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Commits
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a7b0ae80a9 |
v0.42.60.0 chore(release): eleven verified community fixes — changelog + version bump (#2888)
* v0.42.60.0 chore(release): eleven verified community fixes — changelog + version bump Windows full-sync mass-delete fix, gateway tool-loop resume consolidation (fix-wave A), two source-isolation closes, search-cache exclude-policy keying, and six more verified community fixes. Files the take-writes fail-open source fallback and the #2112 doctor hunk as follow-up TODOs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update reference docs for v0.42.60.0 - KEY_FILES.md: unpin stale KNOBS_HASH_VERSION number in the autocut entry (mode.ts is the single source of truth); document the full-sync reconcile path-separator normalization + mass-delete safety valve (planReconcileDeletes, GBRAIN_ALLOW_MASS_RECONCILE); describe the TTY-gated admin bootstrap token banner (--print-admin-token, env-sourced always hidden) - docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md + docs/tutorials/company-brain.md: bootstrap token is now hidden on non-TTY starts; document GBRAIN_ADMIN_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN and --print-admin-token for headless deploys Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(docs): regenerate llms bundle after KEY_FILES/deploy-doc sync Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Sinabina <sinabina@Sinabinas-MacBook-Pro-4.local> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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7b0d99adb0 |
v0.42.2.0 feat: gbrain connect — one-command Claude Code onboarding from a bearer token (#1683)
* fix: gbrain auth create dropped the name on the bare (no-flag) form Extract parseAuthCreateArgs; only exclude the --takes-holders value from the positional search when the flag is present (rest[takesIdx+1] resolved to rest[0] when takesIdx === -1, silently dropping the name). Add regression test. * feat: gbrain connect — one-command Claude Code onboarding from a bearer token New connect command prints a paste-ready claude-mcp-add block (or --install wires it + smoke-tests the token via a raw-bearer get_brain_identity probe). Direct HTTP MCP, literal-token default, URL normalization, token header-injection guard, --json redaction, execFileSync (no shell). Wired into CLI_ONLY + CLI_ONLY_SELF_HELP + handleCliOnly. 58 unit + 3 PGLite-E2E cases; e2e-test-map updated. * docs: lead CLAUDE_CODE.md with gbrain connect (remote fast path) + README one-liner Regenerate llms-full.txt for the README change. * refactor: pre-landing review fixes for gbrain connect - DRY: single DEFAULT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS + shared isAuthErrorMessage predicate - reuse promptLine (shared stdin lifecycle) for the --install confirm - harden redactToken with a Bearer <value> scrub (defense in depth) - +8 tests: orchestrator guard paths, deterministic timeout, invalid --timeout-ms, Bearer-redaction * fix: adversarial-review hardening for gbrain connect - probe: Promise.race the call against a real timer so a stalled connect()/SSE handshake (signal alone doesn't cover it) can't hang --install indefinitely - probe: close transport even if client.connect() throws - parseArgs: reject a missing/flag-shaped value (e.g. --token --install) - block link-local / cloud-metadata hosts (169.254/fe80:/fd00:ec2::254) — keeps localhost + RFC1918 LAN brains working - non-interactive --install now requires --yes - clearer message when --force removed then add failed +8 tests covering each * fix: codex-review P2s for gbrain connect - POSIX single-quote the rendered claude-mcp-add command so a token with shell metacharacters ($(), backticks) can't trigger command substitution on paste - detect IPv4-mapped IPv6 metadata addresses (::ffff:169.254.x.x / ::ffff:a9fe:*) so they don't bypass the link-local guard +3 tests * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.42.2.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: document gbrain connect + connect-probe in CLAUDE.md Key files (v0.42.2.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: gbrain connect — add codex and perplexity agents --agent codex emits 'codex mcp add ... --bearer-token-env-var GBRAIN_REMOTE_TOKEN' (token read from the env var at runtime, never in Codex config; --install runs it). --agent perplexity prints the URL + token for the Settings → Connectors GUI (no --install). Generalized the command file: AGENT_SPECS table, buildCodexMcpAddArgv, cmdString(binary,argv), binary-generic ConnectDeps (hasBinary/runBinary/env), agent-aware buildConnectBlock/buildJson. +25 tests. * docs: codex + perplexity connect paths (new CODEX.md, README, CHANGELOG, CLAUDE.md) Regenerate llms-full.txt for the CLAUDE.md/README edits. * test: real-CLI E2E for connect — drive actual claude + codex against a live server Adds claude-code + codex cases to connect-bearer.test.ts that run the real 'claude mcp add' / 'codex mcp add' through 'gbrain connect --install' against a live 'gbrain serve --http' (sandboxed HOME/CODEX_HOME), then assert via 'claude mcp get' / 'codex mcp get' that the server registered (and codex's token stays out of config). Skips when the binary is absent. Perplexity is GUI-only so it's print-asserted. Regen llms for the CLAUDE.md note. * docs: perplexity OAuth + serve --bind/--public-url footgun (per Perplexity feedback) PERPLEXITY.md now documents the host-side HTTP setup (gbrain serve --http --bind 0.0.0.0 --public-url, the v0.34 ECONNREFUSED footgun) and the OAuth 2.1 client_credentials path (gbrain auth register-client) alongside the legacy bearer token. The 'connect --agent perplexity' output points at the same bind/public-url requirement + PERPLEXITY.md. * feat: gbrain connect --oauth — client-credentials path for perplexity/generic OAuth is the correct path for a third-party cloud connector (Perplexity): instead of a long-lived full-access bearer token, the connector gets Issuer URL + Client ID + Client Secret and mints short-lived scoped tokens. --oauth --register mints a least-privilege client on the host (shells gbrain auth register-client); --oauth --client-id/--client-secret uses an existing one. Rejected for claude-code/codex (bearer) and with --install. Issuer derived from the mcp-url. New E2E proves the full chain: register → connect --oauth → OAuth discovery → /token client_credentials mint → get_brain_identity tool call against a live server. Docs: PERPLEXITY.md leads with OAuth; README + CLAUDE.md updated; +18 unit cases. * docs: add gbrain connect to INSTALL.md MCP section + link CODEX.md The remote-client onboarding command was documented in README/CLAUDE_CODE/CODEX/ PERPLEXITY but missing from INSTALL.md §3 (the natural 'how do I connect a client' home). Add the one-command connect how-to (claude-code/codex/perplexity) and the missing docs/mcp/CODEX.md link. * fix: connect LEARN_INSTRUCTION names put_page, not CLI-only capture The self-orientation block told a connected agent that `capture` is an available MCP tool. It isn't — `capture` is a CLI-only convenience command; the MCP write tool is `put_page`. An agent that followed the instruction hit "unknown tool". Drop capture; put_page was already in the list. Adds a regression block to connect.test.ts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: serve --http surfaces skill-publishing status (banner + nudge) When mcp.publish_skills is OFF, connected agents can search/write but can't call list_skills/get_skill, so the host's skill catalog is invisible to them. The startup banner now shows a Skills: line, and a stderr nudge fires when off with the paste-ready fix. Pure skillPublishStatus() helper, unit-tested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: prove the local stdio MCP funnel end-to-end Spawns real `gbrain serve` (stdio) against a freshly init --pglite brain and drives the official MCP SDK client through initialize -> tools/list -> tools/call (get_brain_identity + search). Pins the advertised core-tool set against what the server actually exposes (asserts capture is NOT advertised). This funnel had zero e2e coverage before. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: make batch-retry-audit ENOENT case hermetic The 'no-op when audit dir does not exist' case called pruneOldBatchRetryAuditFiles(30) without a GBRAIN_AUDIT_DIR override, so it read the real ~/.gbrain/audit and flaked (kept:1) on any dev machine with a batch-retry-*.jsonl on disk. Point it at a guaranteed-missing temp subdir, matching this file's own hermetic-header contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: two-funnel coding-agent onboarding (Claude Code / Codex) New tutorial docs/tutorials/connect-coding-agent.md: Path A (connect to an existing brain) + Path B (start from nothing, local stdio), the brain-first protocol to paste into CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md, and the four translatable habits. README gains a 'Quick start: Claude Code or Codex' fork separating lightweight retrieval from the full autonomous install. INSTALL.md shows the one-command wire-up at the standalone CLI section. mcp/CLAUDE_CODE + CODEX cross-link the tutorial + note publish_skills + capture-is-CLI-only. Tutorial promoted to Shipped in the tutorials index. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: changelog + regenerated llms (v0.42.2.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: CLAUDE.md Key Files annotation for two-funnel onboarding wave Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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488e4824e8 |
