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d3b52edeba
* fix: add built-in HTTP transport with bearer auth for remote MCP
Adds `gbrain serve --http` with token-based authentication using the
existing access_tokens table. Eliminates the need for standalone OAuth
wrappers that may have insecure open registration endpoints.
- New: src/mcp/http-transport.ts — HTTP+SSE transport with bearer auth
- New: SECURITY.md — security advisory for remote MCP deployments
- Updated: serve command accepts --http and --port flags
- Updated: DEPLOY.md recommends --http for remote access
- Bump: 0.22.4 → 0.22.5
* chore: extract shared MCP dispatch + rate-limit modules
dispatch.ts is the single source of truth for stdio + HTTP transport: validateParams,
OperationContext build, handler invocation, error formatting. Server.ts refactored to
use it. Prevents the F1-F3 transport-drift bugs where stdio and HTTP independently
implemented dispatch logic differently (reversed args, missing context fields, no
param validation).
rate-limit.ts: bounded-LRU token-bucket. Tracks lastTouchedMs separately from
lastRefillMs so an exhausted key can't be reset by hammering past the TTL.
* feat: HTTP transport hardening + F1-F3 dispatch bug fixes
Rewrite of src/mcp/http-transport.ts on top of the new dispatch.ts and rate-limit.ts:
- F1 fix: dispatch via shared dispatchToolCall(ctx, params) — was reversed args
(params, ctx) before, would have crashed every real tools/call.
- F2 fix: full OperationContext (engine, config, logger, dryRun, remote) — was
only {engine, remote: true} before.
- F3 fix: validateParams runs on HTTP path — was skipped before.
- Engine.kind fail-fast: clear error message on PGLite (access_tokens table is
Postgres-only by design).
- CORS: default-deny via GBRAIN_HTTP_CORS_ORIGIN allowlist.
- Body cap: stream-counted via req.body reader, catches chunked transfers
without Content-Length. Default 1 MiB via GBRAIN_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES.
- Rate limit: pre-auth IP bucket fires BEFORE DB lookup (limits brute-force
load), post-auth token-id bucket fires after auth (limits runaway clients).
Both bounded LRU with TTL prune.
- mcp_request_log: per-request audit row reusing the existing schema (v4).
- last_used_at SQL-level debounce: WHERE last_used_at < now() - interval
'60 seconds'. Race-tolerant under PgBouncer.
- Response shape: application/json (gbrain MCP tools don't stream).
Streamable-HTTP transport spec compliant for non-streaming responses.
- X-Forwarded-For honored only when GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1.
* feat: wire gbrain auth into the main CLI
The original PR's docs referenced 'gbrain auth create/list/revoke' but auth.ts
was a standalone script never wired to the CLI dispatcher. Running 'gbrain auth'
from the compiled binary returned 'Unknown command'.
- auth.ts: extract the dispatch into runAuth(args) + import.meta.main guard
so direct-script invocation still works (bun run src/commands/auth.ts ...).
- cli.ts: add 'auth' to CLI_ONLY set + handler in handleCliOnly that imports
runAuth and dispatches without requiring an engine connection (auth.ts
manages its own postgres() connection).
* test: HTTP transport unit + E2E coverage (23 + 8 cases)
test/http-transport.test.ts — 23 unit cases against mocked engine.sql:
- Auth: valid/missing/no-Bearer/unknown/revoked/health-bypass (1-6)
- F1+F2 round-trip via dispatch.ts (7) — regression guard for reversed args
- F3 invalid_params via validateParams (8) — regression guard
- Response Content-Type application/json, not SSE (9)
- CORS default-deny + allowlist + non-match (10-12)
- Body cap: Content-Length + chunked-transfer (13-14)
- Rate limit: refill, exhaust+Retry-After, LRU eviction, TTL prune,
pre-auth IP fires before DB, /health bypasses (15-20)
- mcp_request_log audit: success row + auth_failed row (21-22)
test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts — 8 cases against real Postgres:
- /health, tools/list, tools/call list_pages (real op round-trip),
revoked → 401, last_used_at debounce within 60s (asserts ONE update),
debounce 65s gap (asserts TWO updates), mcp_request_log row check,
invalid_params via real handler.
* docs: v0.22.7 CHANGELOG + SECURITY.md + DEPLOY.md
CHANGELOG: v0.22.7 release notes covering the F1-F3 dispatch fixes, the full
hardening surface (CORS default-deny, two-bucket rate limit, body cap, audit
log), and the upgrade path. Master's v0.22.6 schema-verify entry stitched in
above (preserving merge ordering).
