# TODOS

## P1

### Batch embedding queue across files
**What:** Shared embedding queue that collects chunks from all parallel import workers and flushes to OpenAI in batches of 100, instead of each worker batching independently.

**Why:** With 4 workers importing files that average 5 chunks each, you get 4 concurrent OpenAI API calls with small batches (5-10 chunks). A shared queue would batch 100 chunks across workers into one API call, cutting embedding cost and latency roughly in half.

**Pros:** Fewer API calls (500 chunks = 5 calls instead of ~100), lower cost, faster embedding.

**Cons:** Adds coordination complexity: backpressure when queue is full, error attribution back to source file, worker pausing. Medium implementation effort.

**Context:** Deferred during eng review because per-worker embedding is simpler and the parallel workers themselves are the bigger speed win (network round-trips). Revisit after profiling real import workloads to confirm embedding is actually the bottleneck. If most imports use `--no-embed`, this matters less.

**Implementation sketch:** `src/core/embedding-queue.ts` with a Promise-based semaphore. Workers `await queue.submit(chunks)` which resolves when the queue has room. Queue flushes to OpenAI in batches of 100 with max 2-3 concurrent API calls. Track source file per chunk for error propagation.

**Depends on:** Part 5 (parallel import with per-worker engines) -- already shipped.

## P0

### Fix `bun build --compile` WASM embedding for PGLite
**What:** Submit PR to oven-sh/bun fixing WASM file embedding in `bun build --compile` (issue oven-sh/bun#15032).

**Why:** PGLite's WASM files (~3MB) can't be embedded in the compiled binary. Users who install via `bun install -g gbrain` are fine (WASM resolves from node_modules), but the compiled binary can't use PGLite. Jarred Sumner (Bun founder, YC W22) would likely be receptive.

**Pros:** Single-binary distribution includes PGLite. No sidecar files needed.

**Cons:** Requires understanding Bun's bundler internals. May be a large PR.

**Context:** Issue has been open since Nov 2024. The root cause is that `bun build --compile` generates virtual filesystem paths (`/$bunfs/root/...`) that PGLite can't resolve. Multiple users have reported this. A fix would benefit any WASM-dependent package, not just PGLite.

**Depends on:** PGLite engine shipping (to have a real use case for the PR).

### ChatGPT MCP support (OAuth 2.1)
**What:** Add OAuth 2.1 with Dynamic Client Registration to the self-hosted MCP server so ChatGPT can connect.

**Why:** ChatGPT requires OAuth 2.1 for MCP connectors. Bearer token auth is NOT supported. This is the only major AI client that can't use GBrain remotely.

**Pros:** Completes the "every AI client" promise. ChatGPT has the largest user base.

**Cons:** OAuth 2.1 is a significant implementation: authorization endpoint, token endpoint, PKCE flow, dynamic client registration. Estimated CC: ~3-4 hours.

**Context:** Discovered during DX review (2026-04-10). All other clients (Claude Desktop/Code/Cowork, Perplexity) work with bearer tokens. The Edge Function deployment was removed in v0.8.0. OAuth needs to be added to the self-hosted HTTP MCP server (or `gbrain serve --http` when implemented).

**Depends on:** `gbrain serve --http` (not yet implemented).

### Runtime MCP access control
**What:** Add sender identity checking to MCP operations. Brain ops return filtered data based on access tier (Full/Work/Family/None).

**Why:** ACCESS_POLICY.md is prompt-layer enforcement (agent reads policy before responding). A direct MCP caller can bypass it. Runtime enforcement in the MCP server is the real security boundary for multi-user and remote deployments.

**Pros:** Real security boundary. ACCESS_POLICY.md becomes enforceable, not advisory.

**Cons:** Requires adding `sender_id` or `access_tier` to `OperationContext`. Each mutating operation needs a permission check. Medium implementation effort.

**Context:** From CEO review + Codex outside voice (2026-04-13). Prompt-layer access control works in practice (same model as Wintermute) but is not sufficient for remote MCP where direct tool calls bypass the agent's prompt.