v0.34.1.0 fix(mcp): MCP fix wave — source-isolation P0 + PKCE DCR + federated_read + 3 more (#996)
* fix(mcp): skip stdin EOF handlers when MCP_STDIO=1 OpenClaw's bundle-mcp gateway and similar wrappers pipe the JSON-RPC handshake on stdin then close their stdin half. Pre-fix, both stdin 'end' and 'close' listeners (server.ts:65-66 and serve.ts:204-206) treated this as a permanent disconnect and shut the server down before the first tool call arrived. Guard both sites with `process.env.MCP_STDIO !== '1'`. Signal handlers (SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP), transport.onclose, and the parent-process watchdog still cover legitimate shutdown paths. The serve.ts site threads the env read through an injectable `mcpStdio?: boolean` on ServeOptions so tests stay isolated (no process.env mutation per scripts/check-test-isolation.sh R1). Tests: 3 new cases in test/serve-stdio-lifecycle.test.ts pin the guard's invariants — mcpStdio=true must NOT trigger shutdown on stdin EOF, signals must still drive shutdown with mcpStdio=true, and mcpStdio=false (default) preserves existing CLI behavior. 25/25 pass. Origin: PR #870. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(oauth): honor token_endpoint_auth_method=none for PKCE public clients RFC 7591 §3.2.1: when a DCR client declares token_endpoint_auth_method="none" (PKCE-only public clients like Claude Code, Cursor), the authorization server MUST NOT issue a client_secret. Pre-fix, registerClient unconditionally minted a secret, and the MCP SDK's clientAuth middleware then rejected valid public-client flows on /token because it expected client.client_secret to match. Three changes to src/core/oauth-provider.ts:registerClient: - Gate clientSecret generation on isPublicClient = (auth_method === 'none'). Public clients store client_secret_hash = NULL. - Omit client_secret from the response payload for public clients. Confidential clients (default client_secret_post and explicit client_secret_basic) keep their existing one-time-reveal shape. - Normalize NULL secret_hash to JS undefined in getClient so SDK middleware (which checks client.client_secret === undefined, not === null) correctly identifies public clients and skips the secret-comparison branch on /token. Schema is already permissive (client_secret_hash TEXT, no NOT NULL on both src/schema.sql and src/core/pglite-schema.ts) — no migration needed. Tests: 5 new cases in test/oauth.test.ts pin: - public client → no client_secret in response (#11 from plan) - default auth_method → secret unchanged (regression guard) - explicit client_secret_post → secret unchanged - getClient NULL→undefined normalization - PKCE full /authorize → /token end-to-end with no secret (#15 from plan) 69/69 oauth.test.ts cases pass. typecheck clean. Origin: PR #909. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(serve-http): --bind HOST, default to loopback (127.0.0.1) Adds `gbrain serve --http --bind <interface>` to control which network interface the HTTP MCP server listens on. Default flipped from `0.0.0.0` (pre-v0.34) to `127.0.0.1` (v0.34.0+). Why the flip: gbrain's primary use case is a personal-knowledge brain on a laptop. The previous default exposed brains on every interface — one accidental `--http` invocation away from publishing the brain to a LAN. Server operators who need remote access pass `--bind 0.0.0.0` (or a specific interface). Codex's outside-voice on the original PR #864 correctly flagged that the additive flag wasn't actually the fix; the default needed to change for the safety claim to hold. If `--public-url` is set but `--bind` is unset, runServeHttp prints a loud stderr WARN at startup recommending `--bind 0.0.0.0`. Declaring a public URL while quietly binding loopback is almost always a misconfiguration; we want the operator to see it on first start, not silently fail remote requests. Startup banner now includes a `Bind:` row so the listening interface is visible alongside Port / Engine / Issuer. Origin: PR #864, extended with D11 (default flip) per /plan-eng-review codex outside-voice review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): seal source-isolation leak on read path (P0) Pre-fix, an authenticated OAuth MCP client scoped to source-A could enumerate source-B pages via six read-side ops: search, query (text AND image paths), list_pages, traverse_graph, and find_experts. The v0.31.8 source-scoping pattern shipped through dispatch.ts but the op handlers never threaded ctx.sourceId into their engine calls, and hybridSearch.ts:223's explicit SearchOpts rebuild dropped sourceId even when callers passed it. Sealing the leak: - src/core/operations.ts adds sourceScopeOpts(ctx), the canonical precedence ladder: ctx.auth.allowedSources (federated) wins over ctx.sourceId (scalar) wins over nothing. Threaded into all 5 read-side op handlers + the query-image-path searchVector call (the 6th leak surface codex caught in plan review). - src/core/search/hybrid.ts:223 now threads sourceId + sourceIds fields through the inner SearchOpts rebuild. The explicit pick shape is preserved (HNSW inner-CTE ordering depends on it) but extended. - src/core/types.ts adds sourceIds?: string[] to SearchOpts + PageFilters (D9: federated read needs array-shaped engine filter or fan-out; array wins for hot retrieval). - src/core/operations.ts AuthInfo gains sourceId + allowedSources (D2: identity surface symmetric with the federated_read column #876 will add). - Both engines now apply WHERE source_id = $N (scalar) or = ANY($N::text[]) (array) at the SQL layer for searchKeyword, searchKeywordChunks, searchVector, listPages, traverseGraph, traversePaths. Array form wins when both are set. The searchVector filter pushes into the inner HNSW CTE (codex flagged this placement during plan review). - traverseGraph + traversePaths signatures gain opts.sourceId + opts.sourceIds; engine.ts interface updated. - findExperts (the whoknows op, D3 5th leak surface) accepts sourceId + sourceIds and threads them into its internal hybridSearch call. PR #861 was authored before v0.33 shipped so this op wasn't covered in the original PR. Auth wiring: - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken populates AuthInfo.sourceId from oauth_clients.source_id. JOIN guarded by isUndefinedColumnError so pre-v55 brains degrade to legacy projection rather than refusing every token verification. - GBrainOAuthProvider.registerClientManual gains a sourceId parameter (defaults to 'default'). DCR registerClient also sets source_id='default' on the inserted row. - serve-http.ts:929 cleanup: AuthInfo.sourceId is now a real typed field. The cast + GBRAIN_SOURCE env fallback chain is gone (D13). Legacy bearer tokens default to 'default' source in verifyAccessToken. - http-transport.ts (legacy access_tokens path) threads sourceId='default' through DispatchOpts so v0.22.7 callers stay source-scoped. - auth.ts CLI adds --source flag to gbrain auth register-client. Migration v55 (D10 + D13): - ALTER TABLE oauth_clients ADD COLUMN source_id TEXT (nullable). - Backfill UPDATE source_id = 'default' WHERE source_id IS NULL — preserves v0.33 effective behavior verbatim for legacy clients. - ADD CONSTRAINT FK ... REFERENCES sources(id) ON DELETE SET NULL, wrapped in DO block so re-runs against fresh-install brains (where the FK already lives inline in SCHEMA_SQL) no-op cleanly. - CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_clients_source_id WHERE source_id IS NOT NULL for the verifyAccessToken JOIN. - GBRAIN_ACCEPT_SILENT_WIDEN env-flag wired through the runner via SET LOCAL gbrain.accept_silent_widen — reserved for future migrations that hit the silent-widen footgun codex flagged. This migration doesn't need it (column is brand new; no pre-existing stale values possible by definition). - src/core/pglite-schema.ts + src/schema.sql include the column + FK + index inline for fresh installs. Tests: new test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts with 13 regression cases — one per leak surface (search/list_pages/traverse/etc.) plus explicit AuthInfo.sourceId and AuthInfo.allowedSources op-handler threading checks. Full unit suite: 6034 pass / 0 fail. PGLite initSchema time dropped from 2.4s to 850ms after consolidating v55's DO blocks (multiple DO blocks were slow on PGLite; one DO block for the FK install only is fine). Origin: PR #861 + plan-eng-review decisions D2/D3/D4/D9/D10/D13 + F2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(gateway): multimodal embedding for openai-compatible providers Pre-fix, embedMultimodal hardcoded a recipe.id === 'voyage' branch and threw AIConfigError for every other recipe. Multimodal-capable providers fronted by LiteLLM (or any openai-compatible proxy) were unreachable even when the operator had wired up the model. The fix: - src/core/ai/gateway.ts adds embedMultimodalOpenAICompat() that POSTs to the standard /embeddings endpoint with content arrays carrying image_url entries. Routing comes from the existing recipe.implementation switch — Voyage stays on its own /multimodalembeddings path; every other openai-compatible recipe flows through the new helper. - src/core/ai/recipes/litellm-proxy.ts declares supports_multimodal: true so embedMultimodal accepts the recipe. No multimodal_models allow-list: LiteLLM is a passthrough proxy and the user owns model-id selection; provider rejection (400 from upstream) is the right enforcement layer there. Voyage's static allow-list shape stays unchanged (its 12 models share supports_multimodal but only one is multimodal-capable). - D12 runtime dimension validation: the new helper checks the returned vector length against the recipe's declared default_dims (preferred) or the brain's embedding_dimensions config. Mismatch throws AIConfigError with model id + observed + expected so the operator can swap models or rebuild the column. Pre-fix, a wrong-dim response would surface as a cryptic pgvector "vector dimension mismatch" at INSERT time. - Auth resolution routes through the existing defaultResolveAuth helper so optional-auth recipes (LiteLLM proxy with no LITELLM_API_KEY) and required-auth recipes both share one code path. Optional-auth sends "Authorization: Bearer unauthenticated" which servers like Ollama / llama-server ignore but the SDK contract requires. Tests: 11 new cases in test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts cover happy-path, multi-input batching, unauthenticated proxy, D12 dim mismatch + default-dim fallback, 401 / 400 / malformed-JSON / non-array error paths, and an explicit Voyage-regression test pinning that the new openai-compat route doesn't accidentally hijack the Voyage path. All 41 multimodal-related tests pass (existing voyage suite + new). typecheck clean. Origin: PR #875 + plan-eng-review D12 (runtime dim validation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(oauth): federated_read read scope (#876) Pre-fix, OAuth clients had a single source-scope axis (source_id, added in v55). A client could either write+read one source OR be a super-reader across all sources (via NULL source_id). There was no middle ground — WeCare-style L3 dept clients that need to write to dept-x but read dept-x + parent canon + shared canon had no expression. #876 adds federated_read TEXT[] as an orthogonal read-scope axis. source_id is the WRITE authority; federated_read is the READ authority. They default to matching values (read scope == write scope, the pre-v0.34 default) when a client is registered without an explicit federated read list. Migrations v56-v60 (six new migrations on top of v55): - v56: ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN federated_read TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'. - v57 (F5): explicit CASE backfill so source_id IS NULL → '{}' (not an array containing NULL — codex caught this ambiguity during plan review). - v58: post-backfill validation. Fails loud if any row's source_id isn't in its federated_read array, pointing at a logic bug in v57 if fired. - v59: flip the source_id FK from ON DELETE SET NULL to ON DELETE RESTRICT now that federated_read provides the alternative scope-loss path. Pre-flip, deleting a source could silently widen any oauth_client to super-reader; post-flip, source delete is refused if any client references it (operator must revoke/re-scope first). - v60: GIN index on federated_read for array-containment queries. Auth wiring: - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken JOINs c.federated_read and populates AuthInfo.allowedSources. Pre-v56 / pre-v55 brains degrade via the existing isUndefinedColumnError fallback chain. - registerClientManual gains a federatedRead?: string[] parameter (defaults to [sourceId]). - DCR registerClient sets source_id='default' + federated_read=['default'] on the inserted row. - auth.ts CLI adds --federated-read SRC1,SRC2,... flag. The register-client output now prints "Federated reads:" so operators confirm the scope they set. Engines consume the federated array through the SearchOpts.sourceIds / PageFilters.sourceIds field that #861 added (no engine changes here — the plumbing was D9). sourceScopeOpts in operations.ts already prefers the auth.allowedSources array over scalar ctx.sourceId when set. Test seam: - test/book-mirror.test.ts now spawns the CLI with GBRAIN_HOME pointed at a tempdir so the test isn't sensitive to the developer's local ~/.gbrain/config.json. Pre-fix the test could silently inherit a real Postgres connection and hang past the default 5s test timeout. Fresh GBRAIN_HOME → "No brain configured" → exit 1 in <1s. - test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts gains one more regression case: AuthInfo.allowedSources = [] (explicit empty) MUST NOT widen scope to "all sources" — the silent-widen footgun precedence ladder. - test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts is part of the wave's commits via the migrate.ts changes that bump the schema chain. typecheck-only fix on a captured-auth type was already in #875's tree. 6045 unit tests pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean. PGLite initSchema runs v55-v60 in ~786ms total (within the test-harness budget for tests using the canonical beforeAll engine pattern). Origin: PR #876 + plan-eng-review F5 (CASE backfill). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.34.0.0: MCP fix wave (#870 #909 #864 #861 #875 #876) VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG bump for the six-PR MCP fix wave. Schema chain extends from v54 → v60; oauth_clients gains source_id + federated_read columns; auth'd MCP clients now stay inside their scope across all read-side ops; PKCE-only DCR works; --bind defaults to loopback; LiteLLM multimodal embedding ships. Contributed by @Hansen1018 (#870), @ding-modding (#909), @DukeDawg (#864), @toilalesondev (#861 + #876), @yoelgal (#875). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v0.34.0.0 Sync README, CLAUDE.md, SECURITY.md, docs/architecture/topologies.md, and docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md to reflect the v0.34.0.0 MCP fix wave: - README: document --bind HOST default (loopback), --source + --federated-read register-client flags, PKCE public-client gate - SECURITY.md: note loopback-by-default for serve --http, update the trust-proxy contract to point at the new default - CLAUDE.md: annotate operations.ts (sourceScopeOpts helper), oauth-provider.ts (verifyAccessToken JOIN + PKCE public clients), serve-http.ts (--bind flag), gateway.ts (openai-compat multimodal + dim validation), mcp/server.ts (MCP_STDIO guard), auth.ts (--source + --federated-read), migrate.ts (v58-v63 chain), engine.ts (sourceIds field). Add 4 new test-file entries for source-isolation-pglite, openai-compat-multimodal, serve-stdio-lifecycle, oauth.test.ts PKCE cases - docs/architecture/topologies.md: source-scoped register-client example, --bind 0.0.0.0 for thin-client host setup - docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: --bind explanation in the ngrok section, source-scoped client recipe - llms-full.txt: regenerated per the CLAUDE.md-edit chaser rule Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump v0.34.0.0 → v0.34.1.0 Renumbering the MCP fix wave from v0.34.0.0 to v0.34.1.0 so the release slot lands between master's v0.33.2.1 and the next minor. Touches every release-artifact mention: - VERSION: 0.34.0.0 → 0.34.1.0 - package.json: same - CHANGELOG.md header + "To take advantage" block - CLAUDE.md key-files annotations (8 entries that document this wave) - llms-full.txt (regen from CLAUDE.md) - README.md / SECURITY.md / docs/architecture/topologies.md / docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md - Wave code-comment markers ("// v0.34.0 (#NNN):" → "// v0.34.1 (#NNN):") Test files renamed alongside since they were committed with the wave. Commit subjects on the original 6 PR commits + the v0.34.0.0 bump commit ( |
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cb02932388 |
v0.26.9 fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE (#628)
* fix(mcp): close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE + tighten remote contract
The HTTP MCP transport in serve-http.ts inlined its own OperationContext
literal and forgot to set `remote: true`. With the field undefined at the
operations.ts protected-job-name guard (line 1391), an HTTP MCP caller
holding a write-scoped OAuth token could submit `submit_job {name: "shell"}`
and execute arbitrary commands on the gbrain host (RCE-class).
