diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/code_executor/agent.toml b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/code_executor/agent.toml
index 69405214b..1c11321d9 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/code_executor/agent.toml
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/code_executor/agent.toml
@@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ omit_skills_catalog = true
 hint = "coding"
 
 [tools]
-named = ["shell", "file_read", "file_write", "git_operations", "node_exec", "npm_exec"]
+named = ["shell", "file_read", "file_write", "git_operations", "node_exec", "npm_exec", "curl"]
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/agent.toml b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/agent.toml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..977240374
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/agent.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+id = "help"
+display_name = "Help"
+delegate_name = "ask_docs"
+when_to_use = "Product help — answers questions about how OpenHuman works, what features exist, how to configure things, or where to find a guide. Reads the OpenHuman GitBook docs via the `gitbooks_*` tools. Use this for any 'how do I…' / 'what does X do' / 'where is the setting for…' question about OpenHuman itself, before guessing or making things up."
+temperature = 0.3
+max_iterations = 6
+sandbox_mode = "read_only"
+
+# Drop the standard identity/safety/skills/profile boilerplate — this
+# agent has a narrow, single-purpose voice and no need for the full
+# orchestrator-style preamble. Memory context is kept on so we can
+# personalise references ("you mentioned earlier that you use X").
+omit_identity = true
+omit_memory_context = false
+omit_safety_preamble = true
+omit_skills_catalog = true
+omit_profile = false
+omit_memory_md = false
+
+[model]
+hint = "agentic"
+
+[tools]
+named = ["gitbooks_search", "gitbooks_get_page", "memory_recall"]
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/mod.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/mod.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8bf84783c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/mod.rs
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+pub mod prompt;
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/prompt.md b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/prompt.md
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..98b9a533c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/prompt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Help Agent
+
+You are the **Help** agent — OpenHuman's product docs specialist. Your job is to answer questions about **OpenHuman itself** by searching the official documentation and giving the user a direct, grounded answer with links to the relevant pages.
+
+## Tone
+
+- **Direct and concrete.** Answer the question. Don't restate it back.
+- **Cite the docs.** When you use information from a search hit or page, include the page link in your reply so the user can read more.
+- **Short.** A sentence or two when that's enough; a tight bulleted list when there are real steps.
+- **Honest about gaps.** If the docs don't cover something, say so plainly — do not invent features, flags, or commands.
+
+## How to work
+
+You have three tools:
+
+- `gitbooks_search { query }` — returns excerpts from the OpenHuman GitBook docs along with page titles and URLs. Always start here.
+- `gitbooks_get_page { url }` — fetches the full markdown of a page. Use it only when the search excerpt does not contain enough detail to answer the question.
+- `memory_recall { query, ... }` — pulls relevant past context about this user. Use sparingly, only when the user's question depends on something they told you before.
+
+### Standard flow
+
+1. **Search first.** Call `gitbooks_search` with a focused query that mirrors the user's intent, not their literal phrasing. Prefer feature names ("screen intelligence", "cron", "skills", "MCP") over filler verbs.
+2. **Read the excerpts.** If one of them clearly answers the question, write the answer in your own words and link the page. Done.
+3. **Drill in if needed.** If the excerpts are too partial, call `gitbooks_get_page` on the most promising URL, then answer.
+4. **Refine the search.** If the first query missed, reformulate (different keywords, narrower scope) and try once more before admitting you cannot find it.
+
+### What you do NOT do
+
+- Do not run shell commands, write files, edit configuration, or call other tools. Help is read-only — you point to docs, you do not change the system.
+- Do not invent commands, config keys, env vars, or feature names. If GitBook does not mention it, treat it as not documented.
+- Do not delegate by spawning sub-agents. Stay in your lane.
+
+## Output shape
+
+When the answer is short:
+
+> The morning-briefing agent runs at the time you set under `[scheduler.morning_briefing.cron]` in `config.toml`. By default that's 7 AM local. ([source](https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io/openhuman/...))
+
+When there are steps, use a tight numbered list and link the source at the end:
+
+> 1. Open Settings → Skills.
+> 2. Click **Connect** next to Gmail.
+> 3. Authorize in the popup.
+>
+> ([source](https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io/openhuman/...))
+
+When the docs do not cover the question:
+
+> The OpenHuman docs don't cover that. You may want to check the GitHub repo or ask in the community channel.
+
+Keep it that simple.
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/prompt.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/prompt.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8d738de80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/help/prompt.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+//! System prompt builder for the `help` built-in agent.
+//!
+//! Help is a read-only docs-grounded agent. The body is straightforward
+//! — render the archetype, then the standard tools + workspace blocks
+//! so the model sees the `gitbooks_*` schemas the runtime injected.
+
+use crate::openhuman::context::prompt::{
+    render_tools, render_user_files, render_workspace, PromptContext,
+};
+use anyhow::Result;
+
+const ARCHETYPE: &str = include_str!("prompt.md");
+
+pub fn build(ctx: &PromptContext<'_>) -> Result<String> {
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(4096);
+    out.push_str(ARCHETYPE.trim_end());
+    out.push_str("\n\n");
+
+    let user_files = render_user_files(ctx)?;
+    if !user_files.trim().is_empty() {
+        out.push_str(user_files.trim_end());
+        out.push_str("\n\n");
+    }
+
+    let tools = render_tools(ctx)?;
+    if !tools.trim().is_empty() {
+        out.push_str(tools.trim_end());
+        out.push_str("\n\n");
+    }
+
+    let workspace = render_workspace(ctx)?;
+    if !workspace.trim().is_empty() {
+        out.push_str(workspace.trim_end());
+        out.push('\n');
+    }
+
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::openhuman::context::prompt::{LearnedContextData, ToolCallFormat};
+    use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn build_returns_nonempty_body() {
+        let visible: HashSet<String> = HashSet::new();
+        let ctx = PromptContext {
+            workspace_dir: std::path::Path::new("."),
+            model_name: "test",
+            agent_id: "help",
+            tools: &[],
+            skills: &[],
+            dispatcher_instructions: "",
+            learned: LearnedContextData::default(),
+            visible_tool_names: &visible,
+            tool_call_format: ToolCallFormat::PFormat,
+            connected_integrations: &[],
+            connected_identities_md: String::new(),
+            include_profile: false,
+            include_memory_md: false,
+        };
+        let body = build(&ctx).unwrap();
+        assert!(!body.is_empty());
+        assert!(body.contains("Help Agent"));
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/loader.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/loader.rs
index f0dc1cbef..cf78c9eda 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/loader.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/loader.rs
@@ -127,6 +127,11 @@ pub const BUILTINS: &[BuiltinAgent] = &[
         toml: include_str!("summarizer/agent.toml"),
         prompt_fn: super::summarizer::prompt::build,
     },
+    BuiltinAgent {
+        id: "help",
+        toml: include_str!("help/agent.toml"),
+        prompt_fn: super::help::prompt::build,
+    },
 ];
 
 /// Parse every entry in [`BUILTINS`] into an [`AgentDefinition`].
@@ -172,7 +177,7 @@ mod tests {
     fn all_builtins_parse() {
         let defs = load_builtins().expect("built-in TOML must parse");
         assert_eq!(defs.len(), BUILTINS.len());
-        assert_eq!(defs.len(), 14, "expected 14 built-in agents");
+        assert_eq!(defs.len(), 15, "expected 15 built-in agents");
     }
 
     #[test]
@@ -365,13 +370,89 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(def.max_iterations, 8);
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn help_uses_gitbooks_tools_and_is_read_only() {
+        let def = find("help");
+        assert_eq!(def.sandbox_mode, SandboxMode::ReadOnly);
+        match &def.tools {
+            ToolScope::Named(tools) => {
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "gitbooks_search"),
+                    "help needs gitbooks_search"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "gitbooks_get_page"),
+                    "help needs gitbooks_get_page"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "memory_recall"),
+                    "help needs memory_recall for personalisation"
+                );
+                // Help is docs-only — no write/exec tools.
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "shell"));
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "file_write"));
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "curl"));
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "spawn_subagent"));
+            }
+            ToolScope::Wildcard => panic!("help must have a Named tool scope"),
+        }
+        assert!(def.omit_identity);
+        assert!(def.omit_safety_preamble);
+        assert!(!def.omit_memory_context);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn researcher_has_curl_for_artifact_downloads() {
+        let def = find("researcher");
+        match &def.tools {
+            ToolScope::Named(tools) => {
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "curl"),
+                    "researcher needs curl for artifact downloads"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "http_request"),
+                    "researcher still needs http_request"
+                );
+            }
+            ToolScope::Wildcard => panic!("researcher must have Named tool scope"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn code_executor_has_curl_for_artifact_downloads() {
+        let def = find("code_executor");
+        match &def.tools {
+            ToolScope::Named(tools) => {
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "curl"),
+                    "code_executor needs curl for artifact/dataset fetches"
+                );
+            }
+            ToolScope::Wildcard => panic!("code_executor must have Named tool scope"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn orchestrator_does_not_get_curl() {
+        // Per design: curl is a `Write` permission tool that writes
+        // to the workspace. The orchestrator delegates rather than
+        // executing — code_executor / researcher own actual downloads.
+        let def = find("orchestrator");
+        if let ToolScope::Named(tools) = &def.tools {
+            assert!(
+                !tools.iter().any(|t| t == "curl"),
+                "orchestrator must not have curl — it should delegate"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn welcome_has_onboarding_and_memory_tools() {
         let def = find("welcome");
         assert_eq!(def.sandbox_mode, SandboxMode::ReadOnly);
         match &def.tools {
             ToolScope::Named(tools) => {
-                assert_eq!(tools.len(), 4, "welcome should have exactly four tools");
                 assert!(
                     tools.iter().any(|t| t == "check_onboarding_status"),
                     "welcome needs check_onboarding_status"
@@ -388,6 +469,18 @@ mod tests {
                     tools.iter().any(|t| t == "composio_authorize"),
                     "welcome needs composio_authorize"
                 );
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "gitbooks_search"),
+                    "welcome needs gitbooks_search to answer 'how does X work' during onboarding"
+                );
+                assert!(
+                    tools.iter().any(|t| t == "gitbooks_get_page"),
+                    "welcome needs gitbooks_get_page for full-page lookups"
+                );
+                // Welcome must not gain write/exec power; onboarding stays read-only.
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "shell"));
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "file_write"));
+                assert!(!tools.iter().any(|t| t == "curl"));
             }
             ToolScope::Wildcard => panic!("welcome must have a Named tool scope"),
         }
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/mod.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/mod.rs
index 9d519e4b5..b16562b65 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/mod.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/mod.rs
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ mod loader;
 pub mod archivist;
 pub mod code_executor;
 pub mod critic;
+pub mod help;
 pub mod integrations_agent;
 pub mod morning_briefing;
 pub mod orchestrator;
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/researcher/agent.toml b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/researcher/agent.toml
index 46be95e70..db5a77a70 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/researcher/agent.toml
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/researcher/agent.toml
@@ -14,4 +14,4 @@ omit_skills_catalog = true
 hint = "agentic"
 
