mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gbrain.git
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* wip: federated sync v2 pre-merge snapshot
* v0.40.5.0 Federated Sync v2 — parallel source sync + push triggers + per-source health
Bump VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG header + migration walkthrough filename
to v0.40.5.0 (claiming the next free slot in the v0.40.x patch series after
master's v0.40.1.0).
What ships (6 components, all behind sync.federated_v2 feature flag default-on):
1. Per-source sync lock — syncLockId(sourceId), phantom-redirect parity
2. Parallel sync --all — pMapAllSettled fan-out, --max-sources N cap
3. embed-backfill minion handler — D2 per-source lock + D6 $10/job budget + D15.1
fire-and-forget submission + D19 source-level cooldown + 24h $25 rolling cap
4. sync trigger CLI + POST /webhooks/github — HMAC-verified (60 req/min/IP),
X-GitHub-Event=push + ref filter against tracked_branch
5. sources status + federation_health doctor — batched GROUP BY pipeline
(4 queries instead of 6×N per-source roundtrips)
6. sources federate/unfederate hook — auto-submit embed-backfill on flip
Correctness fixes (unconditional):
- D21: sync.ts:959 facts backstop now passes sourceId to engine.getPage
- D15.4: redactSourceConfig + CI guard prevent webhook_secret leak
- D15.5: safeHexEqual extracted to src/core/timing-safe.ts
Schema:
- Migration v89 (sources_github_repo_index): partial expression index on
config->>'github_repo' for fast webhook source-lookup
Tests:
- 14 new test files, 112 cases. 4 IRON-RULE regressions pinned (SYNC_LOCK_ID
back-compat, phantom per-source lock, embed-backfill kill+resume,
webhook HMAC prefix-strip). All 9449 unit tests pass.
Caught at test-write time: the webhook handler had a Buffer.from('sha256=...',
'hex') truncation bug — without the prefix-strip, every signature would have
"matched" empty buffers. Pinned by a test/sources-webhook.test.ts IRON-RULE.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(check-source-config-leak): tighten regex to source-row patterns only
The v0.40.5.0 wave added scripts/check-source-config-leak.sh with a
too-broad pattern (JSON\.stringify\(.*config) that flagged any variable
named 'config' — catching the GLOBAL gbrain config.json serializers in
src/commands/init.ts (status envelopes) and src/core/config.ts (the
config-file write site). On the CI runner without rg installed, the
grep -rE fallback fired correctly and produced 4 false positives that
broke the `verify` script.
Tightened the patterns to specifically match `(source|src|row|s).config`
property access — the actual risk shape (a sources-table row being
serialized whole). The global gbrain config has a different shape and
threat model (file-mode 0o600 at the write site), so it's safe to
exempt at the regex level rather than per-file whitelist.
Also fixed a latent bug: the rg branch used `--include='*.ts'` (grep's
flag, not rg's). rg silently rejected it and CANDIDATES came back empty,
so the local-dev runs (which have rg) would never have caught a real
leak. Now branches on tool availability: `-g '*.ts'` for rg, `--include`
for grep -rE. Both branches verified against a synthetic leak fixture.
Also added init.ts + config.ts to the whitelist as a belt-and-suspenders
since they handle gbrain-global config (not source rows) and could
otherwise reflect-back via regex iteration.
CI: `bun run verify` exit 0 locally with both the original false-positive
fixture (clean repo) and a synthetic leak fixture (correctly caught,
exit 1).
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
126 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
126 lines
5.4 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Tests for /webhooks/github HMAC verification semantics (v0.40 T10).
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*
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* The handler itself is wired inside serve-http.ts's runServeHttp closure
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* (hard to invoke without bringing up the full Express app). This file pins
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* the load-bearing primitives:
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*
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* 1. GitHub HMAC sig format matches `sha256=<hex>` via createHmac.
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* 2. safeHexEqual is constant-time and rejects mismatches.
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* 3. The expected payload schema (repository.full_name + ref) parses.
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* 4. Branch ref construction: refs/heads/<tracked_branch>.
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*
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* The full HTTP path is covered by test/e2e/webhook-github.test.ts
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* (DATABASE_URL-gated; not present in this wave — filed as a follow-up
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* E2E pinned by the test plan artifact).