Two-layer fix:
1. F7 — explicit `remote: true` on the inlined /mcp OperationContext.
Stdio MCP at src/mcp/dispatch.ts:61 already set this; the HTTP path
was the regression.
2. F7b — fail-closed contract on the four ctx.remote consumer sites in
operations.ts (auto-link skip, telemetry x2, protected-job guard).
The protected-job guard flips from `if (ctx.remote && ...)` to
`if (ctx.remote !== false && ...)` and the trusted-marker site flips
from `!ctx.remote && ...` to `ctx.remote === false && ...`. Anything
that isn't strictly `false` now treats the caller as remote/untrusted.
3. D12 — `OperationContext.remote` becomes REQUIRED in the TypeScript
type. The compiler now catches future transports that forget the field.
The runtime fail-closed defaults are belt+suspenders for any caller
that bypasses the type via `as` cast or `Partial<>` spread.
Tests:
- New `test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts` (4 cases) pins the
fail-closed semantics: undefined-via-cast rejects, remote=true rejects,
remote=false allowed (only path that escalates protected-name jobs).
- `test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts` adds 2 cases asserting HTTP MCP
cannot submit `shell` or `subagent` jobs even with read+write scope.
- `test/e2e/graph-quality.test.ts` adds the now-required `remote: false`
to its fixture (e2e graph quality simulates local-CLI writes).
Verification: bun test -> 3742 pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this trust-boundary regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + serve-http defense in depth
OAuth provider hardening pass that brings the provider into RFC compliance
on auth code, refresh token, and revocation flows, and tightens the
serve-http surface around request logging and admin cookies.
Provider (src/core/oauth-provider.ts):
- F1: bind client_id atomically into the auth code DELETE WHERE clause for
exchangeAuthorizationCode + challengeForAuthorizationCode. Previous
pattern (DELETE...RETURNING then post-hoc client compare) burned codes
on the wrong-client path so the legitimate client could not retry.
RFC 6749 §10.5.
- F2: same atomic predicate on exchangeRefreshToken. The pre-fix shape
defeated RFC 6749 §10.4's stolen-token detection by letting attacker +
victim both succeed.
- F3: refresh token rejects requested scopes that are not a subset of the
ORIGINAL grant on the row. Codex C9: subset is checked against the
recorded grant, not the client's currently-allowed scopes (which can
expand later); omitted scope inherits the original verbatim and stays
distinct from explicit-empty. RFC 6749 §6.
- F4: revokeToken adds AND client_id to the DELETE so a client cannot
revoke another client's tokens by guessing the hash. RFC 7009 §2.1.
- F5: deleted_at and token_ttl column probes use a new
isUndefinedColumnError helper (extracted to src/core/utils.ts per D14)
that matches SQLSTATE 42703 or column-name-in-message. Bare catch{}
used to swallow lock timeouts, network blips, and auth failures as
"column missing" — fail-open posture in a security path.
- F6: sweepExpiredTokens uses RETURNING 1 + array length. Pre-fix
(result as any).count returned 0 on at least one engine even when
rows were deleted, and codes were never counted.
- F7c: NEW finding eva-brain missed. exchangeAuthorizationCode now folds
redirect_uri into the atomic DELETE predicate when the parameter is
provided. Stored on /authorize, never compared on /token before this
commit. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 violation. Back-compat: when caller omits the
parameter the predicate is skipped, preserving SDK consumers that
haven't adopted the parameter yet.
- F12 (cleanup, not security): dcrDisabled constructor option replaces
the prior monkey-patch of _clientsStore in serve-http.ts. The SDK's
mcpAuthRouter only wires up /register when the store exposes
registerClient, so omitting the method via the constructor is
sufficient. Reframed as cleanup per codex C10 — the monkey-patch
happened before mcpAuthRouter ran, so the prior shape did not have
a real security regression to claim.
Dispatch (src/mcp/dispatch.ts):
- F8: new summarizeMcpParams(opName, params) intersects submitted keys
against the operation's declared params allow-list. Returns
{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}.
Closes the codex C8 leak: a naive "dump all submitted keys" summary
still echoed attacker-controlled key names like
put_page {"wiki/people/sensitive_name": "..."} into mcp_request_log
+ the SSE feed. Allow-list pattern keeps debug visibility on declared
keys while counting unknowns without naming them.
Serve-http (src/commands/serve-http.ts) + serve (src/commands/serve.ts):
- F8 wiring: mcp_request_log + SSE broadcast routed through
summarizeMcpParams by default. New --log-full-params flag bypasses
redaction with a loud stderr warning at startup. Default privacy-
positive; flag is the documented escape hatch for self-hosted
operators debugging on their own laptop.
- F9: admin cookies set Secure when req.secure OR issuerUrl.protocol
is https. Cloudflare-tunnel + reverse-proxy deployments where the
inside-tunnel hop looks like http but the public URL is https now
tag cookies correctly.
- F10: bound magicLinkNonces with NONCE_LRU_CAP. Previously only the
consumed-nonces map was capped; an attacker (or misbehaving agent)
with the bootstrap token could mint nonces faster than they expired
and grow the live store unbounded.
- F12: dcrDisabled flows through to the provider constructor instead of
monkey-patching _clientsStore after construction.
- F14: try/catch wraps StreamableHTTPServerTransport setup +
handleRequest. SDK-level throws no longer fall through to express's
default HTML error page; clients expecting JSON-RPC envelopes get a
JSON 500 instead.
- F15: error envelope unified via buildError + serializeError from
src/core/errors.ts. OperationError and unexpected exceptions both
emit the same {class, code, message, hint} shape so clients can
pattern-match a single envelope.
Tests:
- test/oauth.test.ts adds 11 cases:
* F1+F2 wrong-client cannot consume / read PKCE / burn refresh,
paired with owner-still-redeems atomically afterward (codex D6 —
proves the predicate doesn't burn the row on attacker attempts).
* F3 refresh scope subset enforced.
* F4 wrong-client cannot revoke.
* F5 non-schema SQL not swallowed by client_credentials soft-delete probe.
* F6 sweepExpiredTokens returns count > 0 after deleting rows.
* F7c redirect_uri match succeeds, mismatch rejects, omitted preserves
back-compat for callers that don't pass the parameter.
* F12 dcrDisabled constructor option exposes only getClient,
registerClientManual still works.
- test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts (NEW, 6 cases): pins the F8
privacy invariants. The codex-C8 attacker-key-name probe asserts that
a sensitive name submitted as a key never appears anywhere in the
redactor's output.
Verification: bun run typecheck clean. test/oauth.test.ts 55/55,
test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts 6/6,
test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts 4/4 from commit A. The one
unrelated unit failure surfaces on master too — environment-sensitive
test that expects ~/.gbrain/config.json to be absent in the test env.
