mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gbrain.git
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df86ea5f1d
* wip: federated sync v2 pre-merge snapshot
* v0.40.5.0 Federated Sync v2 — parallel source sync + push triggers + per-source health
Bump VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG header + migration walkthrough filename
to v0.40.5.0 (claiming the next free slot in the v0.40.x patch series after
master's v0.40.1.0).
What ships (6 components, all behind sync.federated_v2 feature flag default-on):
1. Per-source sync lock — syncLockId(sourceId), phantom-redirect parity
2. Parallel sync --all — pMapAllSettled fan-out, --max-sources N cap
3. embed-backfill minion handler — D2 per-source lock + D6 $10/job budget + D15.1
fire-and-forget submission + D19 source-level cooldown + 24h $25 rolling cap
4. sync trigger CLI + POST /webhooks/github — HMAC-verified (60 req/min/IP),
X-GitHub-Event=push + ref filter against tracked_branch
5. sources status + federation_health doctor — batched GROUP BY pipeline
(4 queries instead of 6×N per-source roundtrips)
6. sources federate/unfederate hook — auto-submit embed-backfill on flip
Correctness fixes (unconditional):
- D21: sync.ts:959 facts backstop now passes sourceId to engine.getPage
- D15.4: redactSourceConfig + CI guard prevent webhook_secret leak
- D15.5: safeHexEqual extracted to src/core/timing-safe.ts
Schema:
- Migration v89 (sources_github_repo_index): partial expression index on
config->>'github_repo' for fast webhook source-lookup
Tests:
- 14 new test files, 112 cases. 4 IRON-RULE regressions pinned (SYNC_LOCK_ID
back-compat, phantom per-source lock, embed-backfill kill+resume,
webhook HMAC prefix-strip). All 9449 unit tests pass.
Caught at test-write time: the webhook handler had a Buffer.from('sha256=...',
'hex') truncation bug — without the prefix-strip, every signature would have
"matched" empty buffers. Pinned by a test/sources-webhook.test.ts IRON-RULE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(check-source-config-leak): tighten regex to source-row patterns only
The v0.40.5.0 wave added scripts/check-source-config-leak.sh with a
too-broad pattern (JSON\.stringify\(.*config) that flagged any variable
named 'config' — catching the GLOBAL gbrain config.json serializers in
src/commands/init.ts (status envelopes) and src/core/config.ts (the
config-file write site). On the CI runner without rg installed, the
grep -rE fallback fired correctly and produced 4 false positives that
broke the `verify` script.
Tightened the patterns to specifically match `(source|src|row|s).config`
property access — the actual risk shape (a sources-table row being
serialized whole). The global gbrain config has a different shape and
threat model (file-mode 0o600 at the write site), so it's safe to
exempt at the regex level rather than per-file whitelist.
Also fixed a latent bug: the rg branch used `--include='*.ts'` (grep's
flag, not rg's). rg silently rejected it and CANDIDATES came back empty,
so the local-dev runs (which have rg) would never have caught a real
leak. Now branches on tool availability: `-g '*.ts'` for rg, `--include`
for grep -rE. Both branches verified against a synthetic leak fixture.
Also added init.ts + config.ts to the whitelist as a belt-and-suspenders
since they handle gbrain-global config (not source rows) and could
otherwise reflect-back via regex iteration.
CI: `bun run verify` exit 0 locally with both the original false-positive
fixture (clean repo) and a synthetic leak fixture (correctly caught,
exit 1).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
48 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
48 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Redact secrets from sources.config before serializing (v0.40 D15.4).
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*
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* Codex outside-voice catch on the v0.40 plan: `webhook show` hides the
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* secret, but any OTHER surface that returns raw `sources.config` (the
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* sources list --json, an MCP get_source op, an HTTP admin API) would
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* leak it. This module is the single redaction primitive every serializer
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* routes through.
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*
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* `scripts/check-source-config-leak.sh` grep-guards against future drift.
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*/
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const SECRET_KEYS: ReadonlySet<string> = new Set([
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'webhook_secret',
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]);
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/**
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* Return a shallow copy of `config` with every key in SECRET_KEYS replaced
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* with the string '<redacted>'. Original input is not mutated.
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*
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* Non-object input returns an empty object (defensive — sources.config is
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* always a JSON object, but driver layer may briefly return a string mid-
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* parse on legacy brains).
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*/
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export function redactSourceConfig(
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config: unknown,
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): Record<string, unknown> {
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if (config === null || typeof config !== 'object' || Array.isArray(config)) {
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return {};
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}
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const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
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for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(config as Record<string, unknown>)) {
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if (SECRET_KEYS.has(k)) {
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out[k] = '<redacted>';
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} else {
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out[k] = v;
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}
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}
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return out;
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}
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/** True iff the config object carries a webhook secret. */
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export function hasWebhookSecret(config: unknown): boolean {
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if (!config || typeof config !== 'object') return false;
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const c = config as Record<string, unknown>;
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return typeof c.webhook_secret === 'string' && c.webhook_secret.length > 0;
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}
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