* fix(mcp): close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE + tighten remote contract
The HTTP MCP transport in serve-http.ts inlined its own OperationContext
literal and forgot to set `remote: true`. With the field undefined at the
operations.ts protected-job-name guard (line 1391), an HTTP MCP caller
holding a write-scoped OAuth token could submit `submit_job {name: "shell"}`
and execute arbitrary commands on the gbrain host (RCE-class).
Two-layer fix:
1. F7 — explicit `remote: true` on the inlined /mcp OperationContext.
Stdio MCP at src/mcp/dispatch.ts:61 already set this; the HTTP path
was the regression.
2. F7b — fail-closed contract on the four ctx.remote consumer sites in
operations.ts (auto-link skip, telemetry x2, protected-job guard).
The protected-job guard flips from `if (ctx.remote && ...)` to
`if (ctx.remote !== false && ...)` and the trusted-marker site flips
from `!ctx.remote && ...` to `ctx.remote === false && ...`. Anything
that isn't strictly `false` now treats the caller as remote/untrusted.
3. D12 — `OperationContext.remote` becomes REQUIRED in the TypeScript
type. The compiler now catches future transports that forget the field.
The runtime fail-closed defaults are belt+suspenders for any caller
that bypasses the type via `as` cast or `Partial<>` spread.
Tests:
- New `test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts` (4 cases) pins the
fail-closed semantics: undefined-via-cast rejects, remote=true rejects,
remote=false allowed (only path that escalates protected-name jobs).
- `test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts` adds 2 cases asserting HTTP MCP
cannot submit `shell` or `subagent` jobs even with read+write scope.
- `test/e2e/graph-quality.test.ts` adds the now-required `remote: false`
to its fixture (e2e graph quality simulates local-CLI writes).
Verification: bun test -> 3742 pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this trust-boundary regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + serve-http defense in depth
OAuth provider hardening pass that brings the provider into RFC compliance
on auth code, refresh token, and revocation flows, and tightens the
serve-http surface around request logging and admin cookies.
Provider (src/core/oauth-provider.ts):
- F1: bind client_id atomically into the auth code DELETE WHERE clause for
exchangeAuthorizationCode + challengeForAuthorizationCode. Previous
pattern (DELETE...RETURNING then post-hoc client compare) burned codes
on the wrong-client path so the legitimate client could not retry.
RFC 6749 §10.5.
- F2: same atomic predicate on exchangeRefreshToken. The pre-fix shape
defeated RFC 6749 §10.4's stolen-token detection by letting attacker +
victim both succeed.
- F3: refresh token rejects requested scopes that are not a subset of the
ORIGINAL grant on the row. Codex C9: subset is checked against the
recorded grant, not the client's currently-allowed scopes (which can
expand later); omitted scope inherits the original verbatim and stays
distinct from explicit-empty. RFC 6749 §6.
- F4: revokeToken adds AND client_id to the DELETE so a client cannot
revoke another client's tokens by guessing the hash. RFC 7009 §2.1.
- F5: deleted_at and token_ttl column probes use a new
isUndefinedColumnError helper (extracted to src/core/utils.ts per D14)
that matches SQLSTATE 42703 or column-name-in-message. Bare catch{}
used to swallow lock timeouts, network blips, and auth failures as
"column missing" — fail-open posture in a security path.
- F6: sweepExpiredTokens uses RETURNING 1 + array length. Pre-fix
(result as any).count returned 0 on at least one engine even when
rows were deleted, and codes were never counted.
- F7c: NEW finding eva-brain missed. exchangeAuthorizationCode now folds
redirect_uri into the atomic DELETE predicate when the parameter is
provided. Stored on /authorize, never compared on /token before this
commit. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 violation. Back-compat: when caller omits the
parameter the predicate is skipped, preserving SDK consumers that
haven't adopted the parameter yet.
