diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/harness/engine/core.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/harness/engine/core.rs index 9c58b39a2..28def0277 100644 --- a/src/openhuman/agent/harness/engine/core.rs +++ b/src/openhuman/agent/harness/engine/core.rs @@ -293,8 +293,38 @@ pub(crate) async fn run_turn_engine( return Err(cap_err.into()); } + // [image sidecar] Rehydrate `[Image: … #att:]` placeholders back to + // inline `[IMAGE:data:…]` from the process stash — but ONLY for + // vision-capable models. Non-vision models keep the text placeholder + // (no `[IMAGE:` markers ⇒ the capability gate above never fires, and no + // multi-MB payload is sent). The rehydrated copy is provider-only and is + // never persisted back to `history`. + let has_image_placeholders = multimodal::has_image_placeholders(history); + let rehydrated_history = if has_vision && has_image_placeholders { + tracing::debug!( + target: "multimodal", + has_vision, + history_len = history.len(), + "[image-sidecar] rehydrating image placeholders for vision-capable provider" + ); + Some(multimodal::rehydrate_image_placeholders(history)) + } else { + if has_image_placeholders { + tracing::debug!( + target: "multimodal", + has_vision, + "[image-sidecar] image placeholders present but provider is non-vision — keeping text placeholders" + ); + } + None + }; + let provider_history: &[_] = match rehydrated_history.as_ref() { + Some(v) => v, + None => history, + }; + let prepared_messages = multimodal::prepare_messages_for_provider( - history, + provider_history, multimodal_config, multimodal_file_config, ) diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal.rs index af7ba227a..a2c03e35a 100644 --- a/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal.rs +++ b/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal.rs @@ -6,8 +6,10 @@ use base64::{engine::general_purpose::STANDARD, Engine as _}; use flate2::read::GzDecoder; use reqwest::Client; use sha2::{Digest, Sha256}; +use std::collections::{HashMap, VecDeque}; use std::io::Read; use std::path::Path; +use std::sync::{Mutex, OnceLock}; use std::time::Duration; const IMAGE_MARKER_PREFIX: &str = "[IMAGE:"; @@ -376,6 +378,272 @@ pub async fn prepare_messages_for_provider( }) } +/// Ingress-time file extraction (PDF-attach fix). +/// +/// Replaces every `[FILE:data:…]` marker in a raw user message with its +/// extracted-text block (`[FILE-EXTRACTED: name="…"]…text…[/FILE-EXTRACTED]`), +/// or a content-less `[FILE-ATTACHED: …]` placeholder when extraction fails. +/// `[IMAGE:…]` markers are deliberately left untouched here — they are handled +/// at provider dispatch (vision needs the inline data URI). +/// +/// Run this at channel ingress, BEFORE the message is persisted to history, +/// auto-saved to the memory store, appended to the cross-thread JSONL, or +/// scanned for prompt injection — so the multi-MB base64 data URI never +/// survives past the front door. Idempotent: a message with no `[FILE:` marker +/// (already-rewritten `[FILE-EXTRACTED]` text included) is returned unchanged. +pub async fn inline_file_attachments(message: &str, file_config: &MultimodalFileConfig) -> String { + if !message.contains(FILE_MARKER_PREFIX) { + return message.to_string(); + } + let (cleaned, file_refs) = parse_file_markers(message); + if file_refs.is_empty() { + return message.to_string(); + } + let (max_files, max_file_size_mb, max_extracted_text_chars) = file_config.effective_limits(); + let max_file_bytes = max_file_size_mb.saturating_mul(1024 * 1024); + // Enforce the per-turn file cap at ingress (rewriting the markers removes + // the count check that `prepare_messages_for_provider` would otherwise do). + // `max_files == 0` is the hard-disable sentinel: read nothing. Over-cap refs + // degrade to a content-less placeholder rather than being normalized/read. + let read_cap = if file_config.max_files == 0 { + 0 + } else { + max_files + }; + let client = build_runtime_proxy_client_with_timeouts("provider.ollama", 30, 10); + + let mut payloads = Vec::with_capacity(file_refs.len()); + for (idx, reference) in file_refs.iter().enumerate() { + if idx >= read_cap { + payloads.push(FilePayload::Reference { + name: "attachment (over file limit)".to_string(), + mime: "application/octet-stream".to_string(), + size_bytes: 0, + sha256_prefix: "skipped".to_string(), + }); + continue; + } + match normalize_file_reference( + reference, + file_config, + max_file_bytes, + max_extracted_text_chars, + &client, + ) + .await + { + Ok(payload) => payloads.push(payload), + Err(err) => { + tracing::warn!