 [tools]
-named = ["http_request", "web_search", "file_read", "memory_recall"]
+named = ["http_request", "curl", "web_search", "file_read", "memory_recall"]
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/agent.toml b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/agent.toml
index fd58bc2d9..6f55dd197 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/agent.toml
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/agent.toml
@@ -30,9 +30,13 @@ hint = "agentic"
 # complete_onboarding: finalize the welcome flow once ready_to_complete is true.
 # memory_recall: pull additional user details beyond injected context.
 # composio_authorize: start an OAuth flow for a toolkit (e.g. gmail).
+# gitbooks_*: answer "how does X work" / "what can OpenHuman do" questions
+#   during onboarding from the real product docs instead of guessing.
 named = [
     "check_onboarding_status",
     "complete_onboarding",
     "memory_recall",
     "composio_authorize",
+    "gitbooks_search",
+    "gitbooks_get_page",
 ]
diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/prompt.md b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/prompt.md
index 7b4fb4286..0e255c2a4 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/prompt.md
+++ b/src/openhuman/agent/agents/welcome/prompt.md
@@ -11,7 +11,9 @@ You are the **Welcome** agent — the first agent a new user talks to in OpenHum
 
 ## Tools you must use correctly
 
-You have `check_onboarding_status`, `complete_onboarding`, `memory_recall`, and `composio_authorize`.
+You have `check_onboarding_status`, `complete_onboarding`, `memory_recall`, `composio_authorize`, `gitbooks_search`, and `gitbooks_get_page`.
+
+If the user asks a "how does X work" / "what can OpenHuman do" / "where is the setting for…" question during onboarding, call `gitbooks_search` first and ground your answer in the real docs — do **not** guess feature names, flags, or commands. Use `gitbooks_get_page` only when the search excerpt is too partial. Cite the page URL inline so they can read more. Keep doc-grounded replies short and steer the conversation back to setup once they're satisfied — your primary job is still onboarding, not an open-ended Q&A loop.
 
 | Tool | What it does |
 |------|--------------|
diff --git a/src/openhuman/config/mod.rs b/src/openhuman/config/mod.rs
index 67580ef16..117b3723b 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/config/mod.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/config/mod.rs
@@ -26,15 +26,16 @@ pub use schema::{
     build_runtime_proxy_client_with_timeouts, runtime_proxy_config, set_runtime_proxy_config,
     AgentConfig, AuditConfig, AutocompleteConfig, AutonomyConfig, BrowserComputerUseConfig,
     BrowserConfig, ChannelsConfig, ComposioConfig, Config, ContextConfig, CostConfig, CronConfig,
-    DelegateAgentConfig, DictationActivationMode, DictationConfig, DiscordConfig,
-    DockerRuntimeConfig, EmbeddingRouteConfig, HeartbeatConfig, HttpRequestConfig, IMessageConfig,
-    IntegrationToggle, IntegrationsConfig, LarkConfig, LearningConfig, LocalAiConfig, MatrixConfig,
-    MemoryConfig, ModelRouteConfig, MultimodalConfig, ObservabilityConfig, ProxyConfig, ProxyScope,
-    ReflectionSource, ReliabilityConfig, ResourceLimitsConfig, RuntimeConfig, SandboxBackend,
-    SandboxConfig, SchedulerConfig, ScreenIntelligenceConfig, SecretsConfig, SecurityConfig,
-    SlackConfig, StorageConfig, StorageProviderConfig, StorageProviderSection, StreamMode,
-    TelegramConfig, UpdateConfig, VoiceActivationMode, VoiceServerConfig, WebSearchConfig,
-    WebhookConfig, DEFAULT_MODEL, MODEL_AGENTIC_V1, MODEL_CODING_V1, MODEL_REASONING_V1,
+    CurlConfig, DelegateAgentConfig, DictationActivationMode, DictationConfig, DiscordConfig,
+    DockerRuntimeConfig, EmbeddingRouteConfig, GitbooksConfig, HeartbeatConfig, HttpRequestConfig,
+    IMessageConfig, IntegrationToggle, IntegrationsConfig, LarkConfig, LearningConfig,
+    LocalAiConfig, MatrixConfig, MemoryConfig, ModelRouteConfig, MultimodalConfig,
+    ObservabilityConfig, ProxyConfig, ProxyScope, ReflectionSource, ReliabilityConfig,
+    ResourceLimitsConfig, RuntimeConfig, SandboxBackend, SandboxConfig, SchedulerConfig,
+    ScreenIntelligenceConfig, SecretsConfig, SecurityConfig, SlackConfig, StorageConfig,
+    StorageProviderConfig, StorageProviderSection, StreamMode, TelegramConfig, UpdateConfig,
+    VoiceActivationMode, VoiceServerConfig, WebSearchConfig, WebhookConfig, DEFAULT_MODEL,
+    MODEL_AGENTIC_V1, MODEL_CODING_V1, MODEL_REASONING_V1,
 };
 pub use schema::{
     clear_active_user, default_root_openhuman_dir, pre_login_user_dir, read_active_user_id,
diff --git a/src/openhuman/config/schema/mod.rs b/src/openhuman/config/schema/mod.rs
index 0c77cb7ba..b3e8f3e08 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/config/schema/mod.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/config/schema/mod.rs
@@ -57,9 +57,9 @@ pub use storage_memory::{
     MemoryConfig, MemoryTreeConfig, StorageConfig, StorageProviderConfig, StorageProviderSection,
 };
 pub use tools::{
-    BrowserComputerUseConfig, BrowserConfig, ComposioConfig, ComputerControlConfig,
-    HttpRequestConfig, IntegrationToggle, IntegrationsConfig, MultimodalConfig, SecretsConfig,
-    WebSearchConfig,
+    BrowserComputerUseConfig, BrowserConfig, ComposioConfig, ComputerControlConfig, CurlConfig,
+    GitbooksConfig, HttpRequestConfig, IntegrationToggle, IntegrationsConfig, MultimodalConfig,
+    SecretsConfig, WebSearchConfig,
 };
 pub use update::UpdateConfig;
 mod voice_server;
diff --git a/src/openhuman/config/schema/tools.rs b/src/openhuman/config/schema/tools.rs
index aa4fda071..4e4c9eaa0 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/config/schema/tools.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/config/schema/tools.rs
@@ -148,6 +148,75 @@ fn default_http_timeout_secs() -> u64 {
     30
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
+pub struct CurlConfig {
+    /// Subdirectory under `workspace_dir` where downloads land. Inputs
+    /// are resolved relative to this root; absolute paths and `..`
+    /// segments are rejected.
+    #[serde(default = "default_curl_dest_subdir")]
+    pub dest_subdir: String,
+    /// Hard byte ceiling per download. Streaming aborts and the
+    /// partial file is removed if exceeded.
+    #[serde(default = "default_curl_max_download_bytes")]
+    pub max_download_bytes: u64,
+    /// Per-request timeout in seconds.
+    #[serde(default = "default_curl_timeout_secs")]
+    pub timeout_secs: u64,
+}
+
+fn default_curl_dest_subdir() -> String {
+    "downloads".into()
+}
+
+fn default_curl_max_download_bytes() -> u64 {
+    50 * 1024 * 1024
+}
+
+fn default_curl_timeout_secs() -> u64 {
+    120
+}
+
+impl Default for CurlConfig {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            dest_subdir: default_curl_dest_subdir(),
+            max_download_bytes: default_curl_max_download_bytes(),
+            timeout_secs: default_curl_timeout_secs(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
+pub struct GitbooksConfig {
+    /// When `true`, register `gitbooks_search` and `gitbooks_get_page`.
+    #[serde(default = "defaults::default_true")]
+    pub enabled: bool,
+    /// MCP endpoint URL for the OpenHuman GitBook docs.
+    #[serde(default = "default_gitbooks_endpoint")]
+    pub endpoint: String,
+    /// Per-request timeout in seconds.
+    #[serde(default = "default_gitbooks_timeout_secs")]
+    pub timeout_secs: u64,
+}
+
+fn default_gitbooks_endpoint() -> String {
+    "https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io/openhuman/~gitbook/mcp".into()
+}
+
+fn default_gitbooks_timeout_secs() -> u64 {
+    30
+}
+
+impl Default for GitbooksConfig {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            enabled: defaults::default_true(),
+            endpoint: default_gitbooks_endpoint(),
+            timeout_secs: default_gitbooks_timeout_secs(),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
 pub struct WebSearchConfig {
     #[serde(default = "default_web_search_max_results")]
diff --git a/src/openhuman/config/schema/types.rs b/src/openhuman/config/schema/types.rs
index edd442b9f..e834d0ebc 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/config/schema/types.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/config/schema/types.rs
@@ -103,6 +103,12 @@ pub struct Config {
     #[serde(default)]
     pub http_request: HttpRequestConfig,
 
