Files
gbrain/test/source-scope-resolver.test.ts
T
1eb430a2df v0.42.37.0 fix(security,ingest): source-isolation grant enforcement + non-string frontmatter guard + papercuts (#1999)
* fix(security): scope cross-source reads to the caller grant; close get_page exact-path leak

One shared resolveRequestedScope() routes every source-scoped read op
(query, code_callers/callees, search_by_image, code_blast/flow, get_page)
through a single fail-closed trust+grant ladder: a remote caller's __all__
collapses to its granted sources (never the whole brain) and an explicit
out-of-grant source_id is rejected. get_page's exact-match path now honors a
federated grant via getPage(sourceIds[]) in both engines. Legacy bearer tokens
carry their stored permissions.source_id grant (bounded, never widened). Also
retries getConfig on transient connection loss.

Closes #1924, #1371, #1393, #1336, #1603.

* fix(ingest): non-string frontmatter no longer aborts lint/sync; embed/hook/catalog papercuts

Parser coerces a non-string title to a string and falls back to inference for
slug/type (never fabricating a "123" slug), with a lint NON_STRING_FIELD finding
surfacing the malformed frontmatter; a defensive guard in content-sanity stops a
non-string title from crashing the whole lint/sync run brain-wide. Plus: embed
--catch-up no longer arms the overflowed 32-bit budget timer (and surfaces
unembeddable chunks); the frontmatter pre-commit hook ships a correct .md/.mdx
regex; and the skill catalog parses YAML block-scalar descriptions.

Closes #1883, #1658, #1556, #1948, #1946, #1840, #1711.

* v0.42.37.0 fix(security,ingest): source-isolation grant enforcement + non-string frontmatter guard + papercuts

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: add NON_STRING_FIELD frontmatter validation class to docs for v0.42.37.0

The v0.42.37.0 non-string-frontmatter fix added an eighth validation
class (NON_STRING_FIELD / lint code frontmatter-non-string-field). Update
the two current-state docs that enumerate the validation classes:
- skills/frontmatter-guard/SKILL.md (seven->eight + table row)
- docs/integrations/pre-commit.md (seven->eight + table row)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 21:19:25 -07:00

124 lines
5.8 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Source-isolation trust+grant resolver (#1924, #1371, #1393).
*
* The cross-source leak class: a remote OAuth client scoped to one source could
* pass `source_id: "__all__"` (or an explicit out-of-grant source_id) to read
* sources it was never granted. Every source-scoped read op now routes through
* ONE resolver. These tests pin the trust+grant matrix at the unit level so a
* future per-handler "optimization" that re-inlines the `__all__` branch fails
* loudly here.
*/
import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
import {
resolveRequestedScope,
resolveCodeIntelScope,
OperationError,
type OperationContext,
} from '../src/core/operations.ts';
function ctxOf(overrides: Partial<OperationContext> = {}): OperationContext {
return {
engine: {} as any,
config: {} as any,
logger: console as any,
dryRun: false,
remote: true,
sourceId: 'default',
...overrides,
};
}
describe('resolveRequestedScope — __all__ / all_sources', () => {
test('trusted local + __all__ spans every source (empty scope)', () => {
const scope = resolveRequestedScope(ctxOf({ remote: false, sourceId: 'a' }), '__all__');
expect(scope).toEqual({});
});
test('remote + __all__ collapses to the caller grant, NOT the whole brain', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a', auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['a', 'b'] } as any });
const scope = resolveRequestedScope(ctx, '__all__');
expect(scope).toEqual({ sourceIds: ['a', 'b'] });
});
test('remote + __all__ with single-source grant scopes to that one source', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a', auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['a'] } as any });
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctx, '__all__')).toEqual({ sourceIds: ['a'] });
});
test('remote + __all__ with no federated grant falls back to scalar sourceId (never empty)', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a' });
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctx, '__all__')).toEqual({ sourceId: 'a' });
});
test('all_sources=true is treated identically to __all__', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['x'] } as any });
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctx, undefined, true)).toEqual({ sourceIds: ['x'] });
});
});
describe('resolveRequestedScope — explicit source_id', () => {
test('remote + explicit source_id OUTSIDE the grant is rejected', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['a'] } as any });
expect(() => resolveRequestedScope(ctx, 'b')).toThrow(OperationError);
try {
resolveRequestedScope(ctx, 'b');
} catch (e) {
expect((e as OperationError).code).toBe('permission_denied');
}
});
test('remote + explicit source_id INSIDE the grant is allowed', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['a', 'b'] } as any });
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctx, 'b')).toEqual({ sourceId: 'b' });
});
test('trusted local + explicit source_id is allowed even with no grant', () => {
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctxOf({ remote: false }), 'anything')).toEqual({ sourceId: 'anything' });
});
test('remote with no federated grant array can pass an explicit source_id (scalar-floor model)', () => {
// allowedSources undefined → no federated restriction to enforce; the scalar
// sourceId path governs. (Empty [] is treated the same as undefined.)
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctxOf({ remote: true }), 'z')).toEqual({ sourceId: 'z' });
const emptyGrant = ctxOf({ remote: true, auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: [] } as any });
expect(resolveRequestedScope(emptyGrant, 'z')).toEqual({ sourceId: 'z' });
});
});
describe('resolveRequestedScope — default (no param)', () => {
test('falls back to the canonical sourceScopeOpts ladder (federated array wins)', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a', auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['a', 'b'] } as any });
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctx, undefined)).toEqual({ sourceIds: ['a', 'b'] });
});
test('falls back to scalar sourceId when no federated grant', () => {
expect(resolveRequestedScope(ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a' }), undefined)).toEqual({ sourceId: 'a' });
});
});
describe('resolveCodeIntelScope — single-source code traversal', () => {
test('scalar sourceId → that source, allSources false', () => {
expect(resolveCodeIntelScope(ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a' }), undefined)).toEqual({ allSources: false, sourceId: 'a' });
});
test('single-element federated grant → that one source', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['only'] } as any });
expect(resolveCodeIntelScope(ctx, '__all__')).toEqual({ allSources: false, sourceId: 'only' });
});
test('multi-source federated grant → rejected (must specify one)', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: 'a', auth: { token: 't', clientId: 'c', scopes: [], allowedSources: ['a', 'b'] } as any });
expect(() => resolveCodeIntelScope(ctx, '__all__')).toThrow(OperationError);
});
test('trusted local + all → allSources true (spans the brain)', () => {
// ctx.sourceId is empty so the resolver yields {} → trusted-local allSources.
expect(resolveCodeIntelScope(ctxOf({ remote: false, sourceId: '' }), '__all__')).toEqual({ allSources: true, sourceId: undefined });
});
test('remote with no source in scope is denied, never widened to all', () => {
const ctx = ctxOf({ remote: true, sourceId: '' });
expect(() => resolveCodeIntelScope(ctx, '__all__')).toThrow(OperationError);
});
});