( + target: "multimodal", + reason = %err, + "[multimodal::files][ingress] file marker could not be normalized; emitting bare placeholder" + ); + payloads.push(FilePayload::Reference { + name: "attachment".to_string(), + mime: "application/octet-stream".to_string(), + size_bytes: 0, + sha256_prefix: "unavailable".to_string(), + }); + } + } + } + + let rewritten = compose_multimodal_message(&cleaned, &[], &payloads); + tracing::info!( + target: "multimodal", + files = payloads.len(), + before_chars = message.chars().count(), + after_chars = rewritten.chars().count(), + "[multimodal::files][ingress] inlined file attachments — data URI replaced with extracted text/placeholder before persistence" + ); + rewritten +} + +// ── Image sidecar (PDF/image-attach fix, pass 2) ────────────────────────── +// +// Persisted messages must never carry a raw `[IMAGE:data:…]` data URI: like the +// PDF blob it floods the injection scan, the memory auto-save (N-chunk embed → +// Voyage 400), and the cross-thread JSONL index. So at ingress we replace each +// image marker with a compact `[Image: image #att:]` placeholder and stash +// the decoded data URI out-of-band. At provider dispatch we rehydrate the URI +// back into an inline `[IMAGE:…]` marker — but ONLY for vision-capable models; +// non-vision models keep the text placeholder (no multi-MB payload, no error). + +/// Placeholder token left in the persisted message in place of a raw image data +/// URI. Mixed-case so it never collides with the inline `[IMAGE:` parser. +const IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX: &str = "[Image:"; +/// Separator before the stash content-hash id inside a placeholder. +const IMAGE_STASH_REF: &str = "#att:"; + +/// Upper bounds on the in-memory image stash so it can't grow without limit +/// over the process lifetime (the data URI is out of history, but still on heap +/// until evicted). Whichever bound trips first evicts oldest-first (FIFO). +const IMAGE_STASH_MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 32; +const IMAGE_STASH_MAX_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024 * 1024; + +/// Bounded, content-addressed stash of inbound image data URIs. FIFO eviction +/// keeps resident memory capped; entries are keyed by content hash so identical +/// images dedupe. In-memory only — lost on restart (a follow-up turn then sees +/// the text placeholder). Disk-backing under `/attachments/` is the +/// production hardening; the persistence-pollution fix holds either way. +#[derive(Default)] +struct ImageStash { + map: HashMap, + order: VecDeque, + bytes: usize, +} + +impl ImageStash { + fn insert(&mut self, id: String, uri: String) { + if self.map.contains_key(&id) { + return; // content-addressed: already present, keep its FIFO position + } + self.bytes = self.bytes.saturating_add(uri.len()); + self.order.push_back(id.clone()); + self.map.insert(id, uri); + while self.map.len() > IMAGE_STASH_MAX_ENTRIES || self.bytes > IMAGE_STASH_MAX_BYTES { + let Some(old) = self.order.pop_front() else { + break; + }; + if let Some(v) = self.map.remove(&old) { + self.bytes = self.bytes.saturating_sub(v.len()); + } + } + } + + fn get(&self, id: &str) -> Option<&String> { + self.map.get(id) + } +} + +static IMAGE_STASH: OnceLock> = OnceLock::new(); + +fn image_stash() -> &'static Mutex { + IMAGE_STASH.get_or_init(|| Mutex::new(ImageStash::default())) +} + +/// Ingress-time