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* fix(mcp): close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE + tighten remote contract
The HTTP MCP transport in serve-http.ts inlined its own OperationContext
literal and forgot to set `remote: true`. With the field undefined at the
operations.ts protected-job-name guard (line 1391), an HTTP MCP caller
holding a write-scoped OAuth token could submit `submit_job {name: "shell"}`
and execute arbitrary commands on the gbrain host (RCE-class).
Two-layer fix:
1. F7 — explicit `remote: true` on the inlined /mcp OperationContext.
Stdio MCP at src/mcp/dispatch.ts:61 already set this; the HTTP path
was the regression.
2. F7b — fail-closed contract on the four ctx.remote consumer sites in
operations.ts (auto-link skip, telemetry x2, protected-job guard).
The protected-job guard flips from `if (ctx.remote && ...)` to
`if (ctx.remote !== false && ...)` and the trusted-marker site flips
from `!ctx.remote && ...` to `ctx.remote === false && ...`. Anything
that isn't strictly `false` now treats the caller as remote/untrusted.
3. D12 — `OperationContext.remote` becomes REQUIRED in the TypeScript
type. The compiler now catches future transports that forget the field.
The runtime fail-closed defaults are belt+suspenders for any caller
that bypasses the type via `as` cast or `Partial<>` spread.
Tests:
- New `test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts` (4 cases) pins the
fail-closed semantics: undefined-via-cast rejects, remote=true rejects,
remote=false allowed (only path that escalates protected-name jobs).
- `test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts` adds 2 cases asserting HTTP MCP
cannot submit `shell` or `subagent` jobs even with read+write scope.
- `test/e2e/graph-quality.test.ts` adds the now-required `remote: false`
to its fixture (e2e graph quality simulates local-CLI writes).
Verification: bun test -> 3742 pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this trust-boundary regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + serve-http defense in depth
OAuth provider hardening pass that brings the provider into RFC compliance
on auth code, refresh token, and revocation flows, and tightens the
serve-http surface around request logging and admin cookies.
Provider (src/core/oauth-provider.ts):
- F1: bind client_id atomically into the auth code DELETE WHERE clause for
exchangeAuthorizationCode + challengeForAuthorizationCode. Previous
pattern (DELETE...RETURNING then post-hoc client compare) burned codes
on the wrong-client path so the legitimate client could not retry.
RFC 6749 §10.5.
- F2: same atomic predicate on exchangeRefreshToken. The pre-fix shape
defeated RFC 6749 §10.4's stolen-token detection by letting attacker +
victim both succeed.
- F3: refresh token rejects requested scopes that are not a subset of the
ORIGINAL grant on the row. Codex C9: subset is checked against the
recorded grant, not the client's currently-allowed scopes (which can
expand later); omitted scope inherits the original verbatim and stays
distinct from explicit-empty. RFC 6749 §6.
- F4: revokeToken adds AND client_id to the DELETE so a client cannot
revoke another client's tokens by guessing the hash. RFC 7009 §2.1.
- F5: deleted_at and token_ttl column probes use a new
isUndefinedColumnError helper (extracted to src/core/utils.ts per D14)
that matches SQLSTATE 42703 or column-name-in-message. Bare catch{}
used to swallow lock timeouts, network blips, and auth failures as
"column missing" — fail-open posture in a security path.
- F6: sweepExpiredTokens uses RETURNING 1 + array length. Pre-fix
(result as any).count returned 0 on at least one engine even when
rows were deleted, and codes were never counted.
- F7c: NEW finding eva-brain missed. exchangeAuthorizationCode now folds
redirect_uri into the atomic DELETE predicate when the parameter is
provided. Stored on /authorize, never compared on /token before this
commit. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 violation. Back-compat: when caller omits the
parameter the predicate is skipped, preserving SDK consumers that
haven't adopted the parameter yet.
- F12 (cleanup, not security): dcrDisabled constructor option replaces
the prior monkey-patch of _clientsStore in serve-http.ts. The SDK's
mcpAuthRouter only wires up /register when the store exposes
registerClient, so omitting the method via the constructor is
sufficient. Reframed as cleanup per codex C10 — the monkey-patch
happened before mcpAuthRouter ran, so the prior shape did not have
a real security regression to claim.
Dispatch (src/mcp/dispatch.ts):
- F8: new summarizeMcpParams(opName, params) intersects submitted keys
against the operation's declared params allow-list. Returns
{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}.
