* fix(mcp): skip stdin EOF handlers when MCP_STDIO=1 OpenClaw's bundle-mcp gateway and similar wrappers pipe the JSON-RPC handshake on stdin then close their stdin half. Pre-fix, both stdin 'end' and 'close' listeners (server.ts:65-66 and serve.ts:204-206) treated this as a permanent disconnect and shut the server down before the first tool call arrived. Guard both sites with `process.env.MCP_STDIO !== '1'`. Signal handlers (SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP), transport.onclose, and the parent-process watchdog still cover legitimate shutdown paths. The serve.ts site threads the env read through an injectable `mcpStdio?: boolean` on ServeOptions so tests stay isolated (no process.env mutation per scripts/check-test-isolation.sh R1). Tests: 3 new cases in test/serve-stdio-lifecycle.test.ts pin the guard's invariants — mcpStdio=true must NOT trigger shutdown on stdin EOF, signals must still drive shutdown with mcpStdio=true, and mcpStdio=false (default) preserves existing CLI behavior. 25/25 pass. Origin: PR #870. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(oauth): honor token_endpoint_auth_method=none for PKCE public clients RFC 7591 §3.2.1: when a DCR client declares token_endpoint_auth_method="none" (PKCE-only public clients like Claude Code, Cursor), the authorization server MUST NOT issue a client_secret. Pre-fix, registerClient unconditionally minted a secret, and the MCP SDK's clientAuth middleware then rejected valid public-client flows on /token because it expected client.client_secret to match. Three changes to src/core/oauth-provider.ts:registerClient: - Gate clientSecret generation on isPublicClient = (auth_method === 'none'). Public clients store client_secret_hash = NULL. - Omit client_secret from the response payload for public clients. Confidential clients (default client_secret_post and explicit client_secret_basic) keep their existing one-time-reveal shape. - Normalize NULL secret_hash to JS undefined in getClient so SDK middleware (which checks client.client_secret === undefined, not === null) correctly identifies public clients and skips the secret-comparison branch on /token. Schema is already permissive (client_secret_hash TEXT, no NOT NULL on both src/schema.sql and src/core/pglite-schema.ts) — no migration needed. Tests: 5 new cases in test/oauth.test.ts pin: - public client → no client_secret in response (#11 from plan) - default auth_method → secret unchanged (regression guard) - explicit client_secret_post → secret unchanged - getClient NULL→undefined normalization - PKCE full /authorize → /token end-to-end with no secret (#15 from plan) 69/69 oauth.test.ts cases pass. typecheck clean. Origin: PR #909. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(serve-http): --bind HOST, default to loopback (127.0.0.1) Adds `gbrain serve --http --bind <interface>` to control which network interface the HTTP MCP server listens on. Default flipped from `0.0.0.0` (pre-v0.34) to `127.0.0.1` (v0.34.0+). Why the flip: gbrain's primary use case is a personal-knowledge brain on a laptop. The previous default exposed brains on every interface — one accidental `--http` invocation away from publishing the brain to a LAN. Server operators who need remote access pass `--bind 0.0.0.0` (or a specific interface). Codex's outside-voice on the original PR #864 correctly flagged that the additive flag wasn't actually the fix; the default needed to change for the safety claim to hold. If `--public-url` is set but `--bind` is unset, runServeHttp prints a loud stderr WARN at startup recommending `--bind 0.0.0.0`. Declaring a public URL while quietly binding loopback is almost always a misconfiguration; we want the operator to see it on first start, not silently fail remote requests. Startup banner now includes a `Bind:` row so the listening interface is visible alongside Port / Engine / Issuer. Origin: PR #864, extended with D11 (default flip) per /plan-eng-review codex outside-voice review. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): seal source-isolation leak on read path (P0) Pre-fix, an authenticated OAuth MCP client scoped to source-A could enumerate source-B pages via six read-side ops: search, query (text AND image paths), list_pages, traverse_graph, and find_experts. The v0.31.8 source-scoping pattern shipped through dispatch.ts but the op handlers never threaded ctx.sourceId into their engine calls, and hybridSearch.ts:223's explicit SearchOpts rebuild dropped sourceId even when callers passed it. Sealing the leak: - src/core/operations.ts adds sourceScopeOpts(ctx), the canonical precedence ladder: ctx.auth.allowedSources (federated) wins over ctx.sourceId (scalar) wins over nothing. Threaded into all 5 read-side op handlers + the query-image-path searchVector call (the 6th leak surface codex caught in plan review). - src/core/search/hybrid.ts:223 now threads sourceId + sourceIds fields through the inner SearchOpts rebuild. The explicit pick shape is preserved (HNSW inner-CTE ordering depends on it) but extended. - src/core/types.ts adds sourceIds?: string[] to SearchOpts + PageFilters (D9: federated read needs array-shaped engine filter or fan-out; array wins for hot retrieval). - src/core/operations.ts AuthInfo gains sourceId + allowedSources (D2: identity surface symmetric with the federated_read column #876 will add). - Both engines now apply WHERE source_id = $N (scalar) or = ANY($N::text[]) (array) at the SQL layer for searchKeyword, searchKeywordChunks, searchVector, listPages, traverseGraph, traversePaths. Array form wins when both are set. The searchVector filter pushes into the inner HNSW CTE (codex flagged this placement during plan review). - traverseGraph + traversePaths signatures gain opts.sourceId + opts.sourceIds; engine.ts interface updated. - findExperts (the whoknows op, D3 5th leak surface) accepts sourceId + sourceIds and threads them into its internal hybridSearch call. PR #861 was authored before v0.33 shipped so this op wasn't covered in the original PR. Auth wiring: - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken populates AuthInfo.sourceId from oauth_clients.source_id. JOIN guarded by isUndefinedColumnError so pre-v55 brains degrade to legacy projection rather than refusing every token verification. - GBrainOAuthProvider.registerClientManual gains a sourceId parameter (defaults to 'default'). DCR registerClient also sets source_id='default' on the inserted row. - serve-http.ts:929 cleanup: AuthInfo.sourceId is now a real typed field. The cast + GBRAIN_SOURCE env fallback chain is gone (D13). Legacy bearer tokens default to 'default' source in verifyAccessToken. - http-transport.ts (legacy access_tokens path) threads sourceId='default' through DispatchOpts so v0.22.7 callers stay source-scoped. - auth.ts CLI adds --source flag to gbrain auth register-client. Migration v55 (D10 + D13): - ALTER TABLE oauth_clients ADD COLUMN source_id TEXT (nullable). - Backfill UPDATE source_id = 'default' WHERE source_id IS NULL — preserves v0.33 effective behavior verbatim for legacy clients. - ADD CONSTRAINT FK ... REFERENCES sources(id) ON DELETE SET NULL, wrapped in DO block so re-runs against fresh-install brains (where the FK already lives inline in SCHEMA_SQL) no-op cleanly. - CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_clients_source_id WHERE source_id IS NOT NULL for the verifyAccessToken JOIN. - GBRAIN_ACCEPT_SILENT_WIDEN env-flag wired through the runner via SET LOCAL gbrain.accept_silent_widen — reserved for future migrations that hit the silent-widen footgun codex flagged. This migration doesn't need it (column is brand new; no pre-existing stale values possible by definition). - src/core/pglite-schema.ts + src/schema.sql include the column + FK + index inline for fresh installs. Tests: new test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts with 13 regression cases — one per leak surface (search/list_pages/traverse/etc.) plus explicit AuthInfo.sourceId and AuthInfo.allowedSources op-handler threading checks. Full unit suite: 6034 pass / 0 fail. PGLite initSchema time dropped from 2.4s to 850ms after consolidating v55's DO blocks (multiple DO blocks were slow on PGLite; one DO block for the FK install only is fine). Origin: PR #861 + plan-eng-review decisions D2/D3/D4/D9/D10/D13 + F2. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(gateway): multimodal embedding for openai-compatible providers Pre-fix, embedMultimodal hardcoded a recipe.id === 'voyage' branch and threw AIConfigError for every other recipe. Multimodal-capable providers fronted by LiteLLM (or any openai-compatible proxy) were unreachable even when the operator had wired up the model. The fix: - src/core/ai/gateway.ts adds embedMultimodalOpenAICompat() that POSTs to the standard /embeddings endpoint with content arrays carrying image_url entries. Routing comes from the existing recipe.implementation switch — Voyage stays on its own /multimodalembeddings path; every other openai-compatible recipe flows through the new helper. - src/core/ai/recipes/litellm-proxy.ts declares supports_multimodal: true so embedMultimodal accepts the recipe. No multimodal_models allow-list: LiteLLM is a passthrough proxy and the user owns model-id selection; provider rejection (400 from upstream) is the right enforcement layer there. Voyage's static allow-list shape stays unchanged (its 12 models share supports_multimodal but only one is multimodal-capable). - D12 runtime dimension validation: the new helper checks the returned vector length against the recipe's declared default_dims (preferred) or the brain's embedding_dimensions config. Mismatch throws AIConfigError with model id + observed + expected so the operator can swap models or rebuild the column. Pre-fix, a wrong-dim response would surface as a cryptic pgvector "vector dimension mismatch" at INSERT time. - Auth resolution routes through the existing defaultResolveAuth helper so optional-auth recipes (LiteLLM proxy with no LITELLM_API_KEY) and required-auth recipes both share one code path. Optional-auth sends "Authorization: Bearer unauthenticated" which servers like Ollama / llama-server ignore but the SDK contract requires. Tests: 11 new cases in test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts cover happy-path, multi-input batching, unauthenticated proxy, D12 dim mismatch + default-dim fallback, 401 / 400 / malformed-JSON / non-array error paths, and an explicit Voyage-regression test pinning that the new openai-compat route doesn't accidentally hijack the Voyage path. All 41 multimodal-related tests pass (existing voyage suite + new). typecheck clean. Origin: PR #875 + plan-eng-review D12 (runtime dim validation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(oauth): federated_read read scope (#876) Pre-fix, OAuth clients had a single source-scope axis (source_id, added in v55). A client could either write+read one source OR be a super-reader across all sources (via NULL source_id). There was no middle ground — WeCare-style L3 dept clients that need to write to dept-x but read dept-x + parent canon + shared canon had no expression. #876 adds federated_read TEXT[] as an orthogonal read-scope axis. source_id is the WRITE authority; federated_read is the READ authority. They default to matching values (read scope == write scope, the pre-v0.34 default) when a client is registered without an explicit federated read list. Migrations v56-v60 (six new migrations on top of v55): - v56: ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN federated_read TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'. - v57 (F5): explicit CASE backfill so source_id IS NULL → '{}' (not an array containing NULL — codex caught this ambiguity during plan review). - v58: post-backfill validation. Fails loud if any row's source_id isn't in its federated_read array, pointing at a logic bug in v57 if fired. - v59: flip the source_id FK from ON DELETE SET NULL to ON DELETE RESTRICT now that federated_read provides the alternative scope-loss path. Pre-flip, deleting a source could silently widen any oauth_client to super-reader; post-flip, source delete is refused if any client references it (operator must revoke/re-scope first). - v60: GIN index on federated_read for array-containment queries. Auth wiring: - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken JOINs c.federated_read and populates AuthInfo.allowedSources. Pre-v56 / pre-v55 brains degrade via the existing isUndefinedColumnError fallback chain. - registerClientManual gains a federatedRead?: string[] parameter (defaults to [sourceId]). - DCR registerClient sets source_id='default' + federated_read=['default'] on the inserted row. - auth.ts CLI adds --federated-read SRC1,SRC2,... flag. The register-client output now prints "Federated reads:" so operators confirm the scope they set. Engines consume the federated array through the SearchOpts.sourceIds / PageFilters.sourceIds field that #861 added (no engine changes here — the plumbing was D9). sourceScopeOpts in operations.ts already prefers the auth.allowedSources array over scalar ctx.sourceId when set. Test seam: - test/book-mirror.test.ts now spawns the CLI with GBRAIN_HOME pointed at a tempdir so the test isn't sensitive to the developer's local ~/.gbrain/config.json. Pre-fix the test could silently inherit a real Postgres connection and hang past the