SECURITY.md: full hardening reference for gbrain serve --http — Postgres-only
caveat, CORS allowlist, rate limit + tunnel caveat, body cap, audit log query,
GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY warning.
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: Postgres-only call-out, env var summary, fail-fast behavior
on PGLite.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: codex review follow-ups (DB-probing /health + XFF trust safety contract)
- /health now does SELECT 1 against Postgres and returns 503 + status:unhealthy
when the DB is unreachable. Prevents the failure mode where orchestration
sees green pods while clients get misleading 401s during a DB outage.
- SECURITY.md: tighten the GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1 guidance with the explicit
two-condition safety contract — gbrain bound to a private interface AND the
proxy strips client-supplied XFF. Without both, the flag enables IP spoofing
past the pre-auth rate limit.
- Tests: add 6b (/health DB-down → 503) + assert db:'ok' on the happy path.
Caught by codex adversarial review during /ship Step 11.
* docs: TODOS.md — v0.22.7 follow-ups (audit volume, validateParams enums, SSE, scopes)
* docs: update project documentation for v0.22.7
CLAUDE.md: document src/mcp/dispatch.ts, src/mcp/rate-limit.ts, and the
rewritten src/mcp/http-transport.ts in the Key files section. Add
test/http-transport.test.ts (23 unit cases) and test/e2e/http-transport.test.ts
(8 E2E cases) to the test inventories.
CHANGELOG.md: fix copy-paste version mismatches inside the v0.22.7 entry that
referenced v0.22.5 (header line + "To take advantage of" block).
README.md: replace the standalone bun-run auth invocation with the wired-in
gbrain auth CLI; add gbrain serve --http startup step to the Remote MCP
example; surface gbrain auth in the admin command list; link SECURITY.md
from the Remote MCP section so it's discoverable.
SECURITY.md: align "as of v0.22.5" callouts with the actual release version
(v0.22.7).
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: align v0.22.5+ callout with v0.22.7+; switch token-management
examples from `bun run src/commands/auth.ts` to `gbrain auth` now that auth is
in the main CLI.
docs/mcp/ALTERNATIVES.md: drop the "planned but not yet implemented" note for
gbrain serve --http; document that the built-in HTTP transport is the
recommended path.
docs/mcp/{CLAUDE_DESKTOP,CLAUDE_COWORK,CLAUDE_CODE,PERPLEXITY}.md: switch
token-creation examples from `bun run src/commands/auth.ts create` to
`gbrain auth create` to match the wired-in CLI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: typecheck — cast CallToolRequestSchema handler return to any
MCP SDK 1.29 widened the response type for setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, ...)
to require a 'task' field for managed-task responses. gbrain ops are synchronous and
return the legacy { content, isError? } shape, which is still valid via the SDK's
ServerResult union. Casting the handler return type to any silences the narrowing
that broke after dispatch.ts was extracted (the original inline handler dodged this
because TypeScript inferred its return as any from the function body).
CI failure: src/mcp/server.ts(25,51): error TS2345 — Property 'task' is missing in
type 'ToolResult' but required in type '{ ...; task: { taskId: string; ... }; ... }'.
Caught by the 'test' job's bun run typecheck step at PR #483 commit 65ea9e7.
* docs: regenerate llms-full.txt after master merge
The build-llms regen-drift guard fails when committed llms.txt + llms-full.txt
don't match what scripts/build-llms.ts produces from current source. Master's
v0.22.6.1 merge brought in new content (CLAUDE.md entries, CHANGELOG, etc.)
that hadn't been folded into the bundle. Running 'bun run build:llms' to sync.
llms.txt unchanged; llms-full.txt picks up the new entries.
* docs: CHANGELOG — scrub attack-surface enumeration from v0.22.7 entry
Per CLAUDE.md responsible-disclosure rule: 'when a release fixes a security
gap or a user-impacting bug, describe the fix functionally. Do not enumerate
the attack surface, quantify the exposure window, or highlight the most
sensitive records by name in public-facing artifacts.'
Removed:
- Lead-paragraph attack-chain ('attacker who discovers URL → POST /register
→ client_credentials → read entire brain'). Public-doc readers don't need
the directed probe path.
- 'Bug fixes folded in' section that itemized prior-version failure modes.
Reframed as a 'transport refactor' note in the For Contributors section,
describing the dispatch consolidation functionally without claiming the
prior version was broken in specific ways.
- 'Without the OAuth footgun' lead headline. The fix's mechanism (built-in
bearer auth via access_tokens) is already self-evident from the headline.
- F1/F2/F3 internal labels and 'caught by codex outside-voice during
planning' parenthetical.
Kept:
- The full hardening reference table (configuration / behavior, not exposure).
- 'gbrain serve --http' user-facing operator ergonomics.