image stashing. Replaces every `[IMAGE:data:…]` marker with a +/// `[Image: image #att:]` placeholder and stashes the decoded canonical data +/// URI, so the multi-MB base64 never persists. Idempotent (no `[IMAGE:` ⇒ no-op). +pub async fn stash_image_attachments(message: &str, image_config: &MultimodalConfig) -> String { + if !message.contains(IMAGE_MARKER_PREFIX) { + return message.to_string(); + } + let (cleaned, image_refs) = parse_image_markers(message); + if image_refs.is_empty() { + return message.to_string(); + } + let (max_images, max_image_size_mb) = image_config.effective_limits(); + let max_image_bytes = max_image_size_mb.saturating_mul(1024 * 1024); + let client = build_runtime_proxy_client_with_timeouts("provider.ollama", 30, 10); + + let mut placeholders = Vec::with_capacity(image_refs.len()); + for (idx, reference) in image_refs.iter().enumerate() { + // Enforce the per-turn image cap at ingress: over-cap markers degrade to + // a text placeholder and are never normalized/read or stashed (rewriting + // the markers removes the count check `prepare_messages_for_provider` + // would otherwise apply, and bounds stash growth per message). + if idx >= max_images { + placeholders.push("[Image: (over image limit)]".to_string()); + continue; + } + match normalize_image_reference(reference, image_config, max_image_bytes, &client).await { + Ok(data_uri) => { + let id = sha256_prefix(data_uri.as_bytes()); + image_stash() + .lock() + .unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()) + .insert(id.clone(), data_uri); + placeholders.push(format!("[Image: image {IMAGE_STASH_REF}{id}]")); + } + Err(err) => { + tracing::warn!( + target: "multimodal", + reason = %err, + "[multimodal::images][ingress] image could not be normalized; emitting bare placeholder" + ); + placeholders.push("[Image: (could not be processed)]".to_string()); + } + } + } + + let mut out = cleaned.trim().to_string(); + for p in &placeholders { + if !out.is_empty() { + out.push('\n'); + } + out.push_str(p); + } + tracing::info!( + target: "multimodal", + images = placeholders.len(), + before_chars = message.chars().count(), + after_chars = out.chars().count(), + "[multimodal::images][ingress] stashed image attachments — data URI replaced with placeholder before persistence" + ); + out +} + +/// True if any message carries an `[Image: … #att:]` sidecar placeholder. +pub fn has_image_placeholders(messages: &[ChatMessage]) -> bool { + messages.iter().any(|m| { + m.content.contains(IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX) && m.content.contains(IMAGE_STASH_REF) + }) +} + +/// Rehydrate `[Image: … #att:]` placeholders back into inline +/// `[IMAGE:]` markers from the stash, returning a provider-only copy. +/// Placeholders whose id is absent (e.g. after a restart) keep their text. +/// Call ONLY for vision-capable models. +pub fn rehydrate_image_placeholders(messages: &[ChatMessage]) -> Vec { + let stash = image_stash().lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner()); + messages + .iter() + .map(|m| { + if !(m.content.contains(IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX) + && m.content.contains(IMAGE_STASH_REF)) + { + return m.clone(); + } + ChatMessage { + id: m.id.clone(), + role: m.role.clone(), + content: rehydrate_placeholders_in_text(&m.content, &stash), + extra_metadata: m.extra_metadata.clone(), + } + }) + .collect() +} + +/// Replace each `[Image: #att:]` placeholder in `text` with +/// `[IMAGE:]` when the id is in `stash`; leave it verbatim otherwise. +fn rehydrate_placeholders_in_text(text: &str, stash: &ImageStash) -> String { + let mut out = String::with_capacity(text.len()); + let mut cursor = 0; + while let Some(rel) = text[cursor..].find(IMAGE_PLACEHOLDER_PREFIX) { + let start = cursor + rel; + out.push_str(&text[cursor..start]); + let Some(rel_end) = text[start..].find(']') else { + out.push_str(&text[start..]); + cursor = text.len(); + break; + }; + let end = start + rel_end + 1; + let inner = &text[start..end]; + let replaced = inner.find(IMAGE_STASH_REF).and_then(|ai| { + let id = inner[ai + IMAGE_STASH_REF.len()..] + .trim_end_matches(']') + .trim(); + stash.get(id).map(|uri| format!