Files
gbrain/test/eval
Garry TanandClaude Opus 4.6 e1e699f0a6 feat(eval): Day 9 — sealed qrels via PublicPage + PublicQuery at adapter boundary
Codex fixes #1, #2, #3 from the plan's outside-voice review. Enforcement
shifts from SOFT-VIA-TYPE-COMMENT to SOFT-VIA-SANITIZED-OBJECT. Hard
enforcement via process isolation waits for BrainBench v2 Docker sandbox.

**eval/runner/types.ts** additions:
  - `PublicPage = Pick<Page, 'slug' | 'type' | 'title' | 'compiled_truth' |
    'timeline'>` — the exact 5 fields adapters should see. No _facts.
    No frontmatter (a known hiding spot for accidental gold leaks).
  - `sanitizePage(p: Page): PublicPage` — returns a NEW object with the 5
    fields only. Cannot be bypassed by `(page as any)._facts` because the
    field does not exist on the sanitized object.
  - `PublicQuery = Omit<Query, 'gold'>` — strips the gold field.
  - `sanitizeQuery(q: Query): PublicQuery` — enumerates public fields
    explicitly (not spread+delete) so no prototype weirdness leaves gold
    reachable.

**eval/runner/multi-adapter.ts** — scoreOneRun now calls sanitizePage /
sanitizeQuery before passing to adapter.init / adapter.query. The scorer
retains the full Query shape (including gold.relevant) for precision /
recall computation. Adapter signatures unchanged — the sealing is at the
OBJECT level, not the type level. This keeps existing adapters
(ripgrep-bm25, vector-only, hybrid-nograph, gbrain-after) binary-compatible.
Verified: no existing adapter reads q.gold or page._facts, so the change
is safe without further adapter updates.

**test/eval/sealed-qrels.test.ts** (17 tests):
  - sanitizePage strips _facts + frontmatter + arbitrary hidden keys
  - Output has exactly the 5 public keys (deep introspection)
  - Proxy tripwire simulates a malicious adapter: any access to _facts or
    gold throws `sealed-qrels violation`
  - sanitizeQuery retains optional fields (as_of_date, tags, author,
    acceptable_variants, known_failure_modes) but omits undefined ones
  - Honest documentation of the seal's limits: filesystem bypass and
    Proxy attacks would still work in v1; Docker isolation (v2) is the
    real enforcement

Every existing eval test still passes (273 before + 17 sealed-qrels = 290).

Total eval suite now: 290 pass, 0 fail.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 22:09:00 +08:00
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