Files
gbrain/test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts
T
cb02932388 v0.26.9 fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE (#628)
* fix(mcp): close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE + tighten remote contract

The HTTP MCP transport in serve-http.ts inlined its own OperationContext
literal and forgot to set `remote: true`. With the field undefined at the
operations.ts protected-job-name guard (line 1391), an HTTP MCP caller
holding a write-scoped OAuth token could submit `submit_job {name: "shell"}`
and execute arbitrary commands on the gbrain host (RCE-class).

Two-layer fix:

1. F7 — explicit `remote: true` on the inlined /mcp OperationContext.
   Stdio MCP at src/mcp/dispatch.ts:61 already set this; the HTTP path
   was the regression.

2. F7b — fail-closed contract on the four ctx.remote consumer sites in
   operations.ts (auto-link skip, telemetry x2, protected-job guard).
   The protected-job guard flips from `if (ctx.remote && ...)` to
   `if (ctx.remote !== false && ...)` and the trusted-marker site flips
   from `!ctx.remote && ...` to `ctx.remote === false && ...`. Anything
   that isn't strictly `false` now treats the caller as remote/untrusted.

3. D12 — `OperationContext.remote` becomes REQUIRED in the TypeScript
   type. The compiler now catches future transports that forget the field.
   The runtime fail-closed defaults are belt+suspenders for any caller
   that bypasses the type via `as` cast or `Partial<>` spread.

Tests:

- New `test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts` (4 cases) pins the
  fail-closed semantics: undefined-via-cast rejects, remote=true rejects,
  remote=false allowed (only path that escalates protected-name jobs).

- `test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts` adds 2 cases asserting HTTP MCP
  cannot submit `shell` or `subagent` jobs even with read+write scope.

- `test/e2e/graph-quality.test.ts` adds the now-required `remote: false`
  to its fixture (e2e graph quality simulates local-CLI writes).

Verification: bun test -> 3742 pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean.

Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this trust-boundary regression.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + serve-http defense in depth

OAuth provider hardening pass that brings the provider into RFC compliance
on auth code, refresh token, and revocation flows, and tightens the
serve-http surface around request logging and admin cookies.

Provider (src/core/oauth-provider.ts):

- F1: bind client_id atomically into the auth code DELETE WHERE clause for
  exchangeAuthorizationCode + challengeForAuthorizationCode. Previous
  pattern (DELETE...RETURNING then post-hoc client compare) burned codes
  on the wrong-client path so the legitimate client could not retry.
  RFC 6749 §10.5.

- F2: same atomic predicate on exchangeRefreshToken. The pre-fix shape
  defeated RFC 6749 §10.4's stolen-token detection by letting attacker +
  victim both succeed.

- F3: refresh token rejects requested scopes that are not a subset of the
  ORIGINAL grant on the row. Codex C9: subset is checked against the
  recorded grant, not the client's currently-allowed scopes (which can
  expand later); omitted scope inherits the original verbatim and stays
  distinct from explicit-empty. RFC 6749 §6.

- F4: revokeToken adds AND client_id to the DELETE so a client cannot
  revoke another client's tokens by guessing the hash. RFC 7009 §2.1.

- F5: deleted_at and token_ttl column probes use a new
  isUndefinedColumnError helper (extracted to src/core/utils.ts per D14)
  that matches SQLSTATE 42703 or column-name-in-message. Bare catch{}
  used to swallow lock timeouts, network blips, and auth failures as
  "column missing" — fail-open posture in a security path.

- F6: sweepExpiredTokens uses RETURNING 1 + array length. Pre-fix
  (result as any).count returned 0 on at least one engine even when
  rows were deleted, and codes were never counted.

- F7c: NEW finding eva-brain missed. exchangeAuthorizationCode now folds
  redirect_uri into the atomic DELETE predicate when the parameter is
  provided. Stored on /authorize, never compared on /token before this
  commit. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 violation. Back-compat: when caller omits the
  parameter the predicate is skipped, preserving SDK consumers that
  haven't adopted the parameter yet.

- F12 (cleanup, not security): dcrDisabled constructor option replaces
  the prior monkey-patch of _clientsStore in serve-http.ts. The SDK's
  mcpAuthRouter only wires up /register when the store exposes
  registerClient, so omitting the method via the constructor is
  sufficient. Reframed as cleanup per codex C10 — the monkey-patch
  happened before mcpAuthRouter ran, so the prior shape did not have
  a real security regression to claim.