Out of scope: F11 (auth register-client --redirect-uri flag) and F13
(serve --http argv positive-int validator) per codex C11 — operator
UX gaps, not trust-boundary fixes. Filed as follow-up TODOs.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this hardening pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: file F11 + F13 as OAuth hardening follow-up TODOs
Codex C11 flagged these as scope creep on the v0.26.7 OAuth hardening
PR (operator UX, not trust-boundary). Capturing them here so the
context survives — eva-brain has both implementations and the lift is
mechanical when we want to do them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): close adversarial-review findings on F7c + F8
Two bugs surfaced by an adversarial subagent during /ship's pre-landing
review pass that the codex + plan-eng-review didn't catch.
D15 / F7c: `exchangeAuthorizationCode` used `redirectUri ? ...` ternary
to choose the with-redirect vs no-redirect SQL. Empty string fell
through to the no-redirect branch, so a caller submitting
`redirect_uri=""` at /token bypassed the binding entirely. RFC 6749
§4.1.3 spec violation. Switch to `redirectUri !== undefined`. Test:
empty-string redirect_uri must reject when /authorize stored a real URI.
D16 / F8: `summarizeMcpParams` published exact byte length via
`approx_bytes = JSON.stringify(params).length`. Submitting put_page with
a known prefix and observing the resulting log entry across repeated
probes lets an attacker binary-search the size of secret suffix content.
Bucket to 1KB resolution. The redacted summary keeps a coarse
"roughly how big" signal for operators while making size-based
side-channel attacks useless.
Test count: 65 → 67 across the three new test files.
Typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.26.9)
OAuth 2.1 hardening + HTTP MCP shell-job RCE fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v0.26.9
Annotate CLAUDE.md key-files entries with v0.26.9 OAuth/MCP hardening pass:
- src/core/operations.ts: D12 (OperationContext.remote required) + F7b
(4-site fail-closed flip), HTTP MCP shell-job RCE close
- src/core/utils.ts: D14 isUndefinedColumnError extracted helper
- src/mcp/dispatch.ts: F8 summarizeMcpParams privacy redactor with
declared-keys allow-list + 1KB byte bucketing
- src/commands/serve-http.ts: F7+F8+F9+F10+F12+F14+F15 hardening
- src/core/oauth-provider.ts: F1+F2+F3+F4+F5+F6+F7c+F12 RFC 6749/7009
hardening pass
Add new test-file entries for test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts
(7 cases) and test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts (4 cases). Extend
test/oauth.test.ts (+14 cases) and test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts
(+2 RCE-close regressions) entries with v0.26.9 case counts.
README.md: added --log-full-params to gbrain serve --http surface.
SECURITY.md: documented mcp_request_log.params redaction default
({redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}) +
--log-full-params opt-in.
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: operator-facing note on SSE feed + audit log
redaction default and when to flip --log-full-params on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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3c032d79ec |
v0.26.0 feat: GBrain — MCP Keys OAuth 2.1 + HTTP server + admin dashboard (#358)
* feat: OAuth 2.1 schema tables + shared token utilities
Add oauth_clients, oauth_tokens, oauth_codes tables to both PGLite and
Postgres schemas. Migration v5 creates tables for existing databases.
PGLite now includes auth infrastructure (access_tokens, mcp_request_log,
OAuth tables) because `serve --http` makes it network-accessible.
Extract hashToken() and generateToken() to src/core/utils.ts for DRY
reuse across auth.ts and oauth-provider.ts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: GBrainOAuthProvider — MCP SDK OAuthServerProvider implementation
Implements OAuthServerProvider backed by raw SQL (PGLite or Postgres).
Supports client credentials, authorization code with PKCE, token refresh
with rotation, revocation, and legacy access_tokens fallback.
Key decisions from eng review:
- Uses raw SQL connection, not BrainEngine (OAuth is infrastructure)
- All tokens/secrets SHA-256 hashed before storage
- Legacy tokens grandfathered as read+write+admin
- sweepExpiredTokens() wrapped in try/catch (non-blocking startup)
- Client credentials: no refresh token per RFC 6749 4.4.3
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: scope + localOnly annotations on all 30 operations
Add AuthInfo, scope ('read'|'write'|'admin'), and localOnly fields to
Operation interface. Per-operation audit:
- 14 read ops, 9 write ops, 2 admin ops, 4 admin+localOnly ops
- sync_brain, file_upload, file_list, file_url: admin + localOnly
- Scope enforcement happens in serve-http.ts before handler dispatch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: HTTP MCP server with OAuth 2.1 + 27 OAuth tests
gbrain serve --http starts Express 5 server with:
- MCP SDK mcpAuthRouter (authorize, token, register, revoke endpoints)
- Custom client_credentials handler (SDK doesn't support CC grant)
- Bearer auth + scope enforcement on /mcp tool calls
- Admin dashboard auth via HTTP-only cookie + bootstrap token
- SSE live activity feed at /admin/events
- DCR default OFF (--enable-dcr to enable)
- Rate limiting on /token (50/15min)
- localOnly operations excluded from HTTP
CLI: gbrain serve --http [--port 3131] [--token-ttl 3600] [--enable-dcr]
Dependencies: express@5.2.1, express-rate-limit@7.5.1, cors@2.8.6
SDK pinned to exact 1.29.0 (was ^1.0.0)
27 new tests covering OAuth provider, scope enforcement, auth code flow,
refresh rotation, token revocation, legacy fallback, and sweep.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: React admin dashboard — 7 screens, dark theme, Krug-designed
Admin SPA at /admin with client-side routing (#login, #dashboard,
#agents, #log). Built with Vite + React, served from admin/dist/.
Screens:
- Login: one field, one button, zero happy talk
- Dashboard: metrics bar, SSE live activity feed, token health panel
- Agents: table with scopes/badges, + Register Agent button
- Register: modal form (name, scopes), 3 mindless choices
- Credentials: full-screen modal, copy buttons, download JSON, warning
- Request Log: paginated table (50/page), time-relative timestamps
- Agent Detail: slide-out drawer, config export tabs (Perplexity/Claude/JSON)
Design tokens: #0a0a0f bg, Inter + JetBrains Mono, 4-32px spacing.
Build: bun run build:admin (Vite, 65KB gzipped).
Admin API: /admin/api/register-client endpoint for dashboard registration.
SPA serving: Express static + index.html fallback for client-side routing.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: add admin SPA lockfile
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump version and changelog (v1.0.0.0)
Milestone release: multi-agent GBrain with OAuth 2.1, HTTP server,
and React admin dashboard. See CHANGELOG.md for details.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v1.0.0.0
Sync README, CLAUDE.md, and docs/mcp/ with the OAuth 2.1 + HTTP server
+ admin dashboard surface that shipped in v1.0.0.0.
- README.md: new "Remote MCP with OAuth 2.1" section covering
gbrain serve --http, admin dashboard, scoped operations, legacy
bearer fallback; add serve --http + auth notes to the commands
reference.
- CLAUDE.md: add src/commands/serve-http.ts, src/core/oauth-provider.ts,
admin/ directory as key files; document scope + localOnly additions
to Operation contract; add oauth.test.ts (27 cases) to the test list;
add v1.0.0 key-commands section clarifying that OAuth client
registration is via the /admin dashboard or SDK (no CLI subcommand).
- docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: promote --http as the recommended remote path,
add OAuth 2.1 Setup section, list ChatGPT in supported clients,
remove the "not yet implemented" footer.
- docs/mcp/CHATGPT.md (new): unblocks the P0 TODO. Full ChatGPT
connector setup via OAuth 2.1 + PKCE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: wire gbrain auth subcommand with OAuth register-client
Previously auth.ts was a standalone script invoked via
`bun run src/commands/auth.ts`. CHANGELOG and README documented
`gbrain auth ...` commands that didn't actually work.
- Export `runAuth(args)` from auth.ts (keeps standalone entry intact
via `import.meta.url === file://${process.argv[1]}` check)
- Add `auth` to CLI_ONLY + dispatch in handleCliOnly
- New subcommand `gbrain auth register-client <name> [--grant-types]
[--scopes]` wraps GBrainOAuthProvider.registerClientManual
- Lazy DB check: only subcommands that need DATABASE_URL error out
Now the documented CLI flow works end to end:
gbrain auth register-client perplexity --grant-types client_credentials --scopes "read write"
gbrain serve --http --port 3131
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: reflect wired gbrain auth register-client CLI
After /ship, the doc subagent wrote docs assuming `gbrain auth
register-client` did not exist (it said so explicitly in CLAUDE.md:184).