default 5s test timeout. Fresh GBRAIN_HOME → "No brain configured" → exit 1 in <1s. - test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts gains one more regression case: AuthInfo.allowedSources = [] (explicit empty) MUST NOT widen scope to "all sources" — the silent-widen footgun precedence ladder. - test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts is part of the wave's commits via the migrate.ts changes that bump the schema chain. typecheck-only fix on a captured-auth type was already in #875's tree. 6045 unit tests pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean. PGLite initSchema runs v55-v60 in ~786ms total (within the test-harness budget for tests using the canonical beforeAll engine pattern). Origin: PR #876 + plan-eng-review F5 (CASE backfill). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.34.0.0: MCP fix wave (#870 #909 #864 #861 #875 #876) VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG bump for the six-PR MCP fix wave. Schema chain extends from v54 → v60; oauth_clients gains source_id + federated_read columns; auth'd MCP clients now stay inside their scope across all read-side ops; PKCE-only DCR works; --bind defaults to loopback; LiteLLM multimodal embedding ships. Contributed by @Hansen1018 (#870), @ding-modding (#909), @DukeDawg (#864), @toilalesondev (#861 + #876), @yoelgal (#875). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: update project documentation for v0.34.0.0 Sync README, CLAUDE.md, SECURITY.md, docs/architecture/topologies.md, and docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md to reflect the v0.34.0.0 MCP fix wave: - README: document --bind HOST default (loopback), --source + --federated-read register-client flags, PKCE public-client gate - SECURITY.md: note loopback-by-default for serve --http, update the trust-proxy contract to point at the new default - CLAUDE.md: annotate operations.ts (sourceScopeOpts helper), oauth-provider.ts (verifyAccessToken JOIN + PKCE public clients), serve-http.ts (--bind flag), gateway.ts (openai-compat multimodal + dim validation), mcp/server.ts (MCP_STDIO guard), auth.ts (--source + --federated-read), migrate.ts (v58-v63 chain), engine.ts (sourceIds field). Add 4 new test-file entries for source-isolation-pglite, openai-compat-multimodal, serve-stdio-lifecycle, oauth.test.ts PKCE cases - docs/architecture/topologies.md: source-scoped register-client example, --bind 0.0.0.0 for thin-client host setup - docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: --bind explanation in the ngrok section, source-scoped client recipe - llms-full.txt: regenerated per the CLAUDE.md-edit chaser rule Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: bump v0.34.0.0 → v0.34.1.0 Renumbering the MCP fix wave from v0.34.0.0 to v0.34.1.0 so the release slot lands between master's v0.33.2.1 and the next minor. Touches every release-artifact mention: - VERSION: 0.34.0.0 → 0.34.1.0 - package.json: same - CHANGELOG.md header + "To take advantage" block - CLAUDE.md key-files annotations (8 entries that document this wave) - llms-full.txt (regen from CLAUDE.md) - README.md / SECURITY.md / docs/architecture/topologies.md / docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md - Wave code-comment markers ("// v0.34.0 (#NNN):" → "// v0.34.1 (#NNN):") Test files renamed alongside since they were committed with the wave. Commit subjects on the original 6 PR commits + the v0.34.0.0 bump commit (4f533c72→6b47db7e) intentionally NOT rewritten — those are history. `git log` finds the implementation by message subject, not by version tag. 6275 unit tests pass, typecheck clean, migration chain v58-v63 unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
10 KiB
Deploy GBrain Remote MCP Server
v0.26.0+:
gbrain serve --httpships full OAuth 2.1 (client credentials, auth code + PKCE, refresh rotation, optional DCR), an embedded React admin dashboard at/admin, scoped operations, and a live SSE activity feed. Pre-v0.26 legacy bearer tokens still work —verifyAccessTokenfalls back to theaccess_tokenstable and grandfathers tokens toread+write+admin. Postgres-only for the legacy fallback (theaccess_tokenstable is Postgres-only); OAuth tables work on both PGLite and Postgres. See SECURITY.md for env vars and tunable defaults.
Access your brain from any device, any AI client. GBrain ships two transports:
gbrain serve (stdio) for local agents, and gbrain serve --http (v0.26.0+)
for remote clients over OAuth 2.1.