Dispatch (src/mcp/dispatch.ts):

- F8: new summarizeMcpParams(opName, params) intersects submitted keys
  against the operation's declared params allow-list. Returns
  {redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}.
  Closes the codex C8 leak: a naive "dump all submitted keys" summary
  still echoed attacker-controlled key names like
  put_page {"wiki/people/sensitive_name": "..."} into mcp_request_log
  + the SSE feed. Allow-list pattern keeps debug visibility on declared
  keys while counting unknowns without naming them.

Serve-http (src/commands/serve-http.ts) + serve (src/commands/serve.ts):

- F8 wiring: mcp_request_log + SSE broadcast routed through
  summarizeMcpParams by default. New --log-full-params flag bypasses
  redaction with a loud stderr warning at startup. Default privacy-
  positive; flag is the documented escape hatch for self-hosted
  operators debugging on their own laptop.

- F9: admin cookies set Secure when req.secure OR issuerUrl.protocol
  is https. Cloudflare-tunnel + reverse-proxy deployments where the
  inside-tunnel hop looks like http but the public URL is https now
  tag cookies correctly.

- F10: bound magicLinkNonces with NONCE_LRU_CAP. Previously only the
  consumed-nonces map was capped; an attacker (or misbehaving agent)
  with the bootstrap token could mint nonces faster than they expired
  and grow the live store unbounded.

- F12: dcrDisabled flows through to the provider constructor instead of
  monkey-patching _clientsStore after construction.

- F14: try/catch wraps StreamableHTTPServerTransport setup +
  handleRequest. SDK-level throws no longer fall through to express's
  default HTML error page; clients expecting JSON-RPC envelopes get a
  JSON 500 instead.

- F15: error envelope unified via buildError + serializeError from
  src/core/errors.ts. OperationError and unexpected exceptions both
  emit the same {class, code, message, hint} shape so clients can
  pattern-match a single envelope.

Tests:

- test/oauth.test.ts adds 11 cases:
  * F1+F2 wrong-client cannot consume / read PKCE / burn refresh,
    paired with owner-still-redeems atomically afterward (codex D6 —
    proves the predicate doesn't burn the row on attacker attempts).
  * F3 refresh scope subset enforced.
  * F4 wrong-client cannot revoke.
  * F5 non-schema SQL not swallowed by client_credentials soft-delete probe.
  * F6 sweepExpiredTokens returns count > 0 after deleting rows.
  * F7c redirect_uri match succeeds, mismatch rejects, omitted preserves
    back-compat for callers that don't pass the parameter.
  * F12 dcrDisabled constructor option exposes only getClient,
    registerClientManual still works.

- test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts (NEW, 6 cases): pins the F8
  privacy invariants. The codex-C8 attacker-key-name probe asserts that
  a sensitive name submitted as a key never appears anywhere in the
  redactor's output.

Verification: bun run typecheck clean. test/oauth.test.ts 55/55,
test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts 6/6,
test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts 4/4 from commit A. The one
unrelated unit failure surfaces on master too — environment-sensitive
test that expects ~/.gbrain/config.json to be absent in the test env.

Out of scope: F11 (auth register-client --redirect-uri flag) and F13
(serve --http argv positive-int validator) per codex C11 — operator
UX gaps, not trust-boundary fixes. Filed as follow-up TODOs.

Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this hardening pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: file F11 + F13 as OAuth hardening follow-up TODOs

Codex C11 flagged these as scope creep on the v0.26.7 OAuth hardening
PR (operator UX, not trust-boundary). Capturing them here so the
context survives — eva-brain has both implementations and the lift is
mechanical when we want to do them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(oauth): close adversarial-review findings on F7c + F8

Two bugs surfaced by an adversarial subagent during /ship's pre-landing
review pass that the codex + plan-eng-review didn't catch.

D15 / F7c: `exchangeAuthorizationCode` used `redirectUri ? ...` ternary
to choose the with-redirect vs no-redirect SQL. Empty string fell
through to the no-redirect branch, so a caller submitting
`redirect_uri=""` at /token bypassed the binding entirely. RFC 6749
§4.1.3 spec violation. Switch to `redirectUri !== undefined`. Test:
empty-string redirect_uri must reject when /authorize stored a real URI.

D16 / F8: `summarizeMcpParams` published exact byte length via
`approx_bytes = JSON.stringify(params).length`. Submitting put_page with
a known prefix and observing the resulting log entry across repeated
probes lets an attacker binary-search the size of secret suffix content.
Bucket to 1KB resolution. The redacted summary keeps a coarse
"roughly how big" signal for operators while making size-based
side-channel attacks useless.