A follow-up commit (
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d3b52edeba |
v0.22.7 fix: built-in HTTP transport with bearer auth for remote MCP (#483)
* fix: add built-in HTTP transport with bearer auth for remote MCP
Adds `gbrain serve --http` with token-based authentication using the
existing access_tokens table. Eliminates the need for standalone OAuth
wrappers that may have insecure open registration endpoints.
- New: src/mcp/http-transport.ts — HTTP+SSE transport with bearer auth
- New: SECURITY.md — security advisory for remote MCP deployments
- Updated: serve command accepts --http and --port flags
- Updated: DEPLOY.md recommends --http for remote access
- Bump: 0.22.4 → 0.22.5
* chore: extract shared MCP dispatch + rate-limit modules
dispatch.ts is the single source of truth for stdio + HTTP transport: validateParams,
OperationContext build, handler invocation, error formatting. Server.ts refactored to
use it. Prevents the F1-F3 transport-drift bugs where stdio and HTTP independently
implemented dispatch logic differently (reversed args, missing context fields, no
param validation).
rate-limit.ts: bounded-LRU token-bucket. Tracks lastTouchedMs separately from
lastRefillMs so an exhausted key can't be reset by hammering past the TTL.
* feat: HTTP transport hardening + F1-F3 dispatch bug fixes
Rewrite of src/mcp/http-transport.ts on top of the new dispatch.ts and rate-limit.ts:
- F1 fix: dispatch via shared dispatchToolCall(ctx, params) — was reversed args
(params, ctx) before, would have crashed every real tools/call.
- F2 fix: full OperationContext (engine, config, logger, dryRun, remote) — was
only {engine, remote: true} before.
- F3 fix: validateParams runs on HTTP path — was skipped before.
- Engine.kind fail-fast: clear error message on PGLite (access_tokens table is
Postgres-only by design).
- CORS: default-deny via GBRAIN_HTTP_CORS_ORIGIN allowlist.
- Body cap: stream-counted via req.body reader, catches chunked transfers
without Content-Length. Default 1 MiB via GBRAIN_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES.
- Rate limit: pre-auth IP bucket fires BEFORE DB lookup (limits brute-force
load), post-auth token-id bucket fires after auth (limits runaway clients).
Both bounded LRU with TTL prune.
- mcp_request_log: per-request audit row reusing the existing schema (v4).
- last_used_at SQL-level debounce: WHERE last_used_at < now() - interval
'60 seconds'. Race-tolerant under PgBouncer.
- Response shape: application/json (gbrain MCP tools don't stream).
Streamable-HTTP transport spec compliant for non-streaming responses.
- X-Forwarded-For honored only when GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1.
* feat: wire gbrain auth into the main CLI
The original PR's docs referenced 'gbrain auth create/list/revoke' but auth.ts
was a standalone script never wired to the CLI dispatcher. Running 'gbrain auth'
from the compiled binary returned 'Unknown command'.
- auth.ts: extract the dispatch into runAuth(args) + import.meta.main guard
so direct-script invocation still works (bun run src/commands/auth.ts ...).
- cli.ts: add 'auth' to CLI_ONLY set + handler in handleCliOnly that imports
runAuth and dispatches without requiring an engine connection (auth.ts
manages its own postgres() connection).
* test: HTTP transport unit + E2E coverage (23 + 8 cases)
test/http-transport.test.ts — 23 unit cases against mocked engine.sql:
- Auth: valid/missing/no-Bearer/unknown/revoked/health-bypass (1-6)
- F1+F2 round-trip via dispatch.ts (7) — regression guard for reversed args
- F3 invalid_params via validateParams (8) — regression guard
- Response Content-Type application/json, not SSE (9)
- CORS default-deny + allowlist + non-match (10-12)
- Body cap: Content-Length + chunked-transfer (13-14)
- Rate limit: refill, exhaust+Retry-After, LRU eviction, TTL prune,
pre-auth IP fires before DB, /health bypasses (15-20)
- mcp_request_log audit: success row + auth_failed row (21-22)
test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts — 8 cases against real Postgres:
- /health, tools/list, tools/call list_pages (real op round-trip),
revoked → 401, last_used_at debounce within 60s (asserts ONE update),
debounce 65s gap (asserts TWO updates), mcp_request_log row check,
invalid_params via real handler.
* docs: v0.22.7 CHANGELOG + SECURITY.md + DEPLOY.md
CHANGELOG: v0.22.7 release notes covering the F1-F3 dispatch fixes, the full
hardening surface (CORS default-deny, two-bucket rate limit, body cap, audit
log), and the upgrade path. Master's v0.22.6 schema-verify entry stitched in
above (preserving merge ordering).
SECURITY.md: full hardening reference for gbrain serve --http — Postgres-only
caveat, CORS allowlist, rate limit + tunnel caveat, body cap, audit log query,
GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY warning.
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: Postgres-only call-out, env var summary, fail-fast behavior
on PGLite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: codex review follow-ups (DB-probing /health + XFF trust safety contract)
- /health now does SELECT 1 against Postgres and returns 503 + status:unhealthy
when the DB is unreachable. Prevents the failure mode where orchestration
sees green pods while clients get misleading 401s during a DB outage.
- SECURITY.md: tighten the GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1 guidance with the explicit
two-condition safety contract — gbrain bound to a private interface AND the
proxy strips client-supplied XFF. Without both, the flag enables IP spoofing
past the pre-auth rate limit.
- Tests: add 6b (/health DB-down → 503) + assert db:'ok' on the happy path.
Caught by codex adversarial review during /ship Step 11.
* docs: TODOS.md — v0.22.7 follow-ups (audit volume, validateParams enums, SSE, scopes)
* docs: update project documentation for v0.22.7
CLAUDE.md: document src/mcp/dispatch.ts, src/mcp/rate-limit.ts, and the
rewritten src/mcp/http-transport.ts in the Key files section. Add
test/http-transport.test.ts (23 unit cases) and test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts
(8 E2E cases) to the test inventories.
CHANGELOG.md: fix copy-paste version mismatches inside the v0.22.7 entry that
referenced v0.22.5 (header line + "To take advantage of" block).
README.md: replace the standalone bun-run auth invocation with the wired-in
gbrain auth CLI; add gbrain serve --http startup step to the Remote MCP
example; surface gbrain auth in the admin command list; link SECURITY.md
from the Remote MCP section so it's discoverable.
SECURITY.md: align "as of v0.22.5" callouts with the actual release version
(v0.22.7).
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: align v0.22.5+ callout with v0.22.7+; switch token-management
examples from `bun run src/commands/auth.ts` to `gbrain auth` now that auth is
in the main CLI.
docs/mcp/ALTERNATIVES.md: drop the "planned but not yet implemented" note for
gbrain serve --http; document that the built-in HTTP transport is the
recommended path.
docs/mcp/{CLAUDE_DESKTOP,CLAUDE_COWORK,CLAUDE_CODE,PERPLEXITY}.md: switch
token-creation examples from `bun run src/commands/auth.ts create` to
`gbrain auth create` to match the wired-in CLI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: typecheck — cast CallToolRequestSchema handler return to any
MCP SDK 1.29 widened the response type for setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, ...)
to require a 'task' field for managed-task responses. gbrain ops are synchronous and
return the legacy { content, isError? } shape, which is still valid via the SDK's
ServerResult union. Casting the handler return type to any silences the narrowing
that broke after dispatch.ts was extracted (the original inline handler dodged this
because TypeScript inferred its return as any from the function body).
