mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gbrain.git
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df86ea5f1d
* wip: federated sync v2 pre-merge snapshot
* v0.40.5.0 Federated Sync v2 — parallel source sync + push triggers + per-source health
Bump VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG header + migration walkthrough filename
to v0.40.5.0 (claiming the next free slot in the v0.40.x patch series after
master's v0.40.1.0).
What ships (6 components, all behind sync.federated_v2 feature flag default-on):
1. Per-source sync lock — syncLockId(sourceId), phantom-redirect parity
2. Parallel sync --all — pMapAllSettled fan-out, --max-sources N cap
3. embed-backfill minion handler — D2 per-source lock + D6 $10/job budget + D15.1
fire-and-forget submission + D19 source-level cooldown + 24h $25 rolling cap
4. sync trigger CLI + POST /webhooks/github — HMAC-verified (60 req/min/IP),
X-GitHub-Event=push + ref filter against tracked_branch
5. sources status + federation_health doctor — batched GROUP BY pipeline
(4 queries instead of 6×N per-source roundtrips)
6. sources federate/unfederate hook — auto-submit embed-backfill on flip
Correctness fixes (unconditional):
- D21: sync.ts:959 facts backstop now passes sourceId to engine.getPage
- D15.4: redactSourceConfig + CI guard prevent webhook_secret leak
- D15.5: safeHexEqual extracted to src/core/timing-safe.ts
Schema:
- Migration v89 (sources_github_repo_index): partial expression index on
config->>'github_repo' for fast webhook source-lookup
Tests:
- 14 new test files, 112 cases. 4 IRON-RULE regressions pinned (SYNC_LOCK_ID
back-compat, phantom per-source lock, embed-backfill kill+resume,
webhook HMAC prefix-strip). All 9449 unit tests pass.
Caught at test-write time: the webhook handler had a Buffer.from('sha256=...',
'hex') truncation bug — without the prefix-strip, every signature would have
"matched" empty buffers. Pinned by a test/sources-webhook.test.ts IRON-RULE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(check-source-config-leak): tighten regex to source-row patterns only
The v0.40.5.0 wave added scripts/check-source-config-leak.sh with a
too-broad pattern (JSON\.stringify\(.*config) that flagged any variable
named 'config' — catching the GLOBAL gbrain config.json serializers in
src/commands/init.ts (status envelopes) and src/core/config.ts (the
config-file write site). On the CI runner without rg installed, the
grep -rE fallback fired correctly and produced 4 false positives that
broke the `verify` script.
Tightened the patterns to specifically match `(source|src|row|s).config`
property access — the actual risk shape (a sources-table row being
serialized whole). The global gbrain config has a different shape and
threat model (file-mode 0o600 at the write site), so it's safe to
exempt at the regex level rather than per-file whitelist.
Also fixed a latent bug: the rg branch used `--include='*.ts'` (grep's
flag, not rg's). rg silently rejected it and CANDIDATES came back empty,
so the local-dev runs (which have rg) would never have caught a real
leak. Now branches on tool availability: `-g '*.ts'` for rg, `--include`
for grep -rE. Both branches verified against a synthetic leak fixture.
Also added init.ts + config.ts to the whitelist as a belt-and-suspenders
since they handle gbrain-global config (not source rows) and could
otherwise reflect-back via regex iteration.
CI: `bun run verify` exit 0 locally with both the original false-positive
fixture (clean repo) and a synthetic leak fixture (correctly caught,
exit 1).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
53 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
53 lines
2.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Tests for src/core/timing-safe.ts (v0.40 D15.5 extraction).
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*
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* Pure function: behavior tests plus a source-text grep guard that pins the
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* extraction so a future drift back to a serve-http-internal closure fails
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* loudly. Both the admin-cookie compare AND the webhook HMAC compare MUST
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* route through this helper.
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
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import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { createHash } from 'node:crypto';
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import { safeHexEqual } from '../src/core/timing-safe.ts';
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describe('safeHexEqual behavior', () => {
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test('returns true for identical hex strings', () => {
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const hash = createHash('sha256').update('the-quick-brown-fox').digest('hex');
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expect(safeHexEqual(hash, hash)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('returns false for distinct hex strings of the same length', () => {
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const a = createHash('sha256').update('apple').digest('hex');
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const b = createHash('sha256').update('banana').digest('hex');
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expect(safeHexEqual(a, b)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('returns false on length mismatch (does NOT throw)', () => {
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expect(safeHexEqual('ab', 'abcd')).toBe(false);
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expect(safeHexEqual('', 'ab')).toBe(false);
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expect(safeHexEqual('abcd', 'ab')).toBe(false);
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});
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test('empty strings compare equal', () => {
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expect(safeHexEqual('', '')).toBe(true);
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});
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test('Buffer.from(_, "hex") is case-insensitive — same hex bytes match either case', () => {
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// Documents Node's hex-decode behavior: 'abcd' and 'ABCD' decode to the
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// same bytes, so safeHexEqual returns true. Callers normalize beforehand
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// when they need strict case-equality.
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expect(safeHexEqual('abcd', 'ABCD')).toBe(true);
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});
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});
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describe('extraction contract', () => {
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test('IRON-RULE: serve-http.ts imports safeHexEqual from timing-safe.ts (not redefined)', () => {
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const src = readFileSync('src/commands/serve-http.ts', 'utf8');
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// Must import from the canonical location
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expect(src).toMatch(/import\s*\{[^}]*\bsafeHexEqual\b[^}]*\}\s*from\s*['"]\.\.\/core\/timing-safe\.ts['"]/);
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// Must NOT redefine the function inside the file
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expect(src).not.toMatch(/function\s+safeHexEqual\s*\(/);
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});
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});
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