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub curl: CurlConfig,
+
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub gitbooks: GitbooksConfig,
+
     #[serde(default)]
     pub multimodal: MultimodalConfig,
 
@@ -240,6 +246,8 @@ impl Default for Config {
             secrets: SecretsConfig::default(),
             browser: BrowserConfig::default(),
             http_request: HttpRequestConfig::default(),
+            curl: CurlConfig::default(),
+            gitbooks: GitbooksConfig::default(),
             multimodal: MultimodalConfig::default(),
             web_search: WebSearchConfig::default(),
             proxy: ProxyConfig::default(),
diff --git a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/curl.rs b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/curl.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cdfd67ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/curl.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,544 @@
+//! `curl` — download files from the web to a path under the workspace.
+//!
+//! Distinct from `http_request`: instead of returning the body inline
+//! (size-capped), `curl` streams to disk with a hard byte ceiling. Same
+//! SSRF/allowlist guards (shared via `url_guard`), shares
+//! `http_request.allowed_domains` so there is one allowlist to reason
+//! about.
+
+use super::url_guard::{normalize_allowed_domains, validate_url};
+use crate::openhuman::security::SecurityPolicy;
+use crate::openhuman::tools::traits::{PermissionLevel, Tool, ToolResult};
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use futures_util::StreamExt;
+use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
+use std::path::{Component, Path, PathBuf};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use tokio::fs;
+use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
+
+pub struct CurlTool {
+    security: Arc<SecurityPolicy>,
+    allowed_domains: Vec<String>,
+    workspace_dir: PathBuf,
+    dest_subdir: String,
+    max_download_bytes: u64,
+    timeout_secs: u64,
+}
+
+impl CurlTool {
+    pub fn new(
+        security: Arc<SecurityPolicy>,
+        allowed_domains: Vec<String>,
+        workspace_dir: PathBuf,
+        dest_subdir: String,
+        max_download_bytes: u64,
+        timeout_secs: u64,
+    ) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            security,
+            allowed_domains: normalize_allowed_domains(allowed_domains),
+            workspace_dir,
+            dest_subdir: sanitize_dest_subdir(&dest_subdir),
+            max_download_bytes,
+            timeout_secs,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Resolve a user-supplied dest path to an absolute path inside
+    /// `<workspace>/<dest_subdir>`. Rejects absolute paths, `..`
+    /// segments, and any other escape attempts.
+    fn resolve_dest(&self, dest: &str) -> anyhow::Result<PathBuf> {
+        let trimmed = dest.trim();
+        if trimmed.is_empty() {
+            anyhow::bail!("dest_path cannot be empty");
+        }
+
+        let p = Path::new(trimmed);
+        if p.is_absolute() {
+            anyhow::bail!("dest_path must be relative — got absolute path");
+        }
+
+        for component in p.components() {
+            match component {
+                Component::Normal(_) => {}
+                Component::CurDir => {}
+                Component::ParentDir => {
+                    anyhow::bail!("dest_path may not contain '..'");
+                }
+                Component::Prefix(_) | Component::RootDir => {
+                    anyhow::bail!("dest_path must be relative");
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        let root = self.workspace_dir.join(&self.dest_subdir);
+        let resolved = root.join(p);
+
+        // Belt-and-braces: ensure the resolved path still lives under root.
+        // Lexical check is sufficient because we already rejected `..`.
+        if !resolved.starts_with(&root) {
+            anyhow::bail!("dest_path resolves outside the downloads root");
+        }
+
+        Ok(resolved)
+    }
+
+    fn validate_url(&self, raw_url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
+        validate_url(raw_url, &self.allowed_domains)
+    }
+
+    fn default_filename_from_url(url: &str) -> String {
+        let after_scheme = url.split_once("://").map(|(_, rest)| rest).unwrap_or(url);
+        let path_part = after_scheme.split_once('/').map(|(_, p)| p).unwrap_or("");
+        let last = path_part
+            .split('?')
+            .next()
+            .unwrap_or("")
+            .rsplit('/')
+            .next()
+            .unwrap_or("");
+        let cleaned: String = last
+            .chars()
+            .filter(|c| c.is_alphanumeric() || matches!(c, '.' | '-' | '_'))
+            .collect();
+        if cleaned.is_empty() {
+            "download.bin".into()
+        } else {
+            cleaned
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Tool for CurlTool {
+    fn name(&self) -> &str {
+        "curl"
+    }
+
+    fn description(&self) -> &str {
+        "Download a file from an http(s) URL into the workspace. The body is streamed to disk \
+        with a hard byte ceiling. Same allowlist as `http_request`. Returns the saved path, \
+        bytes written, content-type, and SHA-256 of the file."
+    }
+
+    fn parameters_schema(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
+        serde_json::json!({
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+                "url": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "HTTP or HTTPS URL of the file to download"
+                },
+                "dest_path": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Destination path relative to the downloads root inside the workspace. No '..' or absolute paths. If omitted, the filename is inferred from the URL."
+                },
+                "headers": {
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "description": "Optional HTTP headers (e.g. {\"Authorization\": \"Bearer …\"})",
+                    "default": {}
+                }
+            },
+            "required": ["url"]
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn permission_level(&self) -> PermissionLevel {
+        PermissionLevel::Write
+    }
+
+    async fn execute(&self, args: serde_json::Value) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {
+        let url = args
+            .get("url")
+            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'url' parameter"))?;
+
+        let dest_arg = args.get("dest_path").and_then(|v| v.as_str());
+        let headers_val = args
+            .get("headers")
+            .cloned()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| serde_json::json!({}));
+
+        if !self.security.can_act() {
+            tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, "blocked: autonomy read-only");
+            return Ok(ToolResult::error("Action blocked: autonomy is read-only"));
+        }
+        if !self.security.record_action() {
+            tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, "blocked: rate limit");
+            return Ok(ToolResult::error("Action blocked: rate limit exceeded"));
+        }
+
+        let url = match self.validate_url(url) {
+            Ok(v) => v,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, reason = %e, "url validation failed");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(e.to_string()));
+            }
+        };
+
+        let dest = match dest_arg {
+            Some(d) => d.to_string(),
+            None => Self::default_filename_from_url(&url),
+        };
+        let dest_path = match self.resolve_dest(&dest) {
+            Ok(p) => p,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, dest = %dest, reason = %e, "dest_path rejected");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(e.to_string()));
+            }
+        };
+
+        if let Some(parent) = dest_path.parent() {
+            if let Err(e) = fs::create_dir_all(parent).await {
+                tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, dest = %dest_path.display(), reason = %e, "create_dir_all failed");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!(
+                    "Failed to create destination directory: {e}"
+                )));
+            }
+        }
+
+        let builder = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(Duration::from_secs(self.timeout_secs))
+            .connect_timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
+            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none());
+        let builder =
+            crate::openhuman::config::apply_runtime_proxy_to_builder(builder, "tool.curl");
+        let client = match builder.build() {
+            Ok(c) => c,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", reason = %e, "HTTP client build failed");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("HTTP client build failed: {e}")));
+            }
+        };
+
+        let mut request = client.get(&url);
+        if let Some(obj) = headers_val.as_object() {
+            for (k, v) in obj {
+                if let Some(s) = v.as_str() {
+                    request = request.header(k, s);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, dest = %dest_path.display(), "starting download");
+
+        let response = match request.send().await {
+            Ok(r) => r,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, reason = %e, "request send failed");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("Request failed: {e}")));
+            }
+        };
+
+        let status = response.status();
+        if !status.is_success() {
+            tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, status = %status.as_u16(), "non-success HTTP status");
+            return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!(
+                "HTTP {} {}",
+                status.as_u16(),
+                status.canonical_reason().unwrap_or("Unknown")
+            )));
+        }
+
+        let content_type = response
+            .headers()
+            .get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("application/octet-stream")
+            .to_string();
+
+        let mut file = match fs::File::create(&dest_path).await {
+            Ok(f) => f,
+            Err(e) => {
+                tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), reason = %e, "fs::File::create failed");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!(
+                    "Failed to create destination file: {e}"
+                )));
+            }
+        };
+
+        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
+        let mut bytes_written: u64 = 0;
+        let mut stream = response.bytes_stream();
+
+        while let Some(chunk) = stream.next().await {
+            let chunk = match chunk {
+                Ok(c) => c,
+                Err(e) => {
+                    drop(file);
+                    if let Err(rm) = fs::remove_file(&dest_path).await {
+                        tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), reason = %rm, "cleanup remove_file failed");
+                    }
+                    tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, bytes_written, reason = %e, "stream error");
+                    return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("Stream error: {e}")));
+                }
+            };
+
+            if bytes_written.saturating_add(chunk.len() as u64) > self.max_download_bytes {
+                let _ = file.flush().await;
+                drop(file);
+                if let Err(rm) = fs::remove_file(&dest_path).await {
+                    tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), reason = %rm, "cleanup remove_file failed");
+                }
+                tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", url = %url, bytes_written, max = self.max_download_bytes, "size cap exceeded — download aborted");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!(
+                    "Download exceeded max_download_bytes ({} bytes)",
+                    self.max_download_bytes
+                )));
+            }
+
+            if let Err(e) = file.write_all(&chunk).await {
