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* v0.36.5.0 feat: secure DATABASE_URL access for shell jobs (inherit: ["database_url"]) Replaces PR #1137's plaintext-config / plaintext-env workarounds with code. Shell-job params gain `inherit: ["database_url"]`, validated pre-enqueue in both the CLI (`gbrain jobs submit`) and `submit_job` MCP op handler. Worker resolves the value from its own loadConfig() at child-spawn time; the persisted `minion_jobs.data` row stores only the name. Plain `env: { GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL: ... }` / `env: { DATABASE_URL: ... }` / `env: { GBRAIN_DIRECT_DATABASE_URL: ... }` are rejected pre-enqueue with a paste-ready hint pointing at `inherit:`. Codex pre-landing review caught two bypasses + one missing shadow name: - H1: cmd/argv inline-secret regex scan (cmd:"GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL=... gbrain sync" was a clean bypass — fixed) - H3: GBRAIN_DIRECT_DATABASE_URL added to shadowKeys - H2: honest docs about output-side leakage (stdout_tail/stderr_tail can still carry the value if the script prints it; that's the script author's responsibility, not gbrain's) Also: gbrain doctor learns home_dir_in_worktree (warns when ~/.gbrain lives inside a git worktree); ~/.gbrain/.gitignore retroactive via saveConfig + post-upgrade. New canonical guide: docs/guides/agent-to-gbrain.md (two-domain framing for downstream agent authors: MCP ops via OAuth vs localOnly admin ops via shell-job inherit:). Closes #1137. Tests: +53 new (21 validator + 12 inherit-record + 6 ensureGitignore + 5 doctor + 2 PGLite E2E + 7 codex-driven H1/H3 cases). Credit: @wintermute filed PR #1137 which made the env-stripping gap visible enough to fix in code. Thank you. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.36.5.0 redesign: free-form inherit:, drop closed enum User feedback: "agent spawning minions should have agency to do what it wants with secrets and pass only the ones that it needs. don't be a security nazi please." Replaces the closed INHERITABLE enum (database_url only) with three small helpers in shell-inherit.ts: - INHERIT_NAME_RE: snake_case shape guard. Rejects __proto__, leading underscore, uppercase, path-traversal. Prototype-pollution defense. - deriveEnvKey(name): config-key → child-env-key. Uppercase by default with one override: database_url → GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL. - resolveInheritValue(cfg, name): value lookup with Object.hasOwn. inherit: now accepts any snake_case config-key the worker has. Agent picks what it needs per-job (database_url, anthropic_api_key, voyage_api_key, or any custom field). Validator does NOT police WHICH keys — single-uid trust model treats agent as peer of worker. Drops the v0.36.5.0-RC rules that were paternalistic for the actual threat model: - closed-enum check - env-shadow rejection - cmd/argv inline-secret scan Keeps the parts that defend real problems: - pre-enqueue validation (closes the persistence-before-throw window) - snake_case regex (prototype-pollution + audit-log readability) - fail-fast on missing config value (UX guardrail, not security) Tests: shell-validate (existing rules + new free-form + prototype-pollution defense + T1 regression guard) and shell-inherit (regex matrix, deriveEnvKey per-name, resolveInheritValue with hasOwn defense). E2E case now exercises inherit:["anthropic_api_key"] to prove genuinely free-form. Docs and CHANGELOG rewritten to reflect the open design + the design-arc story (closed → cut → free-form). Migration file too. 7653 unit tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.36.5.0 add: redact_secrets opt-in for stdout/stderr scrubbing Honest defense for the documented output-side leakage. When a script prints an inherited secret, the value lands plaintext in result.stdout_tail / result.stderr_tail / error_text. v0.36.5.0 adds: - `redact_secrets: true` ShellJobParams field - `--redact-secrets` CLI convenience flag on `gbrain jobs submit shell` - shell-redact.ts: pure `redactSecretsInText(text, secrets)` helper (string-mode replaceAll; regex metachars in values stay literal) - Handler post-processes both tails before throw/return, so the persisted row carries `<REDACTED:name>` tokens instead of values Only inherit-resolved values are scrubbed. env: values are not (those are the agent's "fine in the row" channel by design). Heuristic — defeats accidental `echo "$GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL"`, not adversarial encode-then-print. Default false for back-compat. Tests: - test/minions-shell-redact.test.ts (9 cases): pure-function behavior, regex-metachar safety, multi-secret independent redaction, substring overlap, empty-input/map edge cases - test/minions-shell-validate.test.ts: +4 cases for redact_secrets shape - test/e2e/minions-shell-pglite.test.ts: +2 cases proving redact_secrets: true scrubs persisted row AND redact_secrets:false preserves plaintext (back-compat regression guard) Docs + CHANGELOG + migration file + CLAUDE.md updated. 7667 unit tests green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>