("[IMAGE:{uri}]")) + }); + out.push_str(replaced.as_deref().unwrap_or(inner)); + cursor = end; + } + out.push_str(&text[cursor..]); + out +} + fn compose_multimodal_message( text: &str, data_uris: &[String], diff --git a/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal_tests.rs b/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal_tests.rs index 4e85fe39b..c89a6070d 100644 --- a/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal_tests.rs +++ b/src/openhuman/agent/multimodal_tests.rs @@ -827,3 +827,136 @@ async fn prepare_messages_under_untrusted_channel_config_passes_plain_text_throu assert!(!prepared.contains_images); assert_eq!(prepared.messages.len(), 1); } + +// ── Ingress attachment processing: file extraction + image sidecar ─────────── + +#[tokio::test] +async fn inline_file_attachments_replaces_marker_with_extracted_text() { + // base64("hello world") = aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ= + let msg = "summarize [FILE:data:text/plain;base64,aGVsbG8gd29ybGQ=]"; + let out = inline_file_attachments(msg, &MultimodalFileConfig::default()).await; + assert!( + out.contains("[FILE-EXTRACTED"), + "extracted block present: {out}" + ); + assert!(out.contains("hello world"), "extracted text inlined: {out}"); + assert!( + !out.contains("[FILE:data:"), + "raw data-uri marker must be gone: {out}" + ); + assert!(out.contains("summarize"), "user text preserved: {out}"); +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn inline_file_attachments_noop_without_marker() { + let msg = "just a normal message"; + let out = inline_file_attachments(msg, &MultimodalFileConfig::default()).await; + assert_eq!(out, msg); +} + +const TINY_PNG_DATA_URI: &str = ""; + +#[tokio::test] +async fn stash_image_attachments_replaces_marker_with_placeholder() { + let msg = format!("whats this [IMAGE:{TINY_PNG_DATA_URI}]"); + let out = stash_image_attachments(&msg, &MultimodalConfig::default()).await; + assert!(out.contains("[Image:"), "placeholder present: {out}"); + assert!(out.contains("#att:"), "stash ref present: {out}"); + assert!( + !out.contains("[IMAGE:data:"), + "raw image marker must be gone: {out}" + ); + assert!( + !out.contains("base64"), + "no base64 left in persisted form: {out}" + ); + assert!(out.contains("whats this"), "user text preserved: {out}"); +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn image_placeholder_rehydrates_to_inline_marker_for_provider() { + // Ingress: stash the image and leave a placeholder. + let msg = format!("describe [IMAGE:{TINY_PNG_DATA_URI}]"); + let placeholdered = stash_image_attachments(&msg, &MultimodalConfig::default()).await; + let messages = vec![ChatMessage::user(placeholdered)]; + assert!(has_image_placeholders(&messages), "placeholder detected"); + + // Dispatch (vision model): rehydrate back to an inline [IMAGE:data:...] marker. + let rehydrated = rehydrate_image_placeholders(&messages); + assert_eq!(rehydrated.len(), 1); + assert!( + rehydrated[0].content.contains("[IMAGE:data:image/png"), + "rehydrated inline image: {}", + rehydrated[0].content + ); + assert!( + !rehydrated[0].content.contains("#att:"), + "placeholder consumed: {}", + rehydrated[0].content + ); +} + +#[test] +fn rehydrate_missing_stash_id_keeps_placeholder_text() { + // A placeholder whose id is absent from the stash (e.g. after a restart) is + // left verbatim rather than dropped — the model still sees a text mention. + let messages = vec![ChatMessage::user( + "see [Image: image #att:deadbeefdeadbeef]".to_string(), + )]; + let out = rehydrate_image_placeholders(&messages); + assert!(out[0] + .content + .contains("[Image: image #att:deadbeefdeadbeef]")); + assert!