- F12 (cleanup, not security): dcrDisabled constructor option replaces
the prior monkey-patch of _clientsStore in serve-http.ts. The SDK's
mcpAuthRouter only wires up /register when the store exposes
registerClient, so omitting the method via the constructor is
sufficient. Reframed as cleanup per codex C10 — the monkey-patch
happened before mcpAuthRouter ran, so the prior shape did not have
a real security regression to claim.
Dispatch (src/mcp/dispatch.ts):
- F8: new summarizeMcpParams(opName, params) intersects submitted keys
against the operation's declared params allow-list. Returns
{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}.
Closes the codex C8 leak: a naive "dump all submitted keys" summary
still echoed attacker-controlled key names like
put_page {"wiki/people/sensitive_name": "..."} into mcp_request_log
+ the SSE feed. Allow-list pattern keeps debug visibility on declared
keys while counting unknowns without naming them.
Serve-http (src/commands/serve-http.ts) + serve (src/commands/serve.ts):
- F8 wiring: mcp_request_log + SSE broadcast routed through
summarizeMcpParams by default. New --log-full-params flag bypasses
redaction with a loud stderr warning at startup. Default privacy-
positive; flag is the documented escape hatch for self-hosted
operators debugging on their own laptop.
- F9: admin cookies set Secure when req.secure OR issuerUrl.protocol
is https. Cloudflare-tunnel + reverse-proxy deployments where the
inside-tunnel hop looks like http but the public URL is https now
tag cookies correctly.
- F10: bound magicLinkNonces with NONCE_LRU_CAP. Previously only the
consumed-nonces map was capped; an attacker (or misbehaving agent)
with the bootstrap token could mint nonces faster than they expired
and grow the live store unbounded.
- F12: dcrDisabled flows through to the provider constructor instead of
monkey-patching _clientsStore after construction.
- F14: try/catch wraps StreamableHTTPServerTransport setup +
handleRequest. SDK-level throws no longer fall through to express's
default HTML error page; clients expecting JSON-RPC envelopes get a
JSON 500 instead.
- F15: error envelope unified via buildError + serializeError from
src/core/errors.ts. OperationError and unexpected exceptions both
emit the same {class, code, message, hint} shape so clients can
pattern-match a single envelope.
Tests:
- test/oauth.test.ts adds 11 cases:
* F1+F2 wrong-client cannot consume / read PKCE / burn refresh,
paired with owner-still-redeems atomically afterward (codex D6 —
proves the predicate doesn't burn the row on attacker attempts).
* F3 refresh scope subset enforced.
* F4 wrong-client cannot revoke.
* F5 non-schema SQL not swallowed by client_credentials soft-delete probe.
* F6 sweepExpiredTokens returns count > 0 after deleting rows.
* F7c redirect_uri match succeeds, mismatch rejects, omitted preserves
back-compat for callers that don't pass the parameter.
* F12 dcrDisabled constructor option exposes only getClient,
registerClientManual still works.
- test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts (NEW, 6 cases): pins the F8
privacy invariants. The codex-C8 attacker-key-name probe asserts that
a sensitive name submitted as a key never appears anywhere in the
redactor's output.
Verification: bun run typecheck clean. test/oauth.test.ts 55/55,
test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts 6/6,
test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts 4/4 from commit A. The one
unrelated unit failure surfaces on master too — environment-sensitive
test that expects ~/.gbrain/config.json to be absent in the test env.
Out of scope: F11 (auth register-client --redirect-uri flag) and F13
(serve --http argv positive-int validator) per codex C11 — operator
UX gaps, not trust-boundary fixes. Filed as follow-up TODOs.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this hardening pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: file F11 + F13 as OAuth hardening follow-up TODOs
Codex C11 flagged these as scope creep on the v0.26.7 OAuth hardening
PR (operator UX, not trust-boundary). Capturing them here so the
context survives — eva-brain has both implementations and the lift is
mechanical when we want to do them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): close adversarial-review findings on F7c + F8
Two bugs surfaced by an adversarial subagent during /ship's pre-landing
review pass that the codex + plan-eng-review didn't catch.