+                drop(file);
+                if let Err(rm) = fs::remove_file(&dest_path).await {
+                    tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), reason = %rm, "cleanup remove_file failed");
+                }
+                tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), bytes_written, reason = %e, "write_all failed");
+                return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("Write failed: {e}")));
+            }
+            hasher.update(&chunk);
+            bytes_written += chunk.len() as u64;
+        }
+
+        if let Err(e) = file.flush().await {
+            drop(file);
+            if let Err(rm) = fs::remove_file(&dest_path).await {
+                tracing::debug!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), reason = %rm, "cleanup remove_file failed");
+            }
+            tracing::error!(target: "[curl]", dest = %dest_path.display(), bytes_written, reason = %e, "flush failed");
+            return Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("Flush failed: {e}")));
+        }
+
+        let sha256 = format!("{:x}", hasher.finalize());
+
+        tracing::debug!(
+            target: "[curl]",
+            url = %url,
+            dest = %dest_path.display(),
+            bytes = bytes_written,
+            content_type = %content_type,
+            sha256 = %sha256,
+            "download complete"
+        );
+
+        let payload = serde_json::json!({
+            "path": dest_path.display().to_string(),
+            "bytes_written": bytes_written,
+            "content_type": content_type,
+            "sha256": sha256,
+        });
+        Ok(ToolResult::success(payload.to_string()))
+    }
+}
+
+/// Sanitize the configured `dest_subdir` so a malicious or misconfigured
+/// `[curl].dest_subdir` cannot escape the workspace via absolute paths
+/// or `..` segments. Drops disallowed components rather than panicking;
+/// falls back to `"downloads"` if everything is filtered out.
+fn sanitize_dest_subdir(raw: &str) -> String {
+    let trimmed = raw.trim();
+    if trimmed.is_empty() {
+        return "downloads".into();
+    }
+    let p = Path::new(trimmed);
+    let mut buf = PathBuf::new();
+    for component in p.components() {
+        match component {
+            Component::Normal(c) => buf.push(c),
+            // Drop everything else: absolute roots, prefixes, parent dirs, cur dirs.
+            _ => continue,
+        }
+    }
+    if buf.as_os_str().is_empty() {
+        return "downloads".into();
+    }
+    buf.to_string_lossy().into_owned()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::openhuman::security::SecurityPolicy;
+    use tempfile::TempDir;
+
+    fn tool(tmp: &TempDir, allow: Vec<&str>) -> CurlTool {
+        CurlTool::new(
+            Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default()),
+            allow.into_iter().map(String::from).collect(),
+            tmp.path().to_path_buf(),
+            "downloads".into(),
+            1024 * 1024,
+            30,
+        )
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_dest_subdir_strips_absolute_paths() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("/etc/passwd"), "etc/passwd");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("//foo"), "foo");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_dest_subdir_strips_parent_segments() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("../../etc"), "etc");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("a/../b"), "a/b");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_dest_subdir_falls_back_to_downloads() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir(""), "downloads");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("   "), "downloads");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir(".."), "downloads");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("/"), "downloads");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn sanitize_dest_subdir_keeps_normal_paths() {
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("downloads"), "downloads");
+        assert_eq!(sanitize_dest_subdir("artifacts/build"), "artifacts/build");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn new_sanitizes_malicious_dest_subdir() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = CurlTool::new(
+            Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default()),
+            vec!["example.com".into()],
+            tmp.path().to_path_buf(),
+            "../../etc".into(),
+            1024,
+            30,
+        );
+        let resolved = t.resolve_dest("file.txt").unwrap();
+        // Sanitizer reduced "../../etc" to "etc"; resolution must stay under workspace.
+        assert!(resolved.starts_with(tmp.path().join("etc")));
+        assert!(resolved.starts_with(tmp.path()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_dest_normal() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        let p = t.resolve_dest("foo/bar.txt").unwrap();
+        assert!(p.starts_with(tmp.path().join("downloads")));
+        assert!(p.ends_with("foo/bar.txt"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_dest_rejects_absolute() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        let err = t.resolve_dest("/etc/passwd").unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("relative"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_dest_rejects_parent_dir() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        let err = t.resolve_dest("../etc/passwd").unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains(".."));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_dest_rejects_nested_parent_dir() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        let err = t.resolve_dest("a/../../b").unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains(".."));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn resolve_dest_rejects_empty() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        assert!(t.resolve_dest("").is_err());
+        assert!(t.resolve_dest("   ").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn default_filename_from_url_basic() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            CurlTool::default_filename_from_url("https://example.com/foo/bar.zip"),
+            "bar.zip"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn default_filename_from_url_query_stripped() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            CurlTool::default_filename_from_url("https://example.com/file.tar.gz?token=x"),
+            "file.tar.gz"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn default_filename_from_url_root_falls_back() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            CurlTool::default_filename_from_url("https://example.com/"),
+            "download.bin"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn execute_blocks_when_rate_limited() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
+            max_actions_per_hour: 0,
+            ..SecurityPolicy::default()
+        });
+        let t = CurlTool::new(
+            security,
+            vec!["example.com".into()],
+            tmp.path().into(),
+            "downloads".into(),
+            1024,
+            30,
+        );
+        let result = t
+            .execute(serde_json::json!({"url": "https://example.com/x"}))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(result.is_error);
+        assert!(result.output().contains("rate limit"));
+    }
+
+    /// Live integration smoke: downloads example.com (a tiny, stable
+    /// public page). Gated behind `OPENHUMAN_CURL_LIVE_TEST=1` so CI /
+    /// offline runs don't depend on the network.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn live_download_example_com() {
+        if std::env::var("OPENHUMAN_CURL_LIVE_TEST").ok().as_deref() != Some("1") {
+            return;
+        }
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        let result = t
+            .execute(serde_json::json!({
+                "url": "https://example.com/",
+                "dest_path": "example.html"
+            }))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(!result.is_error, "live curl errored: {}", result.output());
+        let payload: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&result.output()).unwrap();
+        let bytes = payload["bytes_written"].as_u64().unwrap();
+        assert!(bytes > 100, "unexpectedly small download: {bytes} bytes");
+        let path = payload["path"].as_str().unwrap();
+        let content = std::fs::read_to_string(path).unwrap();
+        assert!(content.to_lowercase().contains("example domain"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn execute_rejects_allowlist_miss() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let t = tool(&tmp, vec!["example.com"]);
+        let result = t
+            .execute(serde_json::json!({"url": "https://other.example.org/x"}))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(result.is_error);
+        assert!(result.output().contains("allowed_domains"));
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/gitbooks.rs b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/gitbooks.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..45ac08d30
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/gitbooks.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+//! `gitbooks` — answer questions about OpenHuman by talking to the
+//! GitBook MCP server.
+//!
+//! GitBook hosts a stateless Streamable-HTTP MCP server that exposes
+//! exactly two tools:
+//!
+//! - `searchDocumentation { query }` — returns excerpts + page links
+//! - `getPage { url }` — returns the full markdown of a page
+//!
+//! We mirror them as `gitbooks_search` and `gitbooks_get_page`. The
+//! server returns each JSON-RPC response in a single
+//! `event: message\ndata: {…}` SSE frame, so we do a tiny inline
+//! parse — no need to pull in a full SSE/MCP client crate yet.
+
+use crate::openhuman::tools::traits::{PermissionLevel, Tool, ToolResult};
+use async_trait::async_trait;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI64, Ordering};
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+/// Minimal MCP-over-HTTP client for stateless servers (no session id).
+struct McpHttpClient {
+    endpoint: String,
+    timeout_secs: u64,
+    next_id: AtomicI64,
+}
+
+impl McpHttpClient {
+    fn new(endpoint: String, timeout_secs: u64) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            endpoint,
+            timeout_secs,
+            next_id: AtomicI64::new(1),
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn call_tool(&self, name: &str, arguments: Value) -> anyhow::Result<Value> {
+        let id = self.next_id.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        let body = json!({
+            "jsonrpc": "2.0",
+            "id": id,
+            "method": "tools/call",
+            "params": { "name": name, "arguments": arguments }
+        });
+
+        let builder = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(Duration::from_secs(self.timeout_secs))
+            .connect_timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
+            .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none());
+        let builder =
+            crate::openhuman::config::apply_runtime_proxy_to_builder(builder, "tool.gitbooks");
+        let client = builder.build()?;
+
+        // Log only the redacted host so query strings / path params /
+        // any future bearer-token-bearing endpoints don't leak into
+        // logs aggregated for triage.
+        tracing::debug!(
+            target: "[gitbooks]",
+            endpoint = %redact_endpoint(&self.endpoint),
+            tool = %name,
+            "MCP tools/call"
+        );
+
+        let resp = client
+            .post(&self.endpoint)
+            .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+            .header("Accept", "application/json, text/event-stream")
+            .body(serde_json::to_vec(&body)?)
+            .send()
+            .await?;
+
+        let status = resp.status();
+        let content_type = resp
+            .headers()
+            .get(reqwest::header::CONTENT_TYPE)
