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krypticmouseandClaude Opus 4.7
87e978ef20
`AuthMiddleware` is a BaseHTTPMiddleware and never intercepts WebSocket
upgrade requests, so `/v1/chat/stream` and `/v1/agents/events` accepted any
connection — leaking all agent events/message content and allowing
unauthenticated inference even when an API key was configured for HTTP. The
A2A JSON-RPC server likewise dispatched every request without auth.
- Add `websocket_authorized(websocket, expected_key)` (constant-time compare)
and check it in both WS handlers BEFORE `accept()`, closing with code 1008
on failure. Token is read from `?token=` (browsers can't set WS headers) or
an `Authorization: Bearer` header. `create_app` now exposes the key via
`app.state.api_key`; when empty, auth is disabled, matching the HTTP
middleware's local-default behavior (so loopback dev is unchanged).
- A2AServer gains an optional `auth_token`: `handle_request(token=...)`
rejects with JSON-RPC -32001 before dispatch when configured, advertises
`{"schemes": ["bearer"]}` on the agent card, and stays open when unset.
Added `A2AConfig.auth_token`.
Verified empirically against the real mounted endpoints via TestClient: no
token / wrong token are rejected at the handshake (WebSocketDisconnect),
correct token streams normally, and no-key configs still connect freely.
Closes #217
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>