Three Paths
Local stdio (zero setup)
gbrain serve
Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and any MCP client that supports stdio. No server, no tunnel, no token needed. Works on both PGLite and Postgres engines.
Remote over OAuth 2.1 (recommended, v0.26.0+)
gbrain serve --http --port 3131
ngrok http 3131 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
gbrain serve --http --port 3131 --public-url https://your-brain.ngrok.app
Built-in HTTP transport with OAuth 2.1, scoped operations, an admin dashboard
at /admin, and a live SSE activity feed. Zero external dependencies. This is
the only path that works with ChatGPT (OAuth 2.1 + PKCE is required by the
ChatGPT MCP connector). Pass --public-url whenever the server is reachable
at anything other than http://localhost:<port> so the OAuth issuer in
discovery metadata matches what clients hit (RFC 8414 §3.3).
Supported clients:
- ChatGPT — requires OAuth 2.1 + PKCE. Works natively with
--http. - Claude Desktop / Cowork — OAuth 2.1 or legacy bearer tokens.
- Perplexity — OAuth 2.1 client credentials grant.
- Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf — can use OAuth or legacy bearer.
See the OAuth 2.1 setup section below.
Remote with legacy bearer tokens (pre-v0.26 deployments) — Postgres only
Your AI client (Claude Desktop, Perplexity, etc.)
→ ngrok tunnel (https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app)
→ gbrain serve --http (built-in transport with bearer auth)
→ Postgres (pooler connection or self-hosted)
This requires:
- A Postgres-backed brain (the
access_tokenstable only exists on Postgres; runninggbrain serve --httpagainst a PGLite install fails fast at startup) - A machine running
gbrain serve --http - A public tunnel (ngrok, Tailscale, or cloud host)
- A bearer token created via
gbrain auth create <name>
Pre-v1.0 tokens are grandfathered as read+write+admin scopes when you upgrade
to the HTTP server, so no migration is required.
OAuth 2.1 Setup (v0.26.0+)
1. Start the HTTP server
gbrain serve --http --port 3131
On first start, the server prints an admin bootstrap token to stderr:
Admin bootstrap token: 3a1f9c...
Open http://localhost:3131/admin and paste it to log in.
Save this token. Open http://localhost:3131/admin and paste it to access the
dashboard. The dashboard shows live activity, registered clients, request logs,
and per-client config export.
v0.26.9+:
mcp_request_log.paramsand the live SSE activity feed default to a redacted summary{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}. Declared param keys are kept (intersected against the operation's spec); unknown keys are counted but never named, and byte sizes round up to 1KB so size-probe attacks can't binary-search secret content. Operators on a personal laptop who want raw payloads back can passgbrain serve --http --log-full-params(loud stderr warning fires at startup). Multi-tenant deployments should leave it on the redacted default.
2. Register OAuth clients
Register clients from the /admin dashboard:
- Click Register client.
- Enter a name (e.g.
perplexity,chatgpt). - Pick scopes:
read,write,admin(checkboxes). - Pick grant type:
client_credentialsfor machine-to-machine (Perplexity, Claude Desktop bearer mode) orauthorization_codefor browser-based clients with PKCE (ChatGPT). - For
authorization_codeclients, paste the redirect URI. - Hit Register. The credential-reveal modal shows the
client_id(andclient_secretfor confidential clients) once. Copy or Download JSON immediately — secrets are hashed on storage and never shown again.
Or from the CLI — faster for scripting:
gbrain auth register-client perplexity \
--grant-types client_credentials \
--scopes "read write"
v0.34 — source-scoped clients. Multi-source brains can scope a client's
write authority to one source and its read scope to a curated set with the
new --source and --federated-read flags:
gbrain auth register-client dept-x-agent \
--grant-types client_credentials \
--scopes "read write" \
--source dept-x \
--federated-read dept-x,shared,parent-canon
--source controls the write authority — put_page / add_link / etc only
land in dept-x. --federated-read controls the read axis independently;
queries return rows from any of the listed sources. Omit both flags for the
v0.33-compatible super-client shape. Pre-v0.34 clients are backfilled to
source_id='default' on gbrain upgrade.