D15 / F7c: `exchangeAuthorizationCode` used `redirectUri ? ...` ternary
to choose the with-redirect vs no-redirect SQL. Empty string fell
through to the no-redirect branch, so a caller submitting
`redirect_uri=""` at /token bypassed the binding entirely. RFC 6749
§4.1.3 spec violation. Switch to `redirectUri !== undefined`. Test:
empty-string redirect_uri must reject when /authorize stored a real URI.
D16 / F8: `summarizeMcpParams` published exact byte length via
`approx_bytes = JSON.stringify(params).length`. Submitting put_page with
a known prefix and observing the resulting log entry across repeated
probes lets an attacker binary-search the size of secret suffix content.
Bucket to 1KB resolution. The redacted summary keeps a coarse
"roughly how big" signal for operators while making size-based
side-channel attacks useless.
Test count: 65 → 67 across the three new test files.
Typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.26.9)
OAuth 2.1 hardening + HTTP MCP shell-job RCE fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v0.26.9
Annotate CLAUDE.md key-files entries with v0.26.9 OAuth/MCP hardening pass:
- src/core/operations.ts: D12 (OperationContext.remote required) + F7b
(4-site fail-closed flip), HTTP MCP shell-job RCE close
- src/core/utils.ts: D14 isUndefinedColumnError extracted helper
- src/mcp/dispatch.ts: F8 summarizeMcpParams privacy redactor with
declared-keys allow-list + 1KB byte bucketing
- src/commands/serve-http.ts: F7+F8+F9+F10+F12+F14+F15 hardening
- src/core/oauth-provider.ts: F1+F2+F3+F4+F5+F6+F7c+F12 RFC 6749/7009
hardening pass
Add new test-file entries for test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts
(7 cases) and test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts (4 cases). Extend
test/oauth.test.ts (+14 cases) and test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts
(+2 RCE-close regressions) entries with v0.26.9 case counts.
README.md: added --log-full-params to gbrain serve --http surface.
SECURITY.md: documented mcp_request_log.params redaction default
({redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}) +
--log-full-params opt-in.
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: operator-facing note on SSE feed + audit log
redaction default and when to flip --log-full-params on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
6.6 KiB
Security
Reporting Vulnerabilities
If you discover a security issue in GBrain, please report it privately by opening a private security advisory on GitHub.
Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Remote MCP Security
⚠️ Do NOT use open OAuth client registration for remote MCP
If you deploy GBrain's MCP server behind an HTTP wrapper with OAuth 2.1 support, never allow unauthenticated client registration. An attacker who discovers your server URL can:
- Register a new OAuth client via
POST /register - Use
client_credentialsgrant to obtain a bearer token - Access all brain data via the MCP tools
Recommended: gbrain serve --http
As of v0.22.7, GBrain ships a built-in HTTP transport that uses the
existing access_tokens table for authentication:
# Create a token
gbrain auth create "my-client"
# Start the HTTP server
gbrain serve --http --port 8787
# Connect via ngrok, Tailscale, or any tunnel
ngrok http 8787 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
This is the recommended way to expose GBrain remotely. No OAuth, no
registration endpoint, no self-service tokens. Tokens are managed
exclusively via gbrain auth create/list/revoke.
If you must use a custom HTTP wrapper
- Require a secret for client registration — check a header or body parameter before creating new OAuth clients
- Disable
client_credentialsgrant — only allowauthorization_codewith browser-based approval - Restrict scopes — never issue tokens with unlimited scope
- Log all token issuance — alert on unexpected registrations
- Rate-limit registration and token endpoints
Token Management
gbrain auth create "claude-desktop" # Create a new token
gbrain auth list # List all tokens
gbrain auth revoke "claude-desktop" # Revoke a token
gbrain auth test <url> --token <tok> # Smoke-test a remote server
Tokens are stored as SHA-256 hashes in the access_tokens table. The
plaintext token is shown once at creation and never stored.
gbrain serve --http hardening (v0.22.7+)
The built-in HTTP transport ships with several layers of hardening on by default. All env vars below are optional; the defaults are intentionally conservative.
