjarvis.core.config import DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR` alongside the new `from openjarvis.core import open_browser`.

Original API surface and call-site sweep by @sanjayravit in #385 — huge thanks for the careful Windows-compatibility audit. This PR preserves your design while fixing the ImportError edge cases caught during review.

Co-Authored-By: sanjayravit <sanjayravit@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-29 16:28:45 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandGitHub b8245136db fix(security): block IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in SSRF check (#327) 2026-05-07 14:55:52 -07:00
Robby ManihaniandGitHub 259f97b81c fix(server): allow Tauri 2 webview origins on every platform (#292)
The desktop app's chat-completions stream relies on a raw browser
fetch from the Tauri webview to the FastAPI backend, so it is
subject to CORS. The default allowlist only contained
`tauri://localhost`, which is the production webview origin on
macOS, Linux, and iOS. On Windows and Android, Tauri 2 serves the
app from `http://tauri.localhost` (or `https://tauri.localhost`
when `windows.useHttpsScheme` is enabled), so the preflight for
`POST /v1/chat/completions` was rejected and the streaming fetch
threw `TypeError: Failed to fetch` before any byte was read.

Symptom users reported: in the Logs tab the request appears to
succeed up to "Request sent", followed immediately by
"Stream error: Failed to fetch" and "Response: 22 chars" -- which
is exactly the length of the synthesized fallback string
`Error: Failed to fetch` written by InputArea.tsx when streamChat
throws.

Add `http://tauri.localhost` and `https://tauri.localhost` to both
default origin lists (`ServerConfig.cors_origins` and the
`create_app` fallback), and add a regression test that drives a
real preflight against `/v1/chat/completions` for each of the
three Tauri origin schemes.

Browser model loading kept working because it is routed through
the Rust `tauriInvoke('fetch_models')` command, which is a
server-to-server HTTP call not subject to browser CORS -- only
streaming chat goes through the webview's fetch.
2026-04-29 12:55:25 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandGitHub a009646071 feat: Morning Digest with Voice Mode + unified OAuth + Apple connectors (#174) 2026-04-03 11:05:41 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Opus 4.6 f122f5a699 fix: tests work without Rust extension and server extras
- BoundaryGuard degrades gracefully when Rust scanners unavailable
- BoundaryGuard tests use lightweight mock scanners (no Rust needed)
- Server-dependent tests use pytest.importorskip for starlette/fastapi
- Fix import ordering in test files

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 21:46:53 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Opus 4.6 57ecd5c77f feat: security profiles — personal, shared, server presets with user overrides
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 21:30:27 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Sonnet 4.6 60317ffcba feat: get_tool_credential — scoped credential access without env pollution
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 21:26:42 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Sonnet 4.6 687ad30f9e feat: SanitizingFormatter — auto-redact credentials in all log output
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 21:24:57 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Sonnet 4.6 9909dde780 feat: secure_mkdir and secure_create helpers for restrictive file permissions
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 20:57:25 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Sonnet 4.6 472938cc2b fix: fail-closed webhook validation — reject when SDK missing or secret unconfigured
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 20:56:24 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Opus 4.6 d2dbd4c2a2 feat: wire BoundaryGuard into ToolExecutor for external tool scanning
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 20:28:33 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Sonnet 4.6 677ece6fb3 feat: tag engines with is_cloud and tools with is_local for boundary scanning
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 20:26:26 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Opus 4.6 7c1f983891 feat: BoundaryGuard module — scan/redact/block at device exit points
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 20:24:07 -07:00
Jon Saad-FalconandClaude Opus 4.6 63a32d20d6 feat: secure server defaults — loopback binding, redact mode, rate limiting
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-28 20:00:49 -07:00
Prathap PandGitHub c2756964a7 fix(channels): wire channel→agent handler and fix Telegram send pipeline (#94)
* fix(channels): wire channel→agent handler and fix Telegram send pipeline

* format code

* add supported tests
2026-03-20 18:35:18 -07:00
Tarun SureshandClaude Opus 4.6 181d9ac0eb fix: resolve ruff I001 import sorting and E501 line length in tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-17 00:13:49 +00:00
Tarun SureshandClaude Opus 4.6 4cc16972ec feat: add credential stripping, tool output wrapping, and severity policy
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-03-16 17:57:47 +00:00
Jon Saad-FalconandGitHub 4557fe2930 feat(security): wire guardrails into all entry points (#60) 2026-03-14 16:33:50 -07:00
Jon Saad-Falconandkrypticmouse 8798e2ee4f init commit 2026-03-12 17:29:39 +00:00