+            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+            .unwrap_or("")
+            .to_string();
+        let text = resp.text().await?;
+
+        if !status.is_success() {
+            anyhow::bail!("MCP HTTP {} — {}", status.as_u16(), text);
+        }
+
+        let payload: Value = if content_type.starts_with("text/event-stream") {
+            parse_sse_message(&text)?
+        } else {
+            serde_json::from_str(&text).map_err(|e| {
+                anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to parse MCP JSON response: {e} — body: {text}")
+            })?
+        };
+
+        if let Some(err) = payload.get("error") {
+            anyhow::bail!("MCP error: {err}");
+        }
+        let result = payload
+            .get("result")
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("MCP response missing 'result': {payload}"))?
+            .clone();
+        Ok(result)
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reduce a configured endpoint URL to `scheme://host[:port]` for
+/// safe logging. Anything that doesn't parse as a recognisable
+/// http(s) URL is reported as `<redacted>` rather than echoed.
+fn redact_endpoint(raw: &str) -> String {
+    let trimmed = raw.trim();
+    let (scheme, rest) = if let Some(r) = trimmed.strip_prefix("https://") {
+        ("https", r)
+    } else if let Some(r) = trimmed.strip_prefix("http://") {
+        ("http", r)
+    } else {
+        return "<redacted>".into();
+    };
+    let authority = rest.split(['/', '?', '#']).next().unwrap_or("");
+    if authority.is_empty() || authority.contains('@') {
+        return "<redacted>".into();
+    }
+    format!("{scheme}://{authority}")
+}
+
+/// Parse the first `data: {…}` line from a Streamable-HTTP SSE
+/// response. The GitBook server emits exactly one frame per JSON-RPC
+/// request, so we do not need a full SSE state machine.
+fn parse_sse_message(body: &str) -> anyhow::Result<Value> {
+    for line in body.lines() {
+        let line = line.trim_end_matches('\r');
+        if let Some(data) = line.strip_prefix("data:") {
+            let data = data.trim_start();
+            if data.is_empty() {
+                continue;
+            }
+            return serde_json::from_str(data).map_err(|e| {
+                anyhow::anyhow!("Failed to parse SSE data frame: {e} — line: {data}")
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    anyhow::bail!("No SSE data frame found in MCP response: {body}")
+}
+
+/// Render an MCP `tools/call` result into a single string for the
+/// agent. MCP returns `{ content: [{ type, text }, …], isError? }`.
+fn render_tool_result(result: &Value) -> ToolResult {
+    let is_error = result
+        .get("isError")
+        .and_then(Value::as_bool)
+        .unwrap_or(false);
+
+    let mut out = String::new();
+    if let Some(content) = result.get("content").and_then(Value::as_array) {
+        for block in content {
+            if let Some(t) = block.get("text").and_then(Value::as_str) {
+                if !out.is_empty() {
+                    out.push_str("\n\n");
+                }
+                out.push_str(t);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if out.is_empty() {
+        out = result.to_string();
+    }
+
+    if is_error {
+        ToolResult::error(out)
+    } else {
+        ToolResult::success(out)
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Search ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub struct GitbooksSearchTool {
+    client: Arc<McpHttpClient>,
+}
+
+impl GitbooksSearchTool {
+    pub fn new(endpoint: String, timeout_secs: u64) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            client: Arc::new(McpHttpClient::new(endpoint, timeout_secs)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Tool for GitbooksSearchTool {
+    fn name(&self) -> &str {
+        "gitbooks_search"
+    }
+
+    fn description(&self) -> &str {
+        "Search the OpenHuman product documentation. Use this to answer questions about how \
+        OpenHuman works, find features, look up configuration, or locate guides. Returns \
+        excerpts with page titles and links — follow up with `gitbooks_get_page` for the \
+        full markdown of a page."
+    }
+
+    fn parameters_schema(&self) -> Value {
+        json!({
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+                "query": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Natural-language question or keyword query about OpenHuman."
+                }
+            },
+            "required": ["query"]
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn permission_level(&self) -> PermissionLevel {
+        PermissionLevel::ReadOnly
+    }
+
+    async fn execute(&self, args: Value) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {
+        let query = args
+            .get("query")
+            .and_then(Value::as_str)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'query' parameter"))?;
+        if query.trim().is_empty() {
+            return Ok(ToolResult::error("query cannot be empty"));
+        }
+
+        match self
+            .client
+            .call_tool("searchDocumentation", json!({ "query": query }))
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(result) => Ok(render_tool_result(&result)),
+            Err(e) => Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("gitbooks_search failed: {e}"))),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+// ── Get page ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+pub struct GitbooksGetPageTool {
+    client: Arc<McpHttpClient>,
+}
+
+impl GitbooksGetPageTool {
+    pub fn new(endpoint: String, timeout_secs: u64) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            client: Arc::new(McpHttpClient::new(endpoint, timeout_secs)),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl Tool for GitbooksGetPageTool {
+    fn name(&self) -> &str {
+        "gitbooks_get_page"
+    }
+
+    fn description(&self) -> &str {
+        "Fetch the full markdown of a specific OpenHuman documentation page by URL. Pair this \
+        with `gitbooks_search` — search returns partial excerpts; use this to get the \
+        complete page when more detail is needed."
+    }
+
+    fn parameters_schema(&self) -> Value {
+        json!({
+            "type": "object",
+            "properties": {
+                "url": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "The full URL of the OpenHuman documentation page (e.g. https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io/openhuman/getting-started)."
+                }
+            },
+            "required": ["url"]
+        })
+    }
+
+    fn permission_level(&self) -> PermissionLevel {
+        PermissionLevel::ReadOnly
+    }
+
+    async fn execute(&self, args: Value) -> anyhow::Result<ToolResult> {
+        let url = args
+            .get("url")
+            .and_then(Value::as_str)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Missing 'url' parameter"))?;
+        if url.trim().is_empty() {
+            return Ok(ToolResult::error("url cannot be empty"));
+        }
+
+        match self
+            .client
+            .call_tool("getPage", json!({ "url": url }))
+            .await
+        {
+            Ok(result) => Ok(render_tool_result(&result)),
+            Err(e) => Ok(ToolResult::error(format!("gitbooks_get_page failed: {e}"))),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn redact_endpoint_keeps_only_origin() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            redact_endpoint("https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io/openhuman/~gitbook/mcp"),
+            "https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            redact_endpoint("http://example.com:8080/path?token=secret"),
+            "http://example.com:8080"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn redact_endpoint_rejects_userinfo_and_unknown_schemes() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            redact_endpoint("https://user:pass@example.com/x"),
+            "<redacted>"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(redact_endpoint("ftp://example.com"), "<redacted>");
+        assert_eq!(redact_endpoint(""), "<redacted>");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_sse_extracts_data_frame() {
+        let body = "event: message\ndata: {\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"result\":{\"x\":1}}\n\n";
+        let v = parse_sse_message(body).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v["result"]["x"], 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_sse_handles_crlf() {
+        let body = "event: message\r\ndata: {\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"result\":{}}\r\n\r\n";
+        assert!(parse_sse_message(body).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_sse_errors_when_no_data_line() {
+        let body = "event: ping\n\n";
+        assert!(parse_sse_message(body).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parse_sse_errors_on_invalid_json() {
+        let body = "data: not-json\n\n";
+        assert!(parse_sse_message(body).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn render_tool_result_concatenates_text_blocks() {
+        let r = json!({
+            "content": [
+                {"type": "text", "text": "first"},
+                {"type": "text", "text": "second"}
+            ]
+        });
+        let out = render_tool_result(&r);
+        assert!(!out.is_error);
+        assert!(out.output().contains("first"));
+        assert!(out.output().contains("second"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn render_tool_result_marks_errors() {
+        let r = json!({
+            "content": [{"type": "text", "text": "boom"}],
+            "isError": true
+        });
+        let out = render_tool_result(&r);
+        assert!(out.is_error);
+        assert!(out.output().contains("boom"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn render_tool_result_falls_back_to_raw_json() {
+        let r = json!({"weird": "shape"});
+        let out = render_tool_result(&r);
+        assert!(out.output().contains("weird"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn search_rejects_empty_query() {
+        let t = GitbooksSearchTool::new("https://example.com/mcp".into(), 5);
+        let result = t.execute(json!({"query": "   "})).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(result.is_error);
+        assert!(result.output().contains("empty"));
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn get_page_rejects_empty_url() {
+        let t = GitbooksGetPageTool::new("https://example.com/mcp".into(), 5);
+        let result = t.execute(json!({"url": ""})).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(result.is_error);
+    }
+
+    /// Live integration test against the real GitBook MCP endpoint.
+    /// Gated behind `OPENHUMAN_GITBOOKS_LIVE_TEST=1` so CI / offline
+    /// builds don't depend on the public network.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn live_search_smoke() {
+        if std::env::var("OPENHUMAN_GITBOOKS_LIVE_TEST")
+            .ok()
+            .as_deref()
+            != Some("1")
+        {
+            return;
+        }
+        let t = GitbooksSearchTool::new(
+            "https://tinyhumans.gitbook.io/openhuman/~gitbook/mcp".into(),
+            30,
+        );
+        let result = t
+            .execute(json!({"query": "what is openhuman"}))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            !result.is_error,
+            "live search returned error: {}",
+            result.output()
+        );
+        assert!(!result.output().is_empty());
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/http_request.rs b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/http_request.rs
index 2f943a509..0ec2967a2 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/http_request.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/http_request.rs
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+use super::url_guard::{normalize_allowed_domains, validate_url};
 use crate::openhuman::security::SecurityPolicy;
 use crate::openhuman::tools::traits::{Tool, ToolResult};
 use async_trait::async_trait;
@@ -30,37 +31,7 @@ impl HttpRequestTool {
     }
 
