* v0.36.5.0 feat: secure DATABASE_URL access for shell jobs (inherit: ["database_url"])
Replaces PR #1137's plaintext-config / plaintext-env workarounds with code.
Shell-job params gain `inherit: ["database_url"]`, validated pre-enqueue in
both the CLI (`gbrain jobs submit`) and `submit_job` MCP op handler. Worker
resolves the value from its own loadConfig() at child-spawn time; the
persisted `minion_jobs.data` row stores only the name. Plain
`env: { GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL: ... }` / `env: { DATABASE_URL: ... }` /
`env: { GBRAIN_DIRECT_DATABASE_URL: ... }` are rejected pre-enqueue with a
paste-ready hint pointing at `inherit:`.
Codex pre-landing review caught two bypasses + one missing shadow name:
- H1: cmd/argv inline-secret regex scan (cmd:"GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL=... gbrain
sync" was a clean bypass — fixed)
- H3: GBRAIN_DIRECT_DATABASE_URL added to shadowKeys
- H2: honest docs about output-side leakage (stdout_tail/stderr_tail can still
carry the value if the script prints it; that's the script author's
responsibility, not gbrain's)
Also: gbrain doctor learns home_dir_in_worktree (warns when ~/.gbrain lives
inside a git worktree); ~/.gbrain/.gitignore retroactive via saveConfig +
post-upgrade.
New canonical guide: docs/guides/agent-to-gbrain.md (two-domain framing for
downstream agent authors: MCP ops via OAuth vs localOnly admin ops via
shell-job inherit:).
Closes#1137. Tests: +53 new (21 validator + 12 inherit-record + 6
ensureGitignore + 5 doctor + 2 PGLite E2E + 7 codex-driven H1/H3 cases).
Credit: @wintermute filed PR #1137 which made the env-stripping gap visible
enough to fix in code. Thank you.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* v0.36.5.0 redesign: free-form inherit:, drop closed enum
User feedback: "agent spawning minions should have agency to do what it wants
with secrets and pass only the ones that it needs. don't be a security nazi
please."
Replaces the closed INHERITABLE enum (database_url only) with three small
helpers in shell-inherit.ts:
- INHERIT_NAME_RE: snake_case shape guard. Rejects __proto__, leading
underscore, uppercase, path-traversal. Prototype-pollution defense.
- deriveEnvKey(name): config-key → child-env-key. Uppercase by default with
one override: database_url → GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL.
- resolveInheritValue(cfg, name): value lookup with Object.hasOwn.
inherit: now accepts any snake_case config-key the worker has. Agent picks
what it needs per-job (database_url, anthropic_api_key, voyage_api_key, or
any custom field). Validator does NOT police WHICH keys — single-uid trust
model treats agent as peer of worker.
Drops the v0.36.5.0-RC rules that were paternalistic for the actual threat
model:
- closed-enum check
- env-shadow rejection
- cmd/argv inline-secret scan
Keeps the parts that defend real problems:
- pre-enqueue validation (closes the persistence-before-throw window)
- snake_case regex (prototype-pollution + audit-log readability)
- fail-fast on missing config value (UX guardrail, not security)
Tests: shell-validate (existing rules + new free-form + prototype-pollution
defense + T1 regression guard) and shell-inherit (regex matrix, deriveEnvKey
per-name, resolveInheritValue with hasOwn defense). E2E case now exercises
inherit:["anthropic_api_key"] to prove genuinely free-form.
Docs and CHANGELOG rewritten to reflect the open design + the design-arc
story (closed → cut → free-form). Migration file too.
7653 unit tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* v0.36.5.0 add: redact_secrets opt-in for stdout/stderr scrubbing
Honest defense for the documented output-side leakage. When a script prints
an inherited secret, the value lands plaintext in
result.stdout_tail / result.stderr_tail / error_text. v0.36.5.0 adds:
- `redact_secrets: true` ShellJobParams field
- `--redact-secrets` CLI convenience flag on `gbrain jobs submit shell`
- shell-redact.ts: pure `redactSecretsInText(text, secrets)` helper
(string-mode replaceAll; regex metachars in values stay literal)
- Handler post-processes both tails before throw/return, so the persisted
row carries `<REDACTED:name>` tokens instead of values
Only inherit-resolved values are scrubbed. env: values are not (those are
the agent's "fine in the row" channel by design). Heuristic — defeats
accidental `echo "$GBRAIN_DATABASE_URL"`, not adversarial encode-then-print.
Default false for back-compat.
Tests:
- test/minions-shell-redact.test.ts (9 cases): pure-function behavior,
regex-metachar safety, multi-secret independent redaction, substring
overlap, empty-input/map edge cases
- test/minions-shell-validate.test.ts: +4 cases for redact_secrets shape
- test/e2e/minions-shell-pglite.test.ts: +2 cases proving redact_secrets:
true scrubs persisted row AND redact_secrets:false preserves plaintext
(back-compat regression guard)
Docs + CHANGELOG + migration file + CLAUDE.md updated.
7667 unit tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