- 'Postgres-only by design' known-limit framing.
- Dispatch consolidation as a contributor-facing single-source-of-truth note.
SECURITY.md left intact: its OAuth-deployment guidance is generic 'if you
deploy MCP behind a custom HTTP wrapper, here are the rules' framing, not
gbrain-version-specific exposure. That's defensible under the same rule.
* docs: SECURITY.md — drop unverified security@garrytan.com address
The address was in the original PR's SECURITY.md commit (6e740590, author
'root <root@localhost>' — machine-generated) and never verified to exist or
forward anywhere. A non-monitored disclosure address is worse than no address
at all: reports go to a black hole.
Keep the GitHub private security advisory link as the sole disclosure channel.
GitHub Security Advisories is the working path most researchers reach for
first anyway — restricted-access by default, scopes the conversation to
maintainers, and integrates with CVE issuance when needed.
---------
Co-authored-by: root <root@localhost>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.2 KiB
4.2 KiB
Deploy GBrain Remote MCP Server
v0.22.7+: Use
gbrain serve --httpfor remote access. It includes built-in bearer token auth, default-deny CORS, two-bucket rate limiting, body cap, and per-request audit log. Postgres-only (PGLite is local-only by design). See SECURITY.md for env vars and tunable defaults.
Access your brain from any device, any AI client. GBrain's MCP server runs locally
via gbrain serve (stdio). For remote access, expose it via the built-in HTTP
transport behind a public tunnel.
Two Paths
Local (zero setup)
gbrain serve
Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and any MCP client that supports stdio. No server, no tunnel, no token needed. Works on both PGLite and Postgres engines.
Remote (any device, any AI client) — Postgres only
Your AI client (Claude Desktop, Perplexity, etc.)
→ ngrok tunnel (https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app)
→ gbrain serve --http (built-in transport with bearer auth)
→ Postgres (pooler connection or self-hosted)
This requires:
- A Postgres-backed brain (the
access_tokenstable only exists on Postgres; runninggbrain serve --httpagainst a PGLite install fails fast at startup) - A machine running
gbrain serve --http - A public tunnel (ngrok, Tailscale, or cloud host)
- A bearer token created via
gbrain auth create <name>
Remote Setup
1. Set up the tunnel
See the ngrok-tunnel recipe for full setup. Quick version:
brew install ngrok
ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
ngrok http 8787 --url your-brain.ngrok.app # Hobby tier for fixed domain
2. Create access tokens
# Create a token for each client
gbrain auth create "claude-desktop"
# List all tokens
gbrain auth list
# Revoke a token
gbrain auth revoke "claude-desktop"
Tokens are per-client. Create one for each device/app. Revoke individually if compromised. Tokens are stored SHA-256 hashed in your database.
3. Connect your AI client
- Claude Code: setup guide
- Claude Desktop: setup guide (must use GUI, not JSON config)
- Claude Cowork: setup guide
- Perplexity: setup guide
4. Verify
gbrain auth test \
https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app/mcp \
--token YOUR_TOKEN
Operations
All 30 GBrain operations are available remotely, including sync_brain and
file_upload (no timeout limits with self-hosted server).
Security note on file_upload: remote MCP callers are confined to the working
directory where gbrain serve was launched. Symlinks, .. traversal, and absolute
paths outside cwd are rejected. Page slugs and filenames are allowlist-validated
(alphanumeric + hyphens; no control chars, RTL overrides, or backslashes). Local
CLI callers (gbrain file upload ...) keep unrestricted filesystem access since
the user owns the machine.
Deployment Options
See ALTERNATIVES.md for a comparison of ngrok, Tailscale Funnel, and cloud hosts (Fly.io, Railway).
Troubleshooting
"missing_auth" error
Include the Authorization header: Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN
"invalid_token" error
Run gbrain auth list to see active tokens.
"service_unavailable" error Database connection failed. Check your Supabase dashboard for outages.
Claude Desktop doesn't connect
Remote servers must be added via Settings > Integrations, NOT
claude_desktop_config.json. See CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md.
Expected Latencies
| Operation | Typical Latency | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| get_page | < 100ms | Single DB query |
| list_pages | < 200ms | DB query with filters |
| search (keyword) | 100-300ms | Full-text search |
| query (hybrid) | 1-3s | Embedding + vector + keyword + RRF |
| put_page | 100-500ms | Write + trigger search_vector update |
| get_stats | < 100ms | Aggregate query |
Note: gbrain serve --http (built-in HTTP transport) is planned but not yet
implemented. Currently, remote MCP requires a custom HTTP wrapper. See the
production deployment pattern in the voice recipe
for a reference implementation.