Host-repo wrappers can register programmatically:
await oauthProvider.registerClientManual(
'perplexity',
['client_credentials'],
'read write',
[], // redirect_uris, empty for CC
);
For self-service client registration (Dynamic Client Registration, RFC 7591),
start the server with --enable-dcr. DCR is off by default.
3. Expose the server
v0.34 — bind explicitly. gbrain serve --http defaults to 127.0.0.1.
To accept connections from the ngrok tunnel (or any non-loopback source),
restart with --bind:
gbrain serve --http --port 3131 --bind 0.0.0.0 --public-url https://your-brain.ngrok.app
When --public-url is set without --bind, a stderr WARN fires at
startup so the misconfiguration ("the tunnel is up but my agent gets
ECONNREFUSED") is loud.
brew install ngrok
ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
ngrok http 3131 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
Your OAuth issuer URL becomes https://your-brain.ngrok.app. The MCP SDK's
router exposes the spec-compliant discovery endpoint at
/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server.
4. Scopes and localOnly
Every operation is tagged read | write | admin. Four operations are
localOnly and rejected over HTTP regardless of scope: sync_brain,
file_upload, file_list, file_url. Remote agents cannot reach local
filesystem surface area.
| Scope | What it allows |
|---|---|
read |
search, query, get_page, list_pages, graph traversal |
write |
put_page, delete_page, add_link, add_timeline_entry |
admin |
Client management, token revocation, sweep, local-only ops |
Legacy Bearer Token Setup
Keep using pre-v0.26 bearer tokens if you aren't ready to migrate. They
grandfather to read+write+admin scopes on the HTTP server.
1. Set up the tunnel
See the ngrok-tunnel recipe for full setup. Quick version:
brew install ngrok
ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
ngrok http 8787 --url your-brain.ngrok.app # Hobby tier for fixed domain
2. Create access tokens
# Create a token for each client
gbrain auth create "claude-desktop"
# List all tokens
gbrain auth list
# Revoke a token
gbrain auth revoke "claude-desktop"
Tokens are per-client. Create one for each device/app. Revoke individually if compromised. Tokens are stored SHA-256 hashed in your database.
3. Connect your AI client
- ChatGPT: setup guide (OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, requires
gbrain serve --http) - Claude Code: setup guide
- Claude Desktop: setup guide (must use GUI, not JSON config)
- Claude Cowork: setup guide
- Perplexity: setup guide
4. Verify
gbrain auth test \
https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app/mcp \
--token YOUR_TOKEN
Operations
All 30 GBrain operations are available remotely, including sync_brain and
file_upload (no timeout limits with self-hosted server).
Security note on file_upload: remote MCP callers are confined to the working
directory where gbrain serve was launched. Symlinks, .. traversal, and absolute
paths outside cwd are rejected. Page slugs and filenames are allowlist-validated
(alphanumeric + hyphens; no control chars, RTL overrides, or backslashes). Local
CLI callers (gbrain file upload ...) keep unrestricted filesystem access since
the user owns the machine.
Deployment Options
See ALTERNATIVES.md for a comparison of ngrok, Tailscale Funnel, and cloud hosts (Fly.io, Railway).
Troubleshooting
"missing_auth" error
Include the Authorization header: Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN
"invalid_token" error
Run gbrain auth list to see active tokens.
"service_unavailable" error Database connection failed. Check your Supabase dashboard for outages.
Claude Desktop doesn't connect
Remote servers must be added via Settings > Integrations, NOT
claude_desktop_config.json. See CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md.
Expected Latencies
| Operation | Typical Latency | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| get_page | < 100ms | Single DB query |
| list_pages | < 200ms | DB query with filters |
| search (keyword) | 100-300ms | Full-text search |
| query (hybrid) | 1-3s | Embedding + vector + keyword + RRF |
| put_page | 100-500ms | Write + trigger search_vector update |
| get_stats | < 100ms | Aggregate query |
Note: gbrain serve --http shipped in v0.26.0 with OAuth 2.1 + admin
dashboard baked into the binary. The custom HTTP wrapper pattern (see
voice recipe) is still supported for
teams that need bespoke middleware, but for most remote deployments the
built-in server is the recommended path.