**Depends on:** v0.10.0 GStackBrain skill layer (shipped).

## P1 (new from v0.7.0)

### ~~Constrained health_check DSL for third-party recipes~~
**Completed:** v0.9.3 (2026-04-12). Typed DSL with 4 check types (`http`, `env_exists`, `command`, `any_of`). All 7 first-party recipes migrated. String health checks accepted with deprecation warning + metachar validation for non-embedded recipes.

## P1 (new from v0.11.0 — Minions)

### Per-queue rate limiting for Minions
**What:** Token-bucket rate limiting per queue via a new `minion_rate_limits` table (queue, capacity, refill_rate, tokens, updated_at), with acquire/release in `claim()`.

**Why:** The #1 daily OpenClaw pain is spawn storms hitting OpenAI/Anthropic rate limits. `max_children` caps fan-out per parent, but a queue with 50 ready jobs will still slam the API. Every Minions consumer currently reinvents token-bucket in user code.

**Pros:** First-class rate limiting means no consumer has to roll their own. Composes with `max_children` (which is per-parent) to give two orthogonal throttles.

**Cons:** Adds a write hotspot on the rate-limit row. Mitigate by keeping it a simple `UPDATE ... WHERE tokens > 0 RETURNING` that fails fast and puts the claim back in the pool.

**Effort:** ~2 hours. Deferred from v0.11.0 to keep the parity PR at a reviewable size.

**Depends on:** Minions (shipped in v0.11.0).

### Minions repeat/cron scheduler
**What:** BullMQ-style repeatable jobs. `queue.add(name, data, { repeat: { cron: '0 * * * *' } })`.

**Why:** Idempotency keys (shipped in v0.11.0) are the foundation. Consumers currently use launchd/cron to fire `gbrain jobs submit`, but a native scheduler inside the worker would be cleaner and portable across deployments.

**Pros:** One mental model for both immediate and scheduled work. Idempotency prevents double-fire.

**Cons:** Every cron library has edge cases (DST, missed intervals on worker restart). Use a battle-tested parser.

**Effort:** ~1 day.

**Depends on:** Idempotency keys (shipped in v0.11.0).

### Minions worker event emitter
**What:** `worker.on('job:completed', handler)` / `worker.on('job:failed', ...)` instead of polling.

**Why:** Consumers currently poll `getJob(id)` to watch state changes. An event API is the ergonomic BullMQ has and Minions doesn't.

**Effort:** ~4 hours.

### `waitForChildren(parent_id, n)` / `collectResults(parent_id)` helpers
**What:** Convenience wrappers over `readChildCompletions` for common fan-in patterns.

**Why:** The `child_done` inbox primitive shipped in v0.11.0. Now add the ergonomic API on top so orchestrators don't have to write the polling loop.

**Effort:** ~2 hours.

**Depends on:** `child_done` inbox primitive (shipped in v0.11.0).

## P2

### Security hardening follow-ups (deferred from security-wave-3)
**What:** Close remaining security gaps identified during the v0.9.4 Codex outside-voice review that didn't make the wave's in-scope cut.

**Why:** Wave 3 closed 5 blockers + 4 mediums. These are the known residuals. Each is an independent hardening item that becomes trivial as Runtime MCP access control (P0 above) lands.

