mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gbrain.git
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df86ea5f1d
* wip: federated sync v2 pre-merge snapshot
* v0.40.5.0 Federated Sync v2 — parallel source sync + push triggers + per-source health
Bump VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG header + migration walkthrough filename
to v0.40.5.0 (claiming the next free slot in the v0.40.x patch series after
master's v0.40.1.0).
What ships (6 components, all behind sync.federated_v2 feature flag default-on):
1. Per-source sync lock — syncLockId(sourceId), phantom-redirect parity
2. Parallel sync --all — pMapAllSettled fan-out, --max-sources N cap
3. embed-backfill minion handler — D2 per-source lock + D6 $10/job budget + D15.1
fire-and-forget submission + D19 source-level cooldown + 24h $25 rolling cap
4. sync trigger CLI + POST /webhooks/github — HMAC-verified (60 req/min/IP),
X-GitHub-Event=push + ref filter against tracked_branch
5. sources status + federation_health doctor — batched GROUP BY pipeline
(4 queries instead of 6×N per-source roundtrips)
6. sources federate/unfederate hook — auto-submit embed-backfill on flip
Correctness fixes (unconditional):
- D21: sync.ts:959 facts backstop now passes sourceId to engine.getPage
- D15.4: redactSourceConfig + CI guard prevent webhook_secret leak
- D15.5: safeHexEqual extracted to src/core/timing-safe.ts
Schema:
- Migration v89 (sources_github_repo_index): partial expression index on
config->>'github_repo' for fast webhook source-lookup
Tests:
- 14 new test files, 112 cases. 4 IRON-RULE regressions pinned (SYNC_LOCK_ID
back-compat, phantom per-source lock, embed-backfill kill+resume,
webhook HMAC prefix-strip). All 9449 unit tests pass.
Caught at test-write time: the webhook handler had a Buffer.from('sha256=...',
'hex') truncation bug — without the prefix-strip, every signature would have
"matched" empty buffers. Pinned by a test/sources-webhook.test.ts IRON-RULE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(check-source-config-leak): tighten regex to source-row patterns only
The v0.40.5.0 wave added scripts/check-source-config-leak.sh with a
too-broad pattern (JSON\.stringify\(.*config) that flagged any variable
named 'config' — catching the GLOBAL gbrain config.json serializers in
src/commands/init.ts (status envelopes) and src/core/config.ts (the
config-file write site). On the CI runner without rg installed, the
grep -rE fallback fired correctly and produced 4 false positives that
broke the `verify` script.
Tightened the patterns to specifically match `(source|src|row|s).config`
property access — the actual risk shape (a sources-table row being
serialized whole). The global gbrain config has a different shape and
threat model (file-mode 0o600 at the write site), so it's safe to
exempt at the regex level rather than per-file whitelist.
Also fixed a latent bug: the rg branch used `--include='*.ts'` (grep's
flag, not rg's). rg silently rejected it and CANDIDATES came back empty,
so the local-dev runs (which have rg) would never have caught a real
leak. Now branches on tool availability: `-g '*.ts'` for rg, `--include`
for grep -rE. Both branches verified against a synthetic leak fixture.
Also added init.ts + config.ts to the whitelist as a belt-and-suspenders
since they handle gbrain-global config (not source rows) and could
otherwise reflect-back via regex iteration.
CI: `bun run verify` exit 0 locally with both the original false-positive
fixture (clean repo) and a synthetic leak fixture (correctly caught,
exit 1).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
35 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
35 lines
1.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Constant-time hex string compare (v0.40 D15.5 extraction).
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*
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* Before v0.40 this lived as a closure inside `runServeHttp` in
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* `src/commands/serve-http.ts:601`. It needs to be importable so the new
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* `POST /webhooks/github` handler can verify GitHub HMAC-SHA256 signatures
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* with the same constant-time semantics as the admin-cookie compare.
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*
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* Why extract instead of duplicate: codex outside-voice flagged the closure
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* scope as "hand-waving over actual module boundaries." Two consumers + one
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* function = extract. Source-text grep guard in `test/timing-safe.test.ts`
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* pins that callers import from here rather than re-implementing.
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*
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* Both inputs are expected to be hex strings of equal length (caller asserts
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* the length invariant — e.g. sha256 hex is always 64 chars). `timingSafeEqual`
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* throws on length mismatch; the early-return on length keeps the comparison
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* timing-independent of the length-check itself.
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*/
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import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
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/**
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* True iff `a` and `b` are equal-length hex strings with the same bytes.
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* False on length mismatch (does NOT throw — admin-cookie + webhook callers
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* both prefer a clean boolean return so they can route to a 401 cleanly).
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*
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* Constant-time over the byte compare: `timingSafeEqual` is the underlying
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* primitive. Length mismatch short-circuits, which is acceptable because
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* length itself is not a secret (both callers know the expected hex length
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* from the algorithm — sha256 = 64 hex chars).
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*/
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export function safeHexEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
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if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
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return timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a, 'hex'), Buffer.from(b, 'hex'));
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}
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