Test count: 65 → 67 across the three new test files.
Typecheck clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.26.9)

OAuth 2.1 hardening + HTTP MCP shell-job RCE fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v0.26.9

Annotate CLAUDE.md key-files entries with v0.26.9 OAuth/MCP hardening pass:
- src/core/operations.ts: D12 (OperationContext.remote required) + F7b
  (4-site fail-closed flip), HTTP MCP shell-job RCE close
- src/core/utils.ts: D14 isUndefinedColumnError extracted helper
- src/mcp/dispatch.ts: F8 summarizeMcpParams privacy redactor with
  declared-keys allow-list + 1KB byte bucketing
- src/commands/serve-http.ts: F7+F8+F9+F10+F12+F14+F15 hardening
- src/core/oauth-provider.ts: F1+F2+F3+F4+F5+F6+F7c+F12 RFC 6749/7009
  hardening pass

Add new test-file entries for test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts
(7 cases) and test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts (4 cases). Extend
test/oauth.test.ts (+14 cases) and test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts
(+2 RCE-close regressions) entries with v0.26.9 case counts.

README.md: added --log-full-params to gbrain serve --http surface.

SECURITY.md: documented mcp_request_log.params redaction default
({redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}) +
--log-full-params opt-in.

docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: operator-facing note on SSE feed + audit log
redaction default and when to flip --log-full-params on.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-04 21:11:15 -07:00

91 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Trust-boundary contract regression tests (F7b).
*
* Pins the fail-closed semantics on `ctx.remote`. After v0.27 the field is
* REQUIRED in the TypeScript type, but consumer code MUST still treat any
* value that isn't strictly `false` as remote/untrusted. This is the runtime
* defense-in-depth for the case where a context is constructed via `as` cast
* or `Partial<>` spread and `remote` ends up undefined despite the type.
*
* The bug class this guards against: a future transport (HTTP/2, WebSocket,
* a third-party plugin) inlines its own OperationContext literal and forgets
* to set `remote`. Without these tests, the type system's compile-time check
* is the only line of defense, and any `as OperationContext` cast bypasses
* it.
*/
import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
import {
operations,
type Operation,
type OperationContext,
} from '../src/core/operations.ts';
import type { BrainEngine } from '../src/core/engine.ts';
const submit_job = operations.find(o => o.name === 'submit_job') as Operation;
if (!submit_job) throw new Error('submit_job operation missing');
// Stub engine — submit_job's protected-name guard fires before any DB call,
// so the engine handle is never read on the rejection path.
const stubEngine = {} as BrainEngine;
const stubLogger = { info: () => {}, warn: () => {}, error: () => {} };
/**
* Construct an OperationContext with `remote` deliberately undefined despite
* the type system saying it's required. Mimics what would happen if a future
* transport inlines its own context literal and forgets the field.
*/
function castUndefinedRemoteCtx(): OperationContext {
return {
engine: stubEngine,
config: { engine: 'pglite' } as any,
logger: stubLogger,
dryRun: false,
// remote intentionally omitted; cast through unknown to bypass the type
} as unknown as OperationContext;
}
describe('F7b — trust-boundary contract fail-closed semantics', () => {
test('protected job submission rejected when remote is undefined (cast bypass)', async () => {
const ctx = castUndefinedRemoteCtx();
await expect(
submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'shell', data: { cmd: 'id' } })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
});
test('protected job submission rejected when remote is true', async () => {
const ctx = { ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: true } as OperationContext;
await expect(
submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'shell', data: { cmd: 'id' } })
).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
});
test('protected job submission ALLOWED only when remote is strictly false', async () => {
const ctx = { ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: false } as OperationContext;
// The handler now passes the protected-name guard and continues into the
// queue. We don't actually want to enqueue anything in a unit test, so
// we expect the call to fail at a LATER point (engine.executeRaw on the
// stub). That's fine — what we're proving is that the guard does NOT
// throw `permission_denied`, which is the failure mode we'd see if F7b
// regressed back to a falsy check that treated remote=false as remote.
await expect(
submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'shell', data: { cmd: 'id' } })
).rejects.not.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
});
test('non-protected job names always allowed regardless of remote', async () => {
// 'default-noop' is not in PROTECTED_JOB_NAMES. The protected-name guard
// skips entirely, so we again get a downstream stub-engine error.
const cases: OperationContext[] = [
castUndefinedRemoteCtx(),
{ ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: true } as OperationContext,
{ ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: false } as OperationContext,
];
for (const ctx of cases) {
await expect(
submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'noop-job', data: {} })
).rejects.not.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
}
});
});