**Items (each a separate small task):**
- **DNS rebinding protection for HTTP health_checks.** Current `isInternalUrl` validates the hostname string; DNS resolution happens later inside `fetch`. A malicious DNS server can return a public IP on first lookup and an internal IP on the actual request. Fix: resolve hostname via `dns.lookup` before fetch, pin the IP with a custom `http.Agent` `lookup` override, re-validate post-resolution. Alternative: use `ssrf-req-filter` library.
- **Extended IPv6 private-range coverage.** Block `fc00::/7` (Unique Local Addresses), `fe80::/10` (link-local), `2002::/16` (6to4), `2001::/32` (Teredo), `::/128`. Current code covers `::1`, `::`, and IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:*`) via hex hextet parsing.
- **IPv4 shorthand parsing.** `127.1` (legacy 2-octet form = 127.0.0.1), `127.0.1` (3-octet), mixed-radix with trailing dots. Current code handles hex/octal/decimal integer-form IPs but not these shorthand variants.
- **Broader operation-layer limit caps.** `traverse_graph` `depth` param, plus `get_chunks`, `get_links`, `get_backlinks`, `get_timeline`, `get_versions`, `get_raw_data`, `resolve_slugs` — all currently accept unbounded `limit`/`depth`. Wave 3 only clamped `list_pages` and `get_ingest_log`.
- **`sync_brain` repo path validation.** The `repo` parameter accepts an arbitrary filesystem path. Same threat model as `file_upload` before wave 3. Add `validateUploadPath` (strict) for remote callers.
- **`file_upload` size limit.** `readFileSync` loads the entire file into memory. Trivial memory-DoS from MCP. Add ~100MB cap (matches CLI's TUS routing threshold) and stream for larger files.
- **`file_upload` regular-file check.** Reject directories, devices, FIFOs, Unix sockets via `stat.isFile()` before `readFileSync`.
- **Explicit confinement root (H2).** `file_upload` strict mode currently uses `process.cwd()`. Move to `ctx.config.upload_root` (or derive from where the brain's schema lives) so MCP server cwd can't be the wrong anchor.

**Effort:** M total (human: ~1 day / CC: ~1-2 hrs).

**Priority:** P2 — deferred consciously. Wave 3 closed the easily-exploitable paths. These are the defense-in-depth follow-ups.

**Depends on:** Security wave 3 shipped. None are blockers for Runtime MCP access control, but all three security workstreams (this, that P0, and the health-check DSL) converge on the same zero-trust MCP goal.

### Community recipe submission (`gbrain integrations submit`)
**What:** Package a user's custom integration recipe as a PR to the GBrain repo. Validates frontmatter, checks constrained DSL health_checks, creates PR with template.

**Why:** Turns GBrain from a single-author integration set into a community ecosystem. The recipe format IS the contribution format.

**Pros:** Community-driven integration library. Users build Slack-to-brain, RSS-to-brain, Discord-to-brain.

**Cons:** Support burden. Need constrained DSL (P1) before accepting third-party recipes. Need review process for recipe quality.

**Context:** From CEO review (2026-04-11). User explicitly deferred due to bandwidth constraints. Target v0.9.0.

**Depends on:** Constrained health_check DSL (P1) — **SHIPPED in v0.9.3.**

### Always-on deployment recipes (Fly.io, Railway)
**What:** Alternative deployment recipes for voice-to-brain and future integrations that run on cloud servers instead of local + ngrok.

**Why:** ngrok free URLs are ephemeral (change on restart). Always-on deployment eliminates the watchdog complexity and gives a stable webhook URL.

**Pros:** Stable URLs, no ngrok dependency, production-grade uptime.

**Cons:** Costs $5-10/mo per integration. Requires cloud account.

**Context:** From DX review (2026-04-11). v0.7.0 ships local+ngrok as v1 deployment path.

**Depends on:** v0.7.0 recipe format (shipped).

### `gbrain serve --http` + Fly.io/Railway deployment
**What:** Add `gbrain serve --http` as a thin HTTP wrapper around the stdio MCP server. Include a Dockerfile/fly.toml for cloud deployment.

**Why:** The Edge Function deployment was removed in v0.8.0. Remote MCP now requires a custom HTTP wrapper around `gbrain serve`. A built-in `--http` flag would make this zero-effort. Bun runs natively, no bundling seam, no 60s timeout, no cold start.

**Pros:** Simpler remote MCP setup. Users run `gbrain serve --http` behind ngrok instead of building a custom server. Supports all 30 operations remotely (including sync_brain and file_upload).

**Cons:** Users need ngrok ($8/mo) or a cloud host (Fly.io $5/mo, Railway $5/mo). Not zero-infra.

**Context:** Production deployments use a custom Hono server wrapping `gbrain serve`. This TODO would formalize that pattern into the CLI. ChatGPT OAuth 2.1 support depends on this.

**Depends on:** v0.8.0 (Edge Function removal shipped).

## Completed

### Implement AWS Signature V4 for S3 storage backend
**Completed:** v0.6.0 (2026-04-10) — replaced with @aws-sdk/client-s3 for proper SigV4 signing.