     fn validate_url(&self, raw_url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
-        let url = raw_url.trim();
-
-        if url.is_empty() {
-            anyhow::bail!("URL cannot be empty");
-        }
-
-        if url.chars().any(char::is_whitespace) {
-            anyhow::bail!("URL cannot contain whitespace");
-        }
-
-        if !url.starts_with("http://") && !url.starts_with("https://") {
-            anyhow::bail!("Only http:// and https:// URLs are allowed");
-        }
-
-        if self.allowed_domains.is_empty() {
-            anyhow::bail!(
-                "HTTP request tool is enabled but no allowed_domains are configured. Add [http_request].allowed_domains in config.toml"
-            );
-        }
-
-        let host = extract_host(url)?;
-
-        if is_private_or_local_host(&host) {
-            anyhow::bail!("Blocked local/private host: {host}");
-        }
-
-        if !host_matches_allowlist(&host, &self.allowed_domains) {
-            anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' is not in http_request.allowed_domains");
-        }
-
-        Ok(url.to_string())
+        validate_url(raw_url, &self.allowed_domains)
     }
 
     fn validate_method(&self, method: &str) -> anyhow::Result<reqwest::Method> {
@@ -225,7 +196,6 @@ impl Tool for HttpRequestTool {
                 let status = response.status();
                 let status_code = status.as_u16();
 
-                // Get response headers (redact sensitive ones)
                 let response_headers = response.headers().iter();
                 let headers_text = response_headers
                     .map(|(k, _)| {
@@ -239,7 +209,6 @@ impl Tool for HttpRequestTool {
                     .collect::<Vec<_>>()
                     .join(", ");
 
-                // Get response body with size limit
                 let response_text = match response.text().await {
                     Ok(text) => self.truncate_response(&text),
                     Err(e) => format!("[Failed to read response body: {e}]"),
@@ -264,149 +233,6 @@ impl Tool for HttpRequestTool {
     }
 }
 
-// Helper functions similar to browser_open.rs
-
-fn normalize_allowed_domains(domains: Vec<String>) -> Vec<String> {
-    let mut normalized = domains
-        .into_iter()
-        .filter_map(|d| normalize_domain(&d))
-        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
-    normalized.sort_unstable();
-    normalized.dedup();
-    normalized
-}
-
-fn normalize_domain(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
-    let mut d = raw.trim().to_lowercase();
-    if d.is_empty() {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    if let Some(stripped) = d.strip_prefix("https://") {
-        d = stripped.to_string();
-    } else if let Some(stripped) = d.strip_prefix("http://") {
-        d = stripped.to_string();
-    }
-
-    if let Some((host, _)) = d.split_once('/') {
-        d = host.to_string();
-    }
-
-    d = d.trim_start_matches('.').trim_end_matches('.').to_string();
-
-    if let Some((host, _)) = d.split_once(':') {
-        d = host.to_string();
-    }
-
-    if d.is_empty() || d.chars().any(char::is_whitespace) {
-        return None;
-    }
-
-    Some(d)
-}
-
-fn extract_host(url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
-    let rest = url
-        .strip_prefix("http://")
-        .or_else(|| url.strip_prefix("https://"))
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Only http:// and https:// URLs are allowed"))?;
-
-    let authority = rest
-        .split(['/', '?', '#'])
-        .next()
-        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid URL"))?;
-
-    if authority.is_empty() {
-        anyhow::bail!("URL must include a host");
-    }
-
-    if authority.contains('@') {
-        anyhow::bail!("URL userinfo is not allowed");
-    }
-
-    if authority.starts_with('[') {
-        anyhow::bail!("IPv6 hosts are not supported in http_request");
-    }
-
-    let host = authority
-        .split(':')
-        .next()
-        .unwrap_or_default()
-        .trim()
-        .trim_end_matches('.')
-        .to_lowercase();
-
-    if host.is_empty() {
-        anyhow::bail!("URL must include a valid host");
-    }
-
-    Ok(host)
-}
-
-fn host_matches_allowlist(host: &str, allowed_domains: &[String]) -> bool {
-    allowed_domains.iter().any(|domain| {
-        host == domain
-            || host
-                .strip_suffix(domain)
-                .is_some_and(|prefix| prefix.ends_with('.'))
-    })
-}
-
-fn is_private_or_local_host(host: &str) -> bool {
-    // Strip brackets from IPv6 addresses like [::1]
-    let bare = host
-        .strip_prefix('[')
-        .and_then(|h| h.strip_suffix(']'))
-        .unwrap_or(host);
-
-    let has_local_tld = bare
-        .rsplit('.')
-        .next()
-        .is_some_and(|label| label == "local");
-
-    if bare == "localhost" || bare.ends_with(".localhost") || has_local_tld {
-        return true;
-    }
-
-    if let Ok(ip) = bare.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
-        return match ip {
-            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => is_non_global_v4(v4),
-            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => is_non_global_v6(v6),
-        };
-    }
-
-    false
-}
-
-/// Returns true if the IPv4 address is not globally routable.
-fn is_non_global_v4(v4: std::net::Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
-    let [a, b, c, _] = v4.octets();
-    v4.is_loopback()                       // 127.0.0.0/8
-        || v4.is_private()                 // 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16
-        || v4.is_link_local()              // 169.254.0.0/16
-        || v4.is_unspecified()             // 0.0.0.0
-        || v4.is_broadcast()              // 255.255.255.255
-        || v4.is_multicast()              // 224.0.0.0/4
-        || (a == 100 && (64..=127).contains(&b)) // Shared address space (RFC 6598)
-        || a >= 240                        // Reserved (240.0.0.0/4, except broadcast)
-        || (a == 192 && b == 0 && (c == 0 || c == 2)) // IETF assignments + TEST-NET-1
-        || (a == 198 && b == 51)           // Documentation (198.51.100.0/24)
-        || (a == 203 && b == 0)            // Documentation (203.0.113.0/24)
-        || (a == 198 && (18..=19).contains(&b)) // Benchmarking (198.18.0.0/15)
-}
-
-/// Returns true if the IPv6 address is not globally routable.
-fn is_non_global_v6(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> bool {
-    let segs = v6.segments();
-    v6.is_loopback()                       // ::1
-        || v6.is_unspecified()             // ::
-        || v6.is_multicast()              // ff00::/8
-        || (segs[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00   // Unique-local (fc00::/7)
-        || (segs[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80   // Link-local (fe80::/10)
-        || (segs[0] == 0x2001 && segs[1] == 0x0db8) // Documentation (2001:db8::/32)
-        || v6.to_ipv4_mapped().is_some_and(is_non_global_v4)
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
@@ -425,102 +251,6 @@ mod tests {
         )
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn normalize_domain_strips_scheme_path_and_case() {
-        let got = normalize_domain("  HTTPS://Docs.Example.com/path ").unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(got, "docs.example.com");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn normalize_allowed_domains_deduplicates() {
-        let got = normalize_allowed_domains(vec![
-            "example.com".into(),
-            "EXAMPLE.COM".into(),
-            "https://example.com/".into(),
-        ]);
-        assert_eq!(got, vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_accepts_exact_domain() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let got = tool.validate_url("https://example.com/docs").unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(got, "https://example.com/docs");
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_accepts_http() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        assert!(tool.validate_url("http://example.com").is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_accepts_subdomain() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        assert!(tool.validate_url("https://api.example.com/v1").is_ok());
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_allowlist_miss() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("https://google.com")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("allowed_domains"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_localhost() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["localhost"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("https://localhost:8080")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("local/private"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_private_ipv4() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["192.168.1.5"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("https://192.168.1.5")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("local/private"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_whitespace() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("https://example.com/hello world")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("whitespace"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_userinfo() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("https://user@example.com")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("userinfo"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_requires_allowlist() {
-        let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default());
-        let tool = HttpRequestTool::new(security, vec![], 1_000_000, 30);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("https://example.com")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("allowed_domains"));
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn validate_accepts_valid_methods() {
         let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
@@ -540,89 +270,6 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(err.contains("Unsupported HTTP method"));
     }
 
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_multicast_ipv4() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("224.0.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("239.255.255.255"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_broadcast() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("255.255.255.255"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_reserved_ipv4() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("240.0.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("250.1.2.3"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_documentation_ranges() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("192.0.2.1")); // TEST-NET-1
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("198.51.100.1")); // TEST-NET-2
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("203.0.113.1")); // TEST-NET-3
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_benchmarking_range() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("198.18.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("198.19.255.255"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_ipv6_localhost() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("[::1]"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_ipv6_multicast() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("ff02::1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_ipv6_link_local() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("fe80::1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_ipv6_unique_local() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("fd00::1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_ipv4_mapped_ipv6() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::ffff:127.0.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::ffff:192.168.1.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::ffff:10.0.0.1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn allows_public_ipv4() {
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("8.8.8.8"));
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("1.1.1.1"));
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("93.184.216.34"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_ipv6_documentation_range() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("2001:db8::1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn allows_public_ipv6() {
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn blocks_shared_address_space() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("100.64.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("100.127.255.255"));
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("100.63.0.1")); // Just below range
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("100.128.0.1")); // Just above range
-    }
-
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn execute_blocks_readonly_mode() {
         let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
@@ -670,7 +317,7 @@ mod tests {
         );
         let text = "hello world this is long";
         let truncated = tool.truncate_response(text);
-        assert!(truncated.len() <= 10 + 60); // limit + message
+        assert!(truncated.len() <= 10 + 60);
         assert!(truncated.contains("[Response truncated"));
     }
 