Closes the codex C8 leak: a naive "dump all submitted keys" summary
still echoed attacker-controlled key names like
put_page {"wiki/people/sensitive_name": "..."} into mcp_request_log
+ the SSE feed. Allow-list pattern keeps debug visibility on declared
keys while counting unknowns without naming them.
Serve-http (src/commands/serve-http.ts) + serve (src/commands/serve.ts):
- F8 wiring: mcp_request_log + SSE broadcast routed through
summarizeMcpParams by default. New --log-full-params flag bypasses
redaction with a loud stderr warning at startup. Default privacy-
positive; flag is the documented escape hatch for self-hosted
operators debugging on their own laptop.
- F9: admin cookies set Secure when req.secure OR issuerUrl.protocol
is https. Cloudflare-tunnel + reverse-proxy deployments where the
inside-tunnel hop looks like http but the public URL is https now
tag cookies correctly.
- F10: bound magicLinkNonces with NONCE_LRU_CAP. Previously only the
consumed-nonces map was capped; an attacker (or misbehaving agent)
with the bootstrap token could mint nonces faster than they expired
and grow the live store unbounded.
- F12: dcrDisabled flows through to the provider constructor instead of
monkey-patching _clientsStore after construction.
- F14: try/catch wraps StreamableHTTPServerTransport setup +
handleRequest. SDK-level throws no longer fall through to express's
default HTML error page; clients expecting JSON-RPC envelopes get a
JSON 500 instead.
- F15: error envelope unified via buildError + serializeError from
src/core/errors.ts. OperationError and unexpected exceptions both
emit the same {class, code, message, hint} shape so clients can
pattern-match a single envelope.
Tests:
- test/oauth.test.ts adds 11 cases:
* F1+F2 wrong-client cannot consume / read PKCE / burn refresh,
paired with owner-still-redeems atomically afterward (codex D6 —
proves the predicate doesn't burn the row on attacker attempts).
* F3 refresh scope subset enforced.
* F4 wrong-client cannot revoke.
* F5 non-schema SQL not swallowed by client_credentials soft-delete probe.
* F6 sweepExpiredTokens returns count > 0 after deleting rows.
* F7c redirect_uri match succeeds, mismatch rejects, omitted preserves
back-compat for callers that don't pass the parameter.
* F12 dcrDisabled constructor option exposes only getClient,
registerClientManual still works.
- test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts (NEW, 6 cases): pins the F8
privacy invariants. The codex-C8 attacker-key-name probe asserts that
a sensitive name submitted as a key never appears anywhere in the
redactor's output.
Verification: bun run typecheck clean. test/oauth.test.ts 55/55,
test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts 6/6,
test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts 4/4 from commit A. The one
unrelated unit failure surfaces on master too — environment-sensitive
test that expects ~/.gbrain/config.json to be absent in the test env.
Out of scope: F11 (auth register-client --redirect-uri flag) and F13
(serve --http argv positive-int validator) per codex C11 — operator
UX gaps, not trust-boundary fixes. Filed as follow-up TODOs.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this hardening pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: file F11 + F13 as OAuth hardening follow-up TODOs
Codex C11 flagged these as scope creep on the v0.26.7 OAuth hardening
PR (operator UX, not trust-boundary). Capturing them here so the
context survives — eva-brain has both implementations and the lift is
mechanical when we want to do them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): close adversarial-review findings on F7c + F8
Two bugs surfaced by an adversarial subagent during /ship's pre-landing
review pass that the codex + plan-eng-review didn't catch.
D15 / F7c: `exchangeAuthorizationCode` used `redirectUri ? ...` ternary
to choose the with-redirect vs no-redirect SQL. Empty string fell
through to the no-redirect branch, so a caller submitting
`redirect_uri=""` at /token bypassed the binding entirely. RFC 6749
§4.1.3 spec violation. Switch to `redirectUri !== undefined`. Test:
empty-string redirect_uri must reject when /authorize stored a real URI.
D16 / F8: `summarizeMcpParams` published exact byte length via
`approx_bytes = JSON.stringify(params).length`. Submitting put_page with
a known prefix and observing the resulting log entry across repeated
probes lets an attacker binary-search the size of secret suffix content.
Bucket to 1KB resolution. The redacted summary keeps a coarse
"roughly how big" signal for operators while making size-based
side-channel attacks useless.
Test count: 65 → 67 across the three new test files.
Typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.26.9)
OAuth 2.1 hardening + HTTP MCP shell-job RCE fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v0.26.9
Annotate CLAUDE.md key-files entries with v0.26.9 OAuth/MCP hardening pass:
- src/core/operations.ts: D12 (OperationContext.remote required) + F7b
(4-site fail-closed flip), HTTP MCP shell-job RCE close
- src/core/utils.ts: D14 isUndefinedColumnError extracted helper
- src/mcp/dispatch.ts: F8 summarizeMcpParams privacy redactor with
declared-keys allow-list + 1KB byte bucketing
- src/commands/serve-http.ts: F7+F8+F9+F10+F12+F14+F15 hardening
- src/core/oauth-provider.ts: F1+F2+F3+F4+F5+F6+F7c+F12 RFC 6749/7009
hardening pass
Add new test-file entries for test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts
(7 cases) and test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts (4 cases). Extend
test/oauth.test.ts (+14 cases) and test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts
(+2 RCE-close regressions) entries with v0.26.9 case counts.
README.md: added --log-full-params to gbrain serve --http surface.
SECURITY.md: documented mcp_request_log.params redaction default
({redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}) +
--log-full-params opt-in.
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: operator-facing note on SSE feed + audit log
redaction default and when to flip --log-full-params on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
91 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
91 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Trust-boundary contract regression tests (F7b).
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*
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* Pins the fail-closed semantics on `ctx.remote`. After v0.27 the field is
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* REQUIRED in the TypeScript type, but consumer code MUST still treat any
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* value that isn't strictly `false` as remote/untrusted. This is the runtime
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* defense-in-depth for the case where a context is constructed via `as` cast
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* or `Partial<>` spread and `remote` ends up undefined despite the type.
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*
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* The bug class this guards against: a future transport (HTTP/2, WebSocket,
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* a third-party plugin) inlines its own OperationContext literal and forgets
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* to set `remote`. Without these tests, the type system's compile-time check
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* is the only line of defense, and any `as OperationContext` cast bypasses
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* it.
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*/
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import { describe, expect, test } from 'bun:test';
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import {
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operations,
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type Operation,
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type OperationContext,
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} from '../src/core/operations.ts';
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import type { BrainEngine } from '../src/core/engine.ts';
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const submit_job = operations.find(o => o.name === 'submit_job') as Operation;
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if (!submit_job) throw new Error('submit_job operation missing');
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// Stub engine — submit_job's protected-name guard fires before any DB call,
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// so the engine handle is never read on the rejection path.
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const stubEngine = {} as BrainEngine;
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const stubLogger = { info: () => {}, warn: () => {}, error: () => {} };
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/**
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* Construct an OperationContext with `remote` deliberately undefined despite
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* the type system saying it's required. Mimics what would happen if a future
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* transport inlines its own context literal and forgets the field.
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*/
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function castUndefinedRemoteCtx(): OperationContext {
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return {
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engine: stubEngine,
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config: { engine: 'pglite' } as any,
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logger: stubLogger,
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dryRun: false,
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// remote intentionally omitted; cast through unknown to bypass the type
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} as unknown as OperationContext;
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}
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describe('F7b — trust-boundary contract fail-closed semantics', () => {
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test('protected job submission rejected when remote is undefined (cast bypass)', async () => {
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const ctx = castUndefinedRemoteCtx();
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await expect(
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submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'shell', data: { cmd: 'id' } })
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
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});
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test('protected job submission rejected when remote is true', async () => {
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const ctx = { ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: true } as OperationContext;
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await expect(
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submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'shell', data: { cmd: 'id' } })
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).rejects.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
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});
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test('protected job submission ALLOWED only when remote is strictly false', async () => {
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const ctx = { ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: false } as OperationContext;
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// The handler now passes the protected-name guard and continues into the
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// queue. We don't actually want to enqueue anything in a unit test, so
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// we expect the call to fail at a LATER point (engine.executeRaw on the
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// stub). That's fine — what we're proving is that the guard does NOT
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// throw `permission_denied`, which is the failure mode we'd see if F7b
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// regressed back to a falsy check that treated remote=false as remote.
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await expect(
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submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'shell', data: { cmd: 'id' } })
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).rejects.not.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
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});
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test('non-protected job names always allowed regardless of remote', async () => {
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// 'default-noop' is not in PROTECTED_JOB_NAMES. The protected-name guard
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// skips entirely, so we again get a downstream stub-engine error.
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const cases: OperationContext[] = [
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castUndefinedRemoteCtx(),
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{ ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: true } as OperationContext,
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{ ...castUndefinedRemoteCtx(), remote: false } as OperationContext,
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];
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for (const ctx of cases) {
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await expect(
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submit_job.handler(ctx, { name: 'noop-job', data: {} })
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).rejects.not.toMatchObject({ code: 'permission_denied' });
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}
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});
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});
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