CI failure: src/mcp/server.ts(25,51): error TS2345 — Property 'task' is missing in
type 'ToolResult' but required in type '{ ...; task: { taskId: string; ... }; ... }'.
Caught by the 'test' job's bun run typecheck step at PR #483 commit 65ea9e7.
* docs: regenerate llms-full.txt after master merge
The build-llms regen-drift guard fails when committed llms.txt + llms-full.txt
don't match what scripts/build-llms.ts produces from current source. Master's
v0.22.6.1 merge brought in new content (CLAUDE.md entries, CHANGELOG, etc.)
that hadn't been folded into the bundle. Running 'bun run build:llms' to sync.
llms.txt unchanged; llms-full.txt picks up the new entries.
* docs: CHANGELOG — scrub attack-surface enumeration from v0.22.7 entry
Per CLAUDE.md responsible-disclosure rule: 'when a release fixes a security
gap or a user-impacting bug, describe the fix functionally. Do not enumerate
the attack surface, quantify the exposure window, or highlight the most
sensitive records by name in public-facing artifacts.'
Removed:
- Lead-paragraph attack-chain ('attacker who discovers URL → POST /register
→ client_credentials → read entire brain'). Public-doc readers don't need
the directed probe path.
- 'Bug fixes folded in' section that itemized prior-version failure modes.
Reframed as a 'transport refactor' note in the For Contributors section,
describing the dispatch consolidation functionally without claiming the
prior version was broken in specific ways.
- 'Without the OAuth footgun' lead headline. The fix's mechanism (built-in
bearer auth via access_tokens) is already self-evident from the headline.
- F1/F2/F3 internal labels and 'caught by codex outside-voice during
planning' parenthetical.
Kept:
- The full hardening reference table (configuration / behavior, not exposure).
- 'gbrain serve --http' user-facing operator ergonomics.
- 'Postgres-only by design' known-limit framing.
- Dispatch consolidation as a contributor-facing single-source-of-truth note.
SECURITY.md left intact: its OAuth-deployment guidance is generic 'if you
deploy MCP behind a custom HTTP wrapper, here are the rules' framing, not
gbrain-version-specific exposure. That's defensible under the same rule.
* docs: SECURITY.md — drop unverified security@garrytan.com address
The address was in the original PR's SECURITY.md commit (
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7bbfc3e36a |
security: fix wave 3 — 9 vulns (file_upload, SSRF, recipe trust, prompt injection) (#174)
* feat(engine): add cap parameter to clampSearchLimit (H6) clampSearchLimit(limit, defaultLimit, cap = MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT) — third arg is a caller-specified cap so operation handlers can enforce limits below MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT. Backward compatible: existing two-arg callers still cap at MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT. This fixes a Codex-caught semantics bug: the prior signature took (limit, defaultLimit) where the second arg was misread as a cap. clampSearchLimit(x, 20) was actually allowing values up to 100, not 20. * feat(integrations): SSRF defense + recipe trust boundary (B1, B2, Fix 2, Fix 4, B3, B4) - B1: split loadAllRecipes into trusted (package-bundled) and untrusted (cwd/recipes, $GBRAIN_RECIPES_DIR) tiers. Only package-bundled recipes get embedded=true. Closes the fake trust boundary that let any cwd-local recipe bypass health-check gates. - B2: hard-block string health_checks for non-embedded recipes (was previously only blocked when isUnsafeHealthCheck regex matched, which the cwd recipe exploit bypassed). Embedded recipes still get the regex defense. - Fix 2: gate command DSL health_checks on isEmbedded. Non-embedded recipes cannot spawnSync. - Fix 4 + B3 + B4: gate http DSL health_checks on isEmbedded; for embedded recipes, validate URLs via new isInternalUrl() before fetch: - Scheme allowlist (http/https only): blocks file:, data:, blob:, ftp:, javascript: - IPv4 range check covering hex/octal/decimal/single-integer bypass forms - IPv6 loopback ::1 + IPv4-mapped ::ffff: (canonicalized hex hextets handled) - Metadata hostnames (AWS, GCP, instance-data) blocked - fetch with redirect: 'manual' + per-hop re-validation up to 3 hops Original PRs #105-109 by @garagon. Wave 3 collector branch reimplemented the fixes after Codex outside-voice review found that PRs #106/#108 alone did not actually gate cwd-local recipes (B1) and that PR #108 missed redirect-following SSRF (B3) and non-http schemes (B4). * feat(file_upload): path/slug/filename validation + remote-caller confinement (Fix 1, B5, H5, M4, Fix 5) - Fix 1 + B5 + H1: validateUploadPath uses realpathSync + path.relative to defeat symlink-parent traversal. lstatSync alone (the original PR #105 approach) only catches final-component symlinks; a symlinked parent dir still followed to /etc/passwd. Now the entire path chain is resolved. - H5: validatePageSlug uses an allowlist regex (alphanumeric + hyphens, slash-separated segments). Closes URL-encoded traversal (%2e%2e%2f), Unicode lookalikes, backslashes, control chars implicitly. - M4: validateFilename allowlist regex. Rejects control chars, backslash, RTL override (\u202E), leading dot/dash. Filename flows into storage_path so this matters for every storage backend. - Fix 5: clamp list_pages and get_ingest_log limits at the operation layer via new clampSearchLimit cap parameter (list_pages caps at 100, get_ingest_log at 50). Internal bulk commands bypass the operation layer and remain uncapped. - New OperationContext.remote flag distinguishes trusted local CLI from untrusted MCP callers. file_upload uses strict cwd confinement when remote=true (default), loose mode when remote=false (CLI). MCP stdio server sets remote=true; cli.ts and handleToolCall (gbrain call) set remote=false. Original PR #105 by @garagon. Issue #139 reported by @Hybirdss. * feat(search): query sanitization + structural prompt boundary (Fix 3, M1, M2, M3) - M1: restructure callHaikuForExpansion to use a system message that declares the user query as untrusted data, plus an XML-tagged <user_query> boundary in the user message. Layered defense with the existing tool_choice constraint (3 layers vs 1). - Fix 3 (regex sanitizer, defense-in-depth): sanitizeQueryForPrompt strips triple-backtick code fences, XML/HTML tags, leading injection prefixes, and caps at 500 chars. Original query is still used for downstream search; only the LLM-facing copy is sanitized. - M2: sanitizeExpansionOutput validates the model's alternative_queries array before it flows into search. Strips control chars, caps length, dedupes case-insensitively, drops empty/non-string items, caps to 2 items. - M3: console.warn on stripped content NEVER logs the query text — privacy-safe debug signal only. Original PR #107 by @garagon. M1/M2/M3 are wave 3 hardening per Codex review. * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.10.2) Security wave 3: 9 vulnerabilities closed across file_upload, recipe trust boundary, SSRF defense, prompt injection, and limit clamping. See CHANGELOG for full details. Contributors: - @garagon (PRs #105-109) - @Hybirdss (Issue #139) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: sync documentation with v0.10.2 security wave 3 - CLAUDE.md: document OperationContext.remote, new security helpers (validateUploadPath, validatePageSlug, validateFilename, isInternalUrl, parseOctet, hostnameToOctets, isPrivateIpv4, getRecipeDirs, sanitizeQueryForPrompt, sanitizeExpansionOutput), updated clampSearchLimit signature, recipe trust boundary, new test files - docs/integrations/README.md: replace string-form health_check example with typed DSL (string checks now hard-block for non-embedded recipes); add recipe trust boundary subsection - docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: document file_upload remote-caller cwd confinement, symlink rejection, slug/filename allowlists Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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91ced664b6 |
feat: Voice v0.8.0 + feature discovery + Edge Function removal (#55)