@@ -726,130 +373,9 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(headers[0].1, "Bearer real-token");
     }
 
-    // ── SSRF: alternate IP notation bypass defense-in-depth ─────────
-    //
-    // Rust's IpAddr::parse() rejects non-standard notations (octal, hex,
-    // decimal integer, zero-padded). These tests document that property
-    // so regressions are caught if the parsing strategy ever changes.
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_octal_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
-        // 0177.0.0.1 is octal for 127.0.0.1 in some languages, but
-        // Rust's IpAddr rejects it — it falls through as a hostname.
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("0177.0.0.1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_hex_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
-        // 0x7f000001 is hex for 127.0.0.1 in some languages.
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("0x7f000001"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_decimal_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
-        // 2130706433 is decimal for 127.0.0.1 in some languages.
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("2130706433"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_zero_padded_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
-        // 127.000.000.001 uses zero-padded octets.
-        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("127.000.000.001"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_alternate_notations_rejected_by_validate_url() {
-        // Even if is_private_or_local_host doesn't flag these, they
-        // fail the allowlist because they're treated as hostnames.
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        for notation in [
-            "http://0177.0.0.1",
-            "http://0x7f000001",
-            "http://2130706433",
-            "http://127.000.000.001",
-        ] {
-            let err = tool.validate_url(notation).unwrap_err().to_string();
-            assert!(
-                err.contains("allowed_domains"),
-                "Expected allowlist rejection for {notation}, got: {err}"
-            );
-        }
-    }
-
     #[test]
     fn redirect_policy_is_none() {
-        // Structural test: the tool should be buildable with redirect-safe config.
-        // The actual Policy::none() enforcement is in execute_request's client builder.
         let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
         assert_eq!(tool.name(), "http_request");
     }
-
-    // ── §1.4 DNS rebinding / SSRF defense-in-depth tests ─────
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_blocks_loopback_127_range() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("127.0.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("127.0.0.2"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("127.255.255.255"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_blocks_rfc1918_10_range() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("10.0.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("10.255.255.255"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_blocks_rfc1918_172_range() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("172.16.0.1"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("172.31.255.255"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_blocks_unspecified_address() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("0.0.0.0"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_blocks_dot_localhost_subdomain() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("evil.localhost"));
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("a.b.localhost"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_blocks_dot_local_tld() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("service.local"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ssrf_ipv6_unspecified() {
-        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_ftp_scheme() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("ftp://example.com")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("http://") || err.contains("https://"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_empty_url() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let err = tool.validate_url("").unwrap_err().to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("empty"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn validate_rejects_ipv6_host() {
-        let tool = test_tool(vec!["example.com"]);
-        let err = tool
-            .validate_url("http://[::1]:8080/path")
-            .unwrap_err()
-            .to_string();
-        assert!(err.contains("IPv6"));
-    }
 }
diff --git a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/mod.rs b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/mod.rs
index d92d07977..23d7fdd1d 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/mod.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/mod.rs
@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
 mod composio;
+mod curl;
+mod gitbooks;
 mod http_request;
+mod url_guard;
 mod web_search;
 
 pub use composio::{ComposioAction, ComposioTool};
+pub use curl::CurlTool;
+pub use gitbooks::{GitbooksGetPageTool, GitbooksSearchTool};
 pub use http_request::HttpRequestTool;
 pub use web_search::WebSearchTool;
diff --git a/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/url_guard.rs b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/url_guard.rs
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..31dcc15d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/openhuman/tools/impl/network/url_guard.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,475 @@
+//! Shared URL validation + SSRF guards for outbound network tools.
+//!
+//! Used by `http_request`, `curl`, and any future tool that takes a
+//! user-supplied URL. The contract is intentionally strict:
+//!
+//! - http(s) only
+//! - non-empty allowlist required (callers pass it in)
+//! - no whitespace, no userinfo, no IPv6 hosts
+//! - blocks loopback / RFC1918 / link-local / multicast / documentation /
+//!   shared-address / IPv4-mapped IPv6, including `localhost` /
+//!   `*.localhost` / `*.local`
+//!
+//! The blocklist deliberately does NOT cover alternate IP notations
+//! (octal, hex, decimal) because Rust's `IpAddr::parse` rejects them —
+//! they fall through and get rejected by the allowlist instead. See the
+//! tests in `http_request.rs` for the documented behaviour.
+
+/// Validate a URL against the allowlist + SSRF rules. Returns the
+/// original URL on success.
+pub(super) fn validate_url(raw_url: &str, allowed_domains: &[String]) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
+    let url = raw_url.trim();
+
+    if url.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!("URL cannot be empty");
+    }
+
+    if url.chars().any(char::is_whitespace) {
+        anyhow::bail!("URL cannot contain whitespace");
+    }
+
+    if !url.starts_with("http://") && !url.starts_with("https://") {
+        anyhow::bail!("Only http:// and https:// URLs are allowed");
+    }
+
+    if allowed_domains.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!(
+            "Network tool is enabled but no allowed_domains are configured. Add [http_request].allowed_domains in config.toml"
+        );
+    }
+
+    let host = extract_host(url)?;
+
+    if is_private_or_local_host(&host) {
+        anyhow::bail!("Blocked local/private host: {host}");
+    }
+
+    if !host_matches_allowlist(&host, allowed_domains) {
+        anyhow::bail!("Host '{host}' is not in http_request.allowed_domains");
+    }
+
+    Ok(url.to_string())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_allowed_domains(domains: Vec<String>) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut normalized = domains
+        .into_iter()
+        .filter_map(|d| normalize_domain(&d))
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>();
+    normalized.sort_unstable();
+    normalized.dedup();
+    normalized
+}
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_domain(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let mut d = raw.trim().to_lowercase();
+    if d.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if let Some(stripped) = d.strip_prefix("https://") {
+        d = stripped.to_string();
+    } else if let Some(stripped) = d.strip_prefix("http://") {
+        d = stripped.to_string();
+    }
+
+    if let Some((host, _)) = d.split_once('/') {
+        d = host.to_string();
+    }
+
+    d = d.trim_start_matches('.').trim_end_matches('.').to_string();
+
+    if let Some((host, _)) = d.split_once(':') {
+        d = host.to_string();
+    }
+
+    if d.is_empty() || d.chars().any(char::is_whitespace) {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    Some(d)
+}
+
+pub(super) fn extract_host(url: &str) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
+    let rest = url
+        .strip_prefix("http://")
+        .or_else(|| url.strip_prefix("https://"))
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Only http:// and https:// URLs are allowed"))?;
+
+    let authority = rest
+        .split(['/', '?', '#'])
+        .next()
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("Invalid URL"))?;
+
+    if authority.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!("URL must include a host");
+    }
+
+    if authority.contains('@') {
+        anyhow::bail!("URL userinfo is not allowed");
+    }
+
+    if authority.starts_with('[') {
+        anyhow::bail!("IPv6 hosts are not supported in http_request");
+    }
+
+    let host = authority
+        .split(':')
+        .next()
+        .unwrap_or_default()
+        .trim()
+        .trim_end_matches('.')
+        .to_lowercase();
+
+    if host.is_empty() {
+        anyhow::bail!("URL must include a valid host");
+    }
+
+    Ok(host)
+}
+
+pub(super) fn host_matches_allowlist(host: &str, allowed_domains: &[String]) -> bool {
+    allowed_domains.iter().any(|domain| {
+        host == domain
+            || host
+                .strip_suffix(domain)
+                .is_some_and(|prefix| prefix.ends_with('.'))
+    })
+}
+
+pub(super) fn is_private_or_local_host(host: &str) -> bool {
+    let bare = host
+        .strip_prefix('[')
+        .and_then(|h| h.strip_suffix(']'))
+        .unwrap_or(host);
+
+    let has_local_tld = bare
+        .rsplit('.')
+        .next()
+        .is_some_and(|label| label == "local");
+
+    if bare == "localhost" || bare.ends_with(".localhost") || has_local_tld {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    if let Ok(ip) = bare.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
+        return match ip {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => is_non_global_v4(v4),
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => is_non_global_v6(v6),
+        };
+    }
+
+    false
+}
+
+fn is_non_global_v4(v4: std::net::Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
+    let [a, b, c, _] = v4.octets();
+    v4.is_loopback()
+        || v4.is_private()
+        || v4.is_link_local()
+        || v4.is_unspecified()
+        || v4.is_broadcast()
+        || v4.is_multicast()
+        || (a == 100 && (64..=127).contains(&b))
+        || a >= 240
+        || (a == 192 && b == 0 && (c == 0 || c == 2))
+        || (a == 198 && b == 51)
+        || (a == 203 && b == 0)
+        || (a == 198 && (18..=19).contains(&b))
+}
+
+fn is_non_global_v6(v6: std::net::Ipv6Addr) -> bool {
+    let segs = v6.segments();
+    v6.is_loopback()
+        || v6.is_unspecified()
+        || v6.is_multicast()
+        || (segs[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00
+        || (segs[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80
+        || (segs[0] == 0x2001 && segs[1] == 0x0db8)
+        || v6.to_ipv4_mapped().is_some_and(is_non_global_v4)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn normalize_domain_strips_scheme_path_and_case() {
+        let got = normalize_domain("  HTTPS://Docs.Example.com/path ").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(got, "docs.example.com");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn normalize_allowed_domains_deduplicates() {
+        let got = normalize_allowed_domains(vec![
+            "example.com".into(),
+            "EXAMPLE.COM".into(),
+            "https://example.com/".into(),
+        ]);
+        assert_eq!(got, vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_accepts_exact_domain() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let got = validate_url("https://example.com/docs", &allow).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(got, "https://example.com/docs");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_accepts_http() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        assert!(validate_url("http://example.com", &allow).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_accepts_subdomain() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        assert!(validate_url("https://api.example.com/v1", &allow).is_ok());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_allowlist_miss() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("https://google.com", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("allowed_domains"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_localhost() {
+        let allow = vec!["localhost".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("https://localhost:8080", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("local/private"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_private_ipv4() {
+        let allow = vec!["192.168.1.5".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("https://192.168.1.5", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("local/private"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_whitespace() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("https://example.com/hello world", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("whitespace"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_userinfo() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("https://user@example.com", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("userinfo"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_requires_allowlist() {
+        let err = validate_url("https://example.com", &[])
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("allowed_domains"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_ftp_scheme() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("ftp://example.com", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("http://") || err.contains("https://"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_empty_url() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("", &allow).unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("empty"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn validate_rejects_ipv6_host() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        let err = validate_url("http://[::1]:8080/path", &allow)
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+        assert!(err.contains("IPv6"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_multicast_ipv4() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("224.0.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("239.255.255.255"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_broadcast() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("255.255.255.255"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_reserved_ipv4() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("240.0.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("250.1.2.3"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_documentation_ranges() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("192.0.2.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("198.51.100.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("203.0.113.1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_benchmarking_range() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("198.18.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("198.19.255.255"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_ipv6_localhost() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("[::1]"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_ipv6_multicast() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("ff02::1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_ipv6_link_local() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("fe80::1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_ipv6_unique_local() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("fd00::1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_ipv4_mapped_ipv6() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::ffff:127.0.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::ffff:192.168.1.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::ffff:10.0.0.1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allows_public_ipv4() {
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("8.8.8.8"));
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("1.1.1.1"));
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("93.184.216.34"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_ipv6_documentation_range() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("2001:db8::1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn allows_public_ipv6() {
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("2607:f8b0:4004:800::200e"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_shared_address_space() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("100.64.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("100.127.255.255"));
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("100.63.0.1"));
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("100.128.0.1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_blocks_loopback_127_range() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("127.0.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("127.0.0.2"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("127.255.255.255"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_blocks_rfc1918_10_range() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("10.0.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("10.255.255.255"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_blocks_rfc1918_172_range() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("172.16.0.1"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("172.31.255.255"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_blocks_unspecified_address() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("0.0.0.0"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_blocks_dot_localhost_subdomain() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("evil.localhost"));
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("a.b.localhost"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_blocks_dot_local_tld() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("service.local"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_ipv6_unspecified() {
+        assert!(is_private_or_local_host("::"));
+    }
+
+    // ── Defense-in-depth: alternate IP notations rejected by allowlist
+    //
+    // Rust's IpAddr::parse() rejects octal, hex, decimal, and
+    // zero-padded notations. They fall through as hostnames and get
+    // rejected by the allowlist instead. These tests pin that
+    // behaviour so a parser change can't silently re-open SSRF.
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_octal_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("0177.0.0.1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_hex_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("0x7f000001"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_decimal_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("2130706433"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_zero_padded_loopback_not_parsed_as_ip() {
+        assert!(!is_private_or_local_host("127.000.000.001"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ssrf_alternate_notations_rejected_by_validate_url() {
+        let allow = vec!["example.com".to_string()];
+        for notation in [
+            "http://0177.0.0.1",
+            "http://0x7f000001",
+            "http://2130706433",
+            "http://127.000.000.001",
+        ] {
+            let err = validate_url(notation, &allow).unwrap_err().to_string();
+            assert!(
+                err.contains("allowed_domains"),
+                "Expected allowlist rejection for {notation}, got: {err}"
+            );
+        }
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/openhuman/tools/ops.rs b/src/openhuman/tools/ops.rs
index 6e3d50edf..cd704a269 100644
--- a/src/openhuman/tools/ops.rs
+++ b/src/openhuman/tools/ops.rs
@@ -169,6 +169,32 @@ pub fn all_tools_with_runtime(
         http_config.timeout_secs,
     )));
 