(!out[0].content.contains("[IMAGE:data:")); +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn inline_file_attachments_caps_at_max_files() { + // base64("a")=YQ==, base64("b")=Yg== + let msg = "[FILE:data:text/plain;base64,YQ==] [FILE:data:text/plain;base64,Yg==]"; + let cfg = MultimodalFileConfig { + max_files: 1, + ..MultimodalFileConfig::default() + }; + let out = inline_file_attachments(msg, &cfg).await; + // First file is extracted; the second is over the cap → placeholder, unread. + assert!( + out.contains("[FILE-EXTRACTED"), + "first file extracted: {out}" + ); + assert!(out.contains("over file limit"), "second file capped: {out}"); +} + +#[tokio::test] +async fn stash_image_attachments_caps_at_max_images() { + let msg = format!("[IMAGE:{TINY_PNG_DATA_URI}]\n[IMAGE:{TINY_PNG_DATA_URI}]"); + let cfg = MultimodalConfig { + max_images: 1, + ..MultimodalConfig::default() + }; + let out = stash_image_attachments(&msg, &cfg).await; + assert!(out.contains("#att:"), "first image stashed: {out}"); + assert!( + out.contains("over image limit"), + "second image capped: {out}" + ); +} + +#[test] +fn image_stash_evicts_oldest_over_capacity() { + let mut stash = ImageStash::default(); + for i in 0..(IMAGE_STASH_MAX_ENTRIES + 5) { + stash.insert(format!("id{i}"), format!("uri-{i}")); + } + assert!( + stash.map.len() <= IMAGE_STASH_MAX_ENTRIES, + "bounded entries" + ); + assert!(stash.get("id0").is_none(), "oldest evicted"); + assert!( + stash + .get(&format!("id{}", IMAGE_STASH_MAX_ENTRIES + 4)) + .is_some(), + "newest retained" + ); +} diff --git a/src/openhuman/channels/providers/web/ops.rs b/src/openhuman/channels/providers/web/ops.rs index ddf77b42e..823aeacd8 100644 --- a/src/openhuman/channels/providers/web/ops.rs +++ b/src/openhuman/channels/providers/web/ops.rs @@ -82,6 +82,63 @@ pub async fn start_chat( return Err("message is required".to_string()); } + // [pdf/image-attach fix] Process attachments at ingress, BEFORE the message is + // injection-scanned, persisted to history/JSONL, or auto-saved to the memory + // store. Otherwise a multi-MB base64 data URI floods every upstream stage + // (N-chunk embed → Voyage 400, cross-thread index) and stalls the turn. + // [FILE:data:…] → [FILE-EXTRACTED]text (or [FILE-ATTACHED] placeholder) + // [IMAGE:data:…] → [Image: … #att:] placeholder + out-of-band stash + // Images are rehydrated to a data URI at provider dispatch for vision-capable + // models only (engine::core). + let message = if message.contains("[FILE:") || message.contains("[IMAGE:") { + let before_chars = message.chars().count(); + log::debug!( + "[web-channel][ingress] preprocessing attachment markers thread_id={} client_id={} chars={}", + thread_id, + client_id, + before_chars + ); + // Fail CLOSED on a config-load error: process with default limits rather + // than passing the raw `[FILE:data:…]`/`[IMAGE:data:…]` blob through — + // otherwise the injection scan, history/JSONL persistence, and memory + // autosave all see the multi-MB data URI again, reopening the flood path. + let (file_cfg, image_cfg) = match crate::openhuman::config::rpc::load_config_with_timeout() + .await + { + Ok(cfg) => { + log::debug!( + "[web-channel][ingress] using configured multimodal limits thread_id={}", + thread_id + ); + (cfg.multimodal_files, cfg.multimodal) + } + Err(err) => { + log::warn!( + "[web-channel][ingress] config load failed; using default limits (fail-closed) thread_id={} err={err}", + thread_id + ); + ( + crate::openhuman::config::MultimodalFileConfig::default(), + crate::openhuman::config::MultimodalConfig::default(), + ) + } + }; + let extracted = + crate::openhuman::agent::multimodal::inline_file_attachments(&message, &file_cfg).await; + let processed = + crate::openhuman::agent::multimodal::stash_image_attachments(&extracted, &image_cfg) + .await; + log::debug!( + "[web-channel][ingress] attachment preprocessing complete thread_id={} before_chars={} after_chars={}", + thread_id, + before_chars, + processed.chars().count() + ); + processed + } else { + message + }; + let request_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string(); let prompt_decision = enforce_prompt_input( &message,