Postgres-only
gbrain serve --http requires a Postgres engine. PGLite is local-only by
design and the access_tokens / mcp_request_log tables don't exist in
the PGLite schema. Local agents continue to use stdio (gbrain serve).
Running --http against a PGLite-backed install fails fast with a clear
error message at startup.
CORS
Default-deny: no Access-Control-Allow-Origin header is sent unless an
allowlist is configured. To allow browser-based MCP clients:
GBRAIN_HTTP_CORS_ORIGIN=https://claude.ai gbrain serve --http --port 8787
# Multiple origins: comma-separated
GBRAIN_HTTP_CORS_ORIGIN=https://claude.ai,https://your.app gbrain serve --http
When the request Origin matches the allowlist, the server echoes it
back in Access-Control-Allow-Origin (with Vary: Origin). Otherwise no
CORS header is sent and the browser blocks the request.
Rate limiting
Two buckets, both stored in a bounded LRU map (default 10K keys, evicts least-recently-used on overflow, prunes entries older than 2× the window):
| Bucket | When it fires | Default | Env var |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pre-auth IP | Before the DB lookup, on every /mcp request |
30 req / 60s | GBRAIN_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_IP |
| Post-auth token | After a valid token is resolved | 60 req / 60s | GBRAIN_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_TOKEN |
| LRU cap | Maximum distinct keys across both buckets | 10000 | GBRAIN_HTTP_RATE_LIMIT_LRU |
On exhaustion the server returns 429 Too Many Requests with a
Retry-After header.
Caveat for tunneled deployments (ngrok, Tailscale Funnel, Cloudflare Tunnel): all requests share one egress IP, so the pre-auth IP bucket becomes effectively shared by all clients on that tunnel. The post-auth token-id bucket is the load-bearing limiter for tunnel-fronted deployments.
Reverse-proxy trust
Disabled by default. To honor X-Forwarded-For (or X-Real-IP) when
gbrain runs behind a trusted reverse proxy:
GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1 gbrain serve --http --port 8787
Critical safety contract: only set GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1 when
both of these are true:
- gbrain is reachable only via a trusted reverse proxy (not directly
exposed to the internet on the configured port). The simplest
guarantee is to bind gbrain to
127.0.0.1or a private interface and have the proxy forward to it. - The proxy strips any client-supplied
X-Forwarded-ForandX-Real-IPheaders, then sets them itself. (nginx withproxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $remote_addrdoes this; Cloudflare and most cloud load balancers handle it automatically.)
If gbrain is reachable directly AND GBRAIN_HTTP_TRUST_PROXY=1 is set,
clients can spoof their IP by sending arbitrary X-Forwarded-For
headers, defeating the pre-auth IP rate limit. Without the flag, gbrain
ignores all forwarded-for headers and uses the socket peer address,
which is the safe default for direct-exposure deployments.
Body size cap
Default 1 MiB, stream-counted (chunked transfers without
Content-Length are still capped). Override:
GBRAIN_HTTP_MAX_BODY_BYTES=2097152 gbrain serve --http # 2 MiB
Over-cap requests get 413 Payload Too Large immediately, before any
body is materialized in memory.
Audit log
Every /mcp request writes one row to mcp_request_log:
psql "$DATABASE_URL" -c \
"SELECT created_at, token_name, operation, status, latency_ms
FROM mcp_request_log
ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 100"
status is one of: success, error, auth_failed, rate_limited,
body_too_large, parse_error, unknown_method. Failed-auth rows have
token_name = NULL. Inserts are fire-and-forget so audit failures
never block requests.
v0.26.9 redaction default. The params column now stores
{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes} instead
of raw JSON-RPC payloads. Declared keys (intersected against the operation's
spec) preserve for debug visibility; unknown keys are counted but never
named so attackers can't probe key existence; byte sizes bucket to 1KB so
content sizes can't be binary-searched. The same shape is broadcast on the
admin SSE feed at /admin/events. Operators on a personal laptop who want
raw payloads back can pass gbrain serve --http --log-full-params (loud
stderr warning at startup). Multi-tenant deployments should leave it
on the redacted default.