+    // curl — always registered. Shares `http_request.allowed_domains`,
+    // adds streaming-to-disk with a hard byte ceiling. Writes land
+    // under `<workspace>/<curl.dest_subdir>`.
+    tools.push(Box::new(CurlTool::new(
+        security.clone(),
+        http_config.allowed_domains.clone(),
+        workspace_dir.to_path_buf(),
+        root_config.curl.dest_subdir.clone(),
+        root_config.curl.max_download_bytes,
+        root_config.curl.timeout_secs,
+    )));
+
+    // gitbooks — answers questions about OpenHuman by calling the
+    // GitBook MCP server. Two tools mirroring the upstream MCP tools.
+    if root_config.gitbooks.enabled {
+        tools.push(Box::new(GitbooksSearchTool::new(
+            root_config.gitbooks.endpoint.clone(),
+            root_config.gitbooks.timeout_secs,
+        )));
+        tools.push(Box::new(GitbooksGetPageTool::new(
+            root_config.gitbooks.endpoint.clone(),
+            root_config.gitbooks.timeout_secs,
+        )));
+        tracing::debug!("[gitbooks] registered gitbooks_search + gitbooks_get_page");
+    }
+
     // Web search — always registered. Result/timeout budget
     // knobs still come from `config.web_search`, but there is no
     // enable flag: every session needs research as a baseline
@@ -372,6 +398,114 @@ mod tests {
         );
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn all_tools_always_registers_curl() {
+        // Regression guard: `curl` is always registered (gated only by
+        // the shared `http_request.allowed_domains` allowlist at call
+        // time, like `http_request`). `Write` permission level keeps it
+        // off agents that aren't allowed to modify the workspace.
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default());
+        let mem_cfg = MemoryConfig {
+            backend: "markdown".into(),
+            ..MemoryConfig::default()
+        };
+        let mem: Arc<dyn Memory> =
+            Arc::from(crate::openhuman::memory::create_memory(&mem_cfg, tmp.path()).unwrap());
+
+        let browser = BrowserConfig::default();
+        let http = crate::openhuman::config::HttpRequestConfig::default();
+        let cfg = test_config(&tmp);
+
+        let tools = all_tools(
+            Arc::new(cfg.clone()),
+            &security,
+            mem,
+            &browser,
+            &http,
+            tmp.path(),
+            &HashMap::new(),
+            &cfg,
+        );
+        let names: Vec<&str> = tools.iter().map(|t| t.name()).collect();
+        assert!(
+            names.contains(&"curl"),
+            "curl must always be registered; got: {names:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn all_tools_registers_gitbooks_when_enabled() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default());
+        let mem_cfg = MemoryConfig {
+            backend: "markdown".into(),
+            ..MemoryConfig::default()
+        };
+        let mem: Arc<dyn Memory> =
+            Arc::from(crate::openhuman::memory::create_memory(&mem_cfg, tmp.path()).unwrap());
+        let browser = BrowserConfig::default();
+        let http = crate::openhuman::config::HttpRequestConfig::default();
+        let mut cfg = test_config(&tmp);
+        cfg.gitbooks.enabled = true;
+
+        let tools = all_tools(
+            Arc::new(cfg.clone()),
+            &security,
+            mem,
+            &browser,
+            &http,
+            tmp.path(),
+            &HashMap::new(),
+            &cfg,
+        );
+        let names: Vec<&str> = tools.iter().map(|t| t.name()).collect();
+        assert!(
+            names.contains(&"gitbooks_search"),
+            "gitbooks_search must register when gitbooks.enabled = true; got: {names:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            names.contains(&"gitbooks_get_page"),
+            "gitbooks_get_page must register when gitbooks.enabled = true; got: {names:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn all_tools_skips_gitbooks_when_disabled() {
+        let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
+        let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy::default());
+        let mem_cfg = MemoryConfig {
+            backend: "markdown".into(),
+            ..MemoryConfig::default()
+        };
+        let mem: Arc<dyn Memory> =
+            Arc::from(crate::openhuman::memory::create_memory(&mem_cfg, tmp.path()).unwrap());
+        let browser = BrowserConfig::default();
+        let http = crate::openhuman::config::HttpRequestConfig::default();
+        let mut cfg = test_config(&tmp);
+        cfg.gitbooks.enabled = false;
+
+        let tools = all_tools(
+            Arc::new(cfg.clone()),
+            &security,
+            mem,
+            &browser,
+            &http,
+            tmp.path(),
+            &HashMap::new(),
+            &cfg,
+        );
+        let names: Vec<&str> = tools.iter().map(|t| t.name()).collect();
+        assert!(
+            !names.contains(&"gitbooks_search"),
+            "gitbooks_search must NOT register when gitbooks.enabled = false; got: {names:?}"
+        );
+        assert!(
+            !names.contains(&"gitbooks_get_page"),
+            "gitbooks_get_page must NOT register when gitbooks.enabled = false; got: {names:?}"
+        );
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn all_tools_includes_complete_onboarding() {
         // Regression guard: the `complete_onboarding` tool must be