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
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import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
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import { safeHexEqual } from '../src/core/timing-safe.ts';
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const GITHUB_SECRET = 'super-secret-webhook-key';
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/** Build a sha256= HMAC sig the way GitHub does. */
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function githubSig(secret: string, payload: Buffer): string {
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return 'sha256=' + createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex');
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}
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/** Strip the GitHub prefix before constant-time hex compare. Matches the
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* webhook handler in serve-http.ts. Buffer.from('sha256=...', 'hex') silently
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* truncates at non-hex chars; comparing prefixed strings as hex returns
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* true-on-anything. The handler strips the prefix; tests must too. */
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function verifyGithubSig(secret: string, payload: Buffer, headerSig: string): boolean {
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const prefix = 'sha256=';
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if (!headerSig.startsWith(prefix)) return false;
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const expected = createHmac('sha256', secret).update(payload).digest('hex');
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return safeHexEqual(headerSig.slice(prefix.length), expected);
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}
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/** Synthetic minimal push payload (real GitHub sends ~100KB; we only read 2 fields). */
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function pushPayload(repo: string, ref: string): Buffer {
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return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({
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ref,
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repository: { full_name: repo, name: repo.split('/')[1], owner: { name: repo.split('/')[0] } },
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head_commit: { id: 'abc123' },
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}), 'utf8');
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}
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describe('GitHub HMAC verification', () => {
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test('valid signature on untampered payload → verify=true', () => {
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const payload = pushPayload('Garry-s-List/zion-brain', 'refs/heads/main');
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const sig = githubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, payload);
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expect(verifyGithubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, payload, sig)).toBe(true);
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});
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test('IRON-RULE: rejects when signature header lacks sha256= prefix', () => {
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// This was the bug: production used safeHexEqual on prefixed strings.
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// Buffer.from('sha256=...', 'hex') silently truncates at non-hex chars,
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// so both sides decoded to empty buffer and signature_mismatch never fired.
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const payload = pushPayload('owner/repo', 'refs/heads/main');
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const expected = createHmac('sha256', GITHUB_SECRET).update(payload).digest('hex');
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// Without prefix the header is invalid format → reject
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expect(verifyGithubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, payload, expected)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('rejects when secret differs', () => {
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const payload = pushPayload('Garry-s-List/zion-brain', 'refs/heads/main');
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const goodSig = githubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, payload);
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expect(verifyGithubSig('wrong-secret', payload, goodSig)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('rejects when payload differs (single-byte tamper)', () => {
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const payload = pushPayload('Garry-s-List/zion-brain', 'refs/heads/main');
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const sig = githubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, payload);
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const tampered = Buffer.from(payload);
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tampered[10] = tampered[10] ^ 0xff;
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expect(verifyGithubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, tampered, sig)).toBe(false);
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});
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test('GitHub sig format is sha256=<64 hex chars>', () => {
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const payload = pushPayload('owner/repo', 'refs/heads/main');
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const sig = githubSig(GITHUB_SECRET, payload);
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expect(sig).toMatch(/^sha256=[0-9a-f]{64}$/);
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});
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});
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describe('Push payload parsing', () => {
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test('extracts repository.full_name + ref', () => {
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const payload = pushPayload('Garry-s-List/zion-brain', 'refs/heads/main');
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const parsed = JSON.parse(payload.toString('utf8'));
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expect(parsed.repository?.full_name).toBe('Garry-s-List/zion-brain');
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expect(parsed.ref).toBe('refs/heads/main');
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});
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test('malformed JSON throws (handler returns 400)', () => {
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const bad = Buffer.from('{not json');
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expect(() => JSON.parse(bad.toString('utf8'))).toThrow();
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});
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test('payload missing repository.full_name is detectable', () => {
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const partial = Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ ref: 'refs/heads/main' }));
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const parsed = JSON.parse(partial.toString('utf8'));
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expect(parsed.repository?.full_name).toBeUndefined();
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});
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});
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describe('Branch ref construction (D5)', () => {
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test('default tracked_branch = main produces refs/heads/main', () => {
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const trackedBranch = 'main';
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expect(`refs/heads/${trackedBranch}`).toBe('refs/heads/main');
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});
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test('non-main branch is exact match', () => {
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const trackedBranch: string = 'master';
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expect(`refs/heads/${trackedBranch}`).toBe('refs/heads/master');
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// ref="refs/heads/main" against tracked="master" must NOT match
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const incoming: string = 'refs/heads/main';
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expect(incoming === `refs/heads/${trackedBranch}`).toBe(false);
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});
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test('feature-branch push to main-tracking source is rejected by exact-match', () => {
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const trackedBranch: string = 'main';
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const pushedRef: string = 'refs/heads/feature/new-stuff';
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expect(pushedRef === `refs/heads/${trackedBranch}`).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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