* chore: remove Supabase Edge Function MCP deployment The Edge Function never worked reliably. All MCP traffic goes through self-hosted server + ngrok tunnel. Removes deploy-remote.sh, edge-entry.ts, supabase/functions/, .env.production.example, and CHATGPT.md (OAuth not implemented). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: rewrite MCP docs for self-hosted + ngrok deployment All per-client guides updated from Edge Function URLs to self-hosted server + ngrok tunnel pattern. DEPLOY.md rewritten with local vs remote paths. ALTERNATIVES.md now shows self-hosted as primary, with ngrok, Tailscale, and Fly.io/Railway comparison. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: voice recipe v0.8.0 — 25 production patterns from real deployment Identity separation, pre-computed bid system, conversation timing fix, proactive advisor mode, radical prompt compression, OpenAI Realtime Prompting Guide structure, auth-before-speech, brain escalation, stuck watchdog, never-hang-up rule, thinking sounds, fallback TwiML, tool set architecture, trusted user auth, caller routing, dynamic VAD, on-screen debug UI, live moment capture, belt-and-suspenders post-call, mandatory 3-step post-call, WebRTC parity, dual API events, report-aware query routing. WebRTC pseudocode updated with native FormData and 6 gotchas. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: post-upgrade feature discovery framework upgrade.ts captures old version before upgrading, then execs gbrain post-upgrade (new binary) to read migration files and print feature pitches. Migration files get YAML frontmatter with feature_pitch field (headline, description, recipe, tiers). CLI prints excited builder tone post-upgrade. v0.8.0 migration offers voice setup with environment detection (server vs local) and 3-tier progressive disclosure. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add Voice section to README with WebRTC screenshot + tweet link Her out of the box: voice-to-brain with 25 production patterns. WebRTC client screenshot embedded. Remote MCP section rewritten for self-hosted + ngrok. Setup block genericized. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: add recipe validation tests + genericize personal refs 5 new integration tests: secrets completeness, semver version, requires resolution, all-recipes-parse, no-personal-references. Test fixture genericized. CLAUDE.md/TODOS.md/SKILLPACK updated for v0.8.0. build:edge script removed from package.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.8.0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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3e21e9b69b |
feat: GBrain v0.6.0 — Remote MCP Server + 12 Bug Fixes (#28)
* fix: 7 bug fixes from Issue #9 and #22 - fix(mcp): use ListToolsRequestSchema/CallToolRequestSchema instead of string literals (Issue #9, PR #25) - fix(mcp): handleToolCall reads dry_run from params instead of hardcoding false (#22 Bug #11) - fix(search): keyword search returns best chunk per page via DISTINCT ON, not all chunks (#22 Bug #8) - fix(search): dedup layer 1 keeps top 3 chunks per page instead of collapsing to 1 (#22 Bug #12) - fix(engine): transaction uses scoped engine via Object.create, no shared state mutation (#22 Bug #2) - fix(engine): upsertChunks uses UPSERT instead of DELETE+INSERT, preserves existing embeddings (#22 Bug #1) - fix(slugs): validateSlug normalizes to lowercase, pathToSlug lowercases consistently (#22 Bug #4) - schema: add unique index on content_chunks(page_id, chunk_index) for UPSERT support - schema: add access_tokens and mcp_request_log tables via migration Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: embed schema.sql at build time, remove fs dependency from initSchema initSchema() previously read schema.sql from disk at runtime via readFileSync, which broke in compiled Bun binaries and Deno Edge Functions. Now uses a generated schema-embedded.ts constant (run `bun run build:schema` to regenerate). - Removes fs and path imports from postgres-engine.ts and db.ts - Adds scripts/build-schema.sh for one-source-of-truth generation - Adds build:schema npm script Fixes Issue #22 Bug #6. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: 5 more bug fixes from Issue #22 - fix(file_upload): call storage.upload() in all 3 paths (operation, CLI upload, CLI sync) with rollback semantics (#22 Bug #9) - fix(import): use atomic index counter for parallel queue instead of array.shift() race, preserve checkpoint on errors (#22 Bug #3) - fix(s3): replace unsigned fetch with @aws-sdk/client-s3 for proper SigV4 auth, supports R2/MinIO via forcePathStyle (#22 Bug #10) - fix(redirect): verify remote file exists before deleting local copy, skip files not found in storage (#22 Bug #5) - deps: add @aws-sdk/client-s3 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: remote MCP server via Supabase Edge Functions Deploy GBrain as a serverless remote MCP endpoint on your existing Supabase instance. One brain, accessible from Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cowork, Perplexity Computer, and any MCP client. Zero new infrastructure. New files: - supabase/functions/gbrain-mcp/index.ts — Edge Function with Hono + MCP SDK - supabase/functions/gbrain-mcp/deno.json — Deno import map - src/edge-entry.ts — curated bundle entry point (excludes fs-dependent modules) - src/commands/auth.ts — standalone token management (create/list/revoke/test) - scripts/deploy-remote.sh — one-script deployment - .env.production.example — 3-value config template Changes: - config.ts: lazy-evaluate CONFIG_DIR (no homedir() at module scope) - schema.sql: add access_tokens + mcp_request_log tables - package.json: add build:edge script Auth: bearer tokens via access_tokens table (SHA-256 hashed, per-client, revocable) Transport: WebStandardStreamableHTTPServerTransport (stateless, Streamable HTTP) Health: /health endpoint (unauth: 200/503, auth: postgres/pgvector/openai checks) Excluded from remote: sync_brain, file_upload (may exceed 60s timeout) Setup: clone, fill .env.production, run scripts/deploy-remote.sh, create token, done. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: per-client MCP setup guides - docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md — deployment walkthrough, auth, troubleshooting, latency table - docs/mcp/CLAUDE_CODE.md — claude mcp add command - docs/mcp/CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md — Settings > Integrations (NOT JSON config!) - docs/mcp/CLAUDE_COWORK.md — remote + local bridge paths - docs/mcp/PERPLEXITY.md — Perplexity Computer connector setup - docs/mcp/CHATGPT.md — coming soon (requires OAuth 2.1, P0 TODO) - docs/mcp/ALTERNATIVES.md — Tailscale Funnel + ngrok self-hosted options Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump version and changelog (v0.6.0) GBrain v0.6.0: Remote MCP server via Supabase Edge Functions + 12 bug fixes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: add Remote MCP Server section to README Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: make document-release mandatory in CLAUDE.md, add MCP key files Post-ship requirements section: document-release is NOT optional. Lists every file that must be checked on every ship. A ship without updated docs is incomplete. Also adds remote MCP server files to Key files section. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: batch upsertChunks into single statement to prevent deadlocks The per-chunk UPSERT loop caused deadlocks under parallel workers because each INSERT ON CONFLICT acquired row-level locks sequentially. Multiple workers upserting different pages could deadlock on the shared unique index. Fix: batch all chunks into a single multi-row INSERT ON CONFLICT statement. One round-trip, one lock acquisition. COALESCE preserves existing embeddings when the new value is NULL. Fixes CI failure: "E2E: Parallel Import > parallel import with --workers 4" Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: advisory lock in initSchema() prevents deadlock on concurrent DDL When multiple processes call initSchema() concurrently (e.g., test setup + CLI subprocess, or parallel workers during E2E tests), the schema SQL's DROP TRIGGER + CREATE TRIGGER statements acquire AccessExclusiveLock on different tables, causing deadlocks. Fix: pg_advisory_lock(42) serializes all initSchema() calls within the same database. The lock is session-scoped and released in a finally block. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: add explicit test timeouts for CLI subprocess E2E tests CLI subprocess tests (Setup Journey, Doctor Command, Parallel Import) spawn `bun run src/cli.ts` which takes several seconds to JIT compile + connect. The Bun test framework default 5000ms per-test timeout is too tight for CI. Added 30-60s timeouts matching each subprocess's own timeout to prevent false failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: infinite recursion in config.ts exported getConfigDir/getConfigPath The replace_all refactor created recursive functions: the exported getConfigDir() called the private getConfigDir() which called itself. Renamed exports to configDir()/configPath() to avoid shadowing. Also adds scripts/smoke-test-mcp.ts — verified all 8 MCP tool calls work against a real Postgres database. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |