Files
gbrain/docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md
T
488e4824e8 v0.34.1.0 fix(mcp): MCP fix wave — source-isolation P0 + PKCE DCR + federated_read + 3 more (#996)
* fix(mcp): skip stdin EOF handlers when MCP_STDIO=1

OpenClaw's bundle-mcp gateway and similar wrappers pipe the JSON-RPC
handshake on stdin then close their stdin half. Pre-fix, both stdin
'end' and 'close' listeners (server.ts:65-66 and serve.ts:204-206)
treated this as a permanent disconnect and shut the server down before
the first tool call arrived.

Guard both sites with `process.env.MCP_STDIO !== '1'`. Signal handlers
(SIGTERM/SIGINT/SIGHUP), transport.onclose, and the parent-process
watchdog still cover legitimate shutdown paths. The serve.ts site
threads the env read through an injectable `mcpStdio?: boolean` on
ServeOptions so tests stay isolated (no process.env mutation per
scripts/check-test-isolation.sh R1).

Tests: 3 new cases in test/serve-stdio-lifecycle.test.ts pin the
guard's invariants — mcpStdio=true must NOT trigger shutdown on stdin
EOF, signals must still drive shutdown with mcpStdio=true, and
mcpStdio=false (default) preserves existing CLI behavior. 25/25 pass.

Origin: PR #870.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(oauth): honor token_endpoint_auth_method=none for PKCE public clients

RFC 7591 §3.2.1: when a DCR client declares
token_endpoint_auth_method="none" (PKCE-only public clients like Claude
Code, Cursor), the authorization server MUST NOT issue a client_secret.
Pre-fix, registerClient unconditionally minted a secret, and the MCP
SDK's clientAuth middleware then rejected valid public-client flows on
/token because it expected client.client_secret to match.

Three changes to src/core/oauth-provider.ts:registerClient:

  - Gate clientSecret generation on isPublicClient = (auth_method === 'none').
    Public clients store client_secret_hash = NULL.
  - Omit client_secret from the response payload for public clients.
    Confidential clients (default client_secret_post and explicit
    client_secret_basic) keep their existing one-time-reveal shape.
  - Normalize NULL secret_hash to JS undefined in getClient so SDK
    middleware (which checks client.client_secret === undefined, not
    === null) correctly identifies public clients and skips the
    secret-comparison branch on /token.

Schema is already permissive (client_secret_hash TEXT, no NOT NULL on
both src/schema.sql and src/core/pglite-schema.ts) — no migration
needed.

Tests: 5 new cases in test/oauth.test.ts pin:
  - public client → no client_secret in response (#11 from plan)
  - default auth_method → secret unchanged (regression guard)
  - explicit client_secret_post → secret unchanged
  - getClient NULL→undefined normalization
  - PKCE full /authorize → /token end-to-end with no secret (#15 from plan)

69/69 oauth.test.ts cases pass. typecheck clean.

Origin: PR #909.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(serve-http): --bind HOST, default to loopback (127.0.0.1)

Adds `gbrain serve --http --bind <interface>` to control which network
interface the HTTP MCP server listens on. Default flipped from
`0.0.0.0` (pre-v0.34) to `127.0.0.1` (v0.34.0+).

Why the flip: gbrain's primary use case is a personal-knowledge brain on
a laptop. The previous default exposed brains on every interface — one
accidental `--http` invocation away from publishing the brain to a LAN.
Server operators who need remote access pass `--bind 0.0.0.0` (or a
specific interface). Codex's outside-voice on the original PR #864
correctly flagged that the additive flag wasn't actually the fix; the
default needed to change for the safety claim to hold.

If `--public-url` is set but `--bind` is unset, runServeHttp prints a
loud stderr WARN at startup recommending `--bind 0.0.0.0`. Declaring a
public URL while quietly binding loopback is almost always a
misconfiguration; we want the operator to see it on first start, not
silently fail remote requests.

Startup banner now includes a `Bind:` row so the listening interface is
visible alongside Port / Engine / Issuer.

Origin: PR #864, extended with D11 (default flip) per /plan-eng-review
codex outside-voice review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(mcp): seal source-isolation leak on read path (P0)

Pre-fix, an authenticated OAuth MCP client scoped to source-A could
enumerate source-B pages via six read-side ops: search, query (text
AND image paths), list_pages, traverse_graph, and find_experts. The
v0.31.8 source-scoping pattern shipped through dispatch.ts but the op
handlers never threaded ctx.sourceId into their engine calls, and
hybridSearch.ts:223's explicit SearchOpts rebuild dropped sourceId
even when callers passed it.

Sealing the leak:

  - src/core/operations.ts adds sourceScopeOpts(ctx), the canonical
    precedence ladder: ctx.auth.allowedSources (federated) wins over
    ctx.sourceId (scalar) wins over nothing. Threaded into all 5
    read-side op handlers + the query-image-path searchVector call
    (the 6th leak surface codex caught in plan review).

  - src/core/search/hybrid.ts:223 now threads sourceId + sourceIds
    fields through the inner SearchOpts rebuild. The explicit pick
    shape is preserved (HNSW inner-CTE ordering depends on it) but
    extended.

  - src/core/types.ts adds sourceIds?: string[] to SearchOpts +
    PageFilters (D9: federated read needs array-shaped engine filter
    or fan-out; array wins for hot retrieval).

  - src/core/operations.ts AuthInfo gains sourceId + allowedSources
    (D2: identity surface symmetric with the federated_read column
    #876 will add).

  - Both engines now apply WHERE source_id = $N (scalar) or = ANY($N::text[])
    (array) at the SQL layer for searchKeyword, searchKeywordChunks,
    searchVector, listPages, traverseGraph, traversePaths. Array form
    wins when both are set. The searchVector filter pushes into the
    inner HNSW CTE (codex flagged this placement during plan review).

  - traverseGraph + traversePaths signatures gain opts.sourceId +
    opts.sourceIds; engine.ts interface updated.

  - findExperts (the whoknows op, D3 5th leak surface) accepts
    sourceId + sourceIds and threads them into its internal
    hybridSearch call. PR #861 was authored before v0.33 shipped so
    this op wasn't covered in the original PR.

Auth wiring:

  - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken populates AuthInfo.sourceId
    from oauth_clients.source_id. JOIN guarded by isUndefinedColumnError
    so pre-v55 brains degrade to legacy projection rather than refusing
    every token verification.

  - GBrainOAuthProvider.registerClientManual gains a sourceId
    parameter (defaults to 'default'). DCR registerClient also sets
    source_id='default' on the inserted row.

  - serve-http.ts:929 cleanup: AuthInfo.sourceId is now a real typed
    field. The cast + GBRAIN_SOURCE env fallback chain is gone (D13).
    Legacy bearer tokens default to 'default' source in
    verifyAccessToken.

  - http-transport.ts (legacy access_tokens path) threads
    sourceId='default' through DispatchOpts so v0.22.7 callers stay
    source-scoped.

  - auth.ts CLI adds --source flag to gbrain auth register-client.

Migration v55 (D10 + D13):

  - ALTER TABLE oauth_clients ADD COLUMN source_id TEXT (nullable).
  - Backfill UPDATE source_id = 'default' WHERE source_id IS NULL —
    preserves v0.33 effective behavior verbatim for legacy clients.
  - ADD CONSTRAINT FK ... REFERENCES sources(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
    wrapped in DO block so re-runs against fresh-install brains (where
    the FK already lives inline in SCHEMA_SQL) no-op cleanly.
  - CREATE INDEX idx_oauth_clients_source_id WHERE source_id IS NOT NULL
    for the verifyAccessToken JOIN.
  - GBRAIN_ACCEPT_SILENT_WIDEN env-flag wired through the runner via
    SET LOCAL gbrain.accept_silent_widen — reserved for future migrations
    that hit the silent-widen footgun codex flagged. This migration
    doesn't need it (column is brand new; no pre-existing stale values
    possible by definition).
  - src/core/pglite-schema.ts + src/schema.sql include the column +
    FK + index inline for fresh installs.

Tests: new test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts with 13 regression
cases — one per leak surface (search/list_pages/traverse/etc.) plus
explicit AuthInfo.sourceId and AuthInfo.allowedSources op-handler
threading checks. Full unit suite: 6034 pass / 0 fail. PGLite
initSchema time dropped from 2.4s to 850ms after consolidating v55's
DO blocks (multiple DO blocks were slow on PGLite; one DO block for
the FK install only is fine).

Origin: PR #861 + plan-eng-review decisions D2/D3/D4/D9/D10/D13 + F2.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(gateway): multimodal embedding for openai-compatible providers

Pre-fix, embedMultimodal hardcoded a recipe.id === 'voyage' branch and
threw AIConfigError for every other recipe. Multimodal-capable providers
fronted by LiteLLM (or any openai-compatible proxy) were unreachable
even when the operator had wired up the model.

The fix:

  - src/core/ai/gateway.ts adds embedMultimodalOpenAICompat() that
    POSTs to the standard /embeddings endpoint with content arrays
    carrying image_url entries. Routing comes from the existing
    recipe.implementation switch — Voyage stays on its own
    /multimodalembeddings path; every other openai-compatible recipe
    flows through the new helper.

  - src/core/ai/recipes/litellm-proxy.ts declares
    supports_multimodal: true so embedMultimodal accepts the recipe.
    No multimodal_models allow-list: LiteLLM is a passthrough proxy
    and the user owns model-id selection; provider rejection (400 from
    upstream) is the right enforcement layer there. Voyage's static
    allow-list shape stays unchanged (its 12 models share
    supports_multimodal but only one is multimodal-capable).

  - D12 runtime dimension validation: the new helper checks the
    returned vector length against the recipe's declared default_dims
    (preferred) or the brain's embedding_dimensions config. Mismatch
    throws AIConfigError with model id + observed + expected so the
    operator can swap models or rebuild the column. Pre-fix, a
    wrong-dim response would surface as a cryptic pgvector
    "vector dimension mismatch" at INSERT time.

  - Auth resolution routes through the existing defaultResolveAuth
    helper so optional-auth recipes (LiteLLM proxy with no
    LITELLM_API_KEY) and required-auth recipes both share one code
    path. Optional-auth sends "Authorization: Bearer unauthenticated"
    which servers like Ollama / llama-server ignore but the SDK
    contract requires.

Tests: 11 new cases in test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts cover
happy-path, multi-input batching, unauthenticated proxy, D12 dim
mismatch + default-dim fallback, 401 / 400 / malformed-JSON / non-array
error paths, and an explicit Voyage-regression test pinning that the
new openai-compat route doesn't accidentally hijack the Voyage path.
All 41 multimodal-related tests pass (existing voyage suite + new).
typecheck clean.

Origin: PR #875 + plan-eng-review D12 (runtime dim validation).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(oauth): federated_read read scope (#876)

Pre-fix, OAuth clients had a single source-scope axis (source_id, added
in v55). A client could either write+read one source OR be a super-reader
across all sources (via NULL source_id). There was no middle ground —
WeCare-style L3 dept clients that need to write to dept-x but read
dept-x + parent canon + shared canon had no expression.

#876 adds federated_read TEXT[] as an orthogonal read-scope axis. source_id
is the WRITE authority; federated_read is the READ authority. They default
to matching values (read scope == write scope, the pre-v0.34 default)
when a client is registered without an explicit federated read list.

Migrations v56-v60 (six new migrations on top of v55):

  - v56: ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN federated_read TEXT[] NOT NULL DEFAULT '{}'.
  - v57 (F5): explicit CASE backfill so source_id IS NULL → '{}' (not an
    array containing NULL — codex caught this ambiguity during plan review).
  - v58: post-backfill validation. Fails loud if any row's source_id isn't
    in its federated_read array, pointing at a logic bug in v57 if fired.
  - v59: flip the source_id FK from ON DELETE SET NULL to ON DELETE
    RESTRICT now that federated_read provides the alternative scope-loss
    path. Pre-flip, deleting a source could silently widen any oauth_client
    to super-reader; post-flip, source delete is refused if any client
    references it (operator must revoke/re-scope first).
  - v60: GIN index on federated_read for array-containment queries.

Auth wiring:

  - GBrainOAuthProvider.verifyAccessToken JOINs c.federated_read and
    populates AuthInfo.allowedSources. Pre-v56 / pre-v55 brains degrade
    via the existing isUndefinedColumnError fallback chain.
  - registerClientManual gains a federatedRead?: string[] parameter
    (defaults to [sourceId]).
  - DCR registerClient sets source_id='default' + federated_read=['default']
    on the inserted row.
  - auth.ts CLI adds --federated-read SRC1,SRC2,... flag. The
    register-client output now prints "Federated reads:" so operators
    confirm the scope they set.

Engines consume the federated array through the SearchOpts.sourceIds /
PageFilters.sourceIds field that #861 added (no engine changes here — the
plumbing was D9). sourceScopeOpts in operations.ts already prefers the
auth.allowedSources array over scalar ctx.sourceId when set.

Test seam:
  - test/book-mirror.test.ts now spawns the CLI with GBRAIN_HOME pointed
    at a tempdir so the test isn't sensitive to the developer's local
    ~/.gbrain/config.json. Pre-fix the test could silently inherit a real
    Postgres connection and hang past the default 5s test timeout. Fresh
    GBRAIN_HOME → "No brain configured" → exit 1 in <1s.
  - test/e2e/source-isolation-pglite.test.ts gains one more regression
    case: AuthInfo.allowedSources = [] (explicit empty) MUST NOT widen
    scope to "all sources" — the silent-widen footgun precedence ladder.
  - test/openai-compat-multimodal.test.ts is part of the wave's commits
    via the migrate.ts changes that bump the schema chain. typecheck-only
    fix on a captured-auth type was already in #875's tree.

6045 unit tests pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean. PGLite initSchema runs
v55-v60 in ~786ms total (within the test-harness budget for tests using
the canonical beforeAll engine pattern).

Origin: PR #876 + plan-eng-review F5 (CASE backfill).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* v0.34.0.0: MCP fix wave (#870 #909 #864 #861 #875 #876)

VERSION + package.json + CHANGELOG bump for the six-PR MCP fix wave.
Schema chain extends from v54 → v60; oauth_clients gains source_id +
federated_read columns; auth'd MCP clients now stay inside their scope
across all read-side ops; PKCE-only DCR works; --bind defaults to
loopback; LiteLLM multimodal embedding ships.

Contributed by @Hansen1018 (#870), @ding-modding (#909), @DukeDawg
(#864), @toilalesondev (#861 + #876), @yoelgal (#875).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs: update project documentation for v0.34.0.0

Sync README, CLAUDE.md, SECURITY.md, docs/architecture/topologies.md,
and docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md to reflect the v0.34.0.0 MCP fix wave:

- README: document --bind HOST default (loopback), --source +
  --federated-read register-client flags, PKCE public-client gate
- SECURITY.md: note loopback-by-default for serve --http, update the
  trust-proxy contract to point at the new default
- CLAUDE.md: annotate operations.ts (sourceScopeOpts helper),
  oauth-provider.ts (verifyAccessToken JOIN + PKCE public clients),
  serve-http.ts (--bind flag), gateway.ts (openai-compat multimodal +
  dim validation), mcp/server.ts (MCP_STDIO guard), auth.ts (--source
  + --federated-read), migrate.ts (v58-v63 chain), engine.ts
  (sourceIds field). Add 4 new test-file entries for
  source-isolation-pglite, openai-compat-multimodal,
  serve-stdio-lifecycle, oauth.test.ts PKCE cases
- docs/architecture/topologies.md: source-scoped register-client
  example, --bind 0.0.0.0 for thin-client host setup
- docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: --bind explanation in the ngrok section,
  source-scoped client recipe
- llms-full.txt: regenerated per the CLAUDE.md-edit chaser rule

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore: bump v0.34.0.0 → v0.34.1.0

Renumbering the MCP fix wave from v0.34.0.0 to v0.34.1.0 so the
release slot lands between master's v0.33.2.1 and the next minor.

Touches every release-artifact mention:
- VERSION: 0.34.0.0 → 0.34.1.0
- package.json: same
- CHANGELOG.md header + "To take advantage" block
- CLAUDE.md key-files annotations (8 entries that document this wave)
- llms-full.txt (regen from CLAUDE.md)
- README.md / SECURITY.md / docs/architecture/topologies.md / docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md
- Wave code-comment markers ("// v0.34.0 (#NNN):" → "// v0.34.1 (#NNN):")

Test files renamed alongside since they were committed with the wave.

Commit subjects on the original 6 PR commits + the v0.34.0.0 bump
commit (4f533c726b47db7e) intentionally NOT rewritten — those are
history. `git log` finds the implementation by message subject, not by
version tag.

6275 unit tests pass, typecheck clean, migration chain v58-v63 unchanged.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-14 20:15:29 -07:00

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Markdown

# Deploy GBrain Remote MCP Server
> **v0.26.0+:** `gbrain serve --http` ships full OAuth 2.1 (client credentials,
> auth code + PKCE, refresh rotation, optional DCR), an embedded React admin
> dashboard at `/admin`, scoped operations, and a live SSE activity feed.
> Pre-v0.26 legacy bearer tokens still work — `verifyAccessToken` falls back
> to the `access_tokens` table and grandfathers tokens to `read+write+admin`.
> Postgres-only for the legacy fallback (the `access_tokens` table is Postgres-only);
> OAuth tables work on both PGLite and Postgres. See [SECURITY.md](../../SECURITY.md)
> for env vars and tunable defaults.
Access your brain from any device, any AI client. GBrain ships two transports:
`gbrain serve` (stdio) for local agents, and `gbrain serve --http` (v0.26.0+)
for remote clients over OAuth 2.1.
## Three Paths
### Local stdio (zero setup)
```bash
gbrain serve
```
Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and any MCP client that supports stdio.
No server, no tunnel, no token needed. Works on both PGLite and Postgres engines.
### Remote over OAuth 2.1 (recommended, v0.26.0+)
```bash
gbrain serve --http --port 3131
ngrok http 3131 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
gbrain serve --http --port 3131 --public-url https://your-brain.ngrok.app
```
Built-in HTTP transport with OAuth 2.1, scoped operations, an admin dashboard
at `/admin`, and a live SSE activity feed. Zero external dependencies. This is
the only path that works with ChatGPT (OAuth 2.1 + PKCE is required by the
ChatGPT MCP connector). Pass `--public-url` whenever the server is reachable
at anything other than `http://localhost:<port>` so the OAuth issuer in
discovery metadata matches what clients hit (RFC 8414 §3.3).
Supported clients:
- **ChatGPT** — requires OAuth 2.1 + PKCE. Works natively with `--http`.
- **Claude Desktop / Cowork** — OAuth 2.1 or legacy bearer tokens.
- **Perplexity** — OAuth 2.1 client credentials grant.
- **Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf** — can use OAuth or legacy bearer.
See the [OAuth 2.1 setup](#oauth-21-setup-v100) section below.
### Remote with legacy bearer tokens (pre-v0.26 deployments) — Postgres only
```
Your AI client (Claude Desktop, Perplexity, etc.)
→ ngrok tunnel (https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app)
→ gbrain serve --http (built-in transport with bearer auth)
→ Postgres (pooler connection or self-hosted)
```
This requires:
1. A Postgres-backed brain (the `access_tokens` table only exists on Postgres;
running `gbrain serve --http` against a PGLite install fails fast at startup)
2. A machine running `gbrain serve --http`
3. A public tunnel (ngrok, Tailscale, or cloud host)
4. A bearer token created via `gbrain auth create <name>`
Pre-v1.0 tokens are grandfathered as `read+write+admin` scopes when you upgrade
to the HTTP server, so no migration is required.
## OAuth 2.1 Setup (v0.26.0+)
### 1. Start the HTTP server
```bash
gbrain serve --http --port 3131
```
On first start, the server prints an **admin bootstrap token** to stderr:
```
Admin bootstrap token: 3a1f9c...
Open http://localhost:3131/admin and paste it to log in.
```
Save this token. Open `http://localhost:3131/admin` and paste it to access the
dashboard. The dashboard shows live activity, registered clients, request logs,
and per-client config export.
> **v0.26.9+:** `mcp_request_log.params` and the live SSE activity feed default
> to a redacted summary `{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}`.
> Declared param keys are kept (intersected against the operation's spec); unknown
> keys are counted but never named, and byte sizes round up to 1KB so size-probe
> attacks can't binary-search secret content. Operators on a personal laptop who
> want raw payloads back can pass `gbrain serve --http --log-full-params` (loud
> stderr warning fires at startup). Multi-tenant deployments should leave it on
> the redacted default.
### 2. Register OAuth clients
Register clients from the **`/admin` dashboard**:
1. Click **Register client**.
2. Enter a name (e.g. `perplexity`, `chatgpt`).
3. Pick scopes: `read`, `write`, `admin` (checkboxes).
4. Pick grant type: `client_credentials` for machine-to-machine (Perplexity,
Claude Desktop bearer mode) or `authorization_code` for browser-based
clients with PKCE (ChatGPT).
5. For `authorization_code` clients, paste the redirect URI.
6. Hit **Register**. The credential-reveal modal shows the `client_id` (and
`client_secret` for confidential clients) once. Copy or Download JSON
immediately — secrets are hashed on storage and never shown again.
Or from the CLI — faster for scripting:
```bash
gbrain auth register-client perplexity \
--grant-types client_credentials \
--scopes "read write"
```
**v0.34 — source-scoped clients.** Multi-source brains can scope a client's
write authority to one source and its read scope to a curated set with the
new `--source` and `--federated-read` flags:
```bash
gbrain auth register-client dept-x-agent \
--grant-types client_credentials \
--scopes "read write" \
--source dept-x \
--federated-read dept-x,shared,parent-canon
```
`--source` controls the write authority — `put_page` / `add_link` / etc only
land in `dept-x`. `--federated-read` controls the read axis independently;
queries return rows from any of the listed sources. Omit both flags for the
v0.33-compatible super-client shape. Pre-v0.34 clients are backfilled to
`source_id='default'` on `gbrain upgrade`.
Host-repo wrappers can register programmatically:
```ts
await oauthProvider.registerClientManual(
'perplexity',
['client_credentials'],
'read write',
[], // redirect_uris, empty for CC
);
```
For self-service client registration (Dynamic Client Registration, RFC 7591),
start the server with `--enable-dcr`. DCR is off by default.
### 3. Expose the server
**v0.34 — bind explicitly.** `gbrain serve --http` defaults to `127.0.0.1`.
To accept connections from the ngrok tunnel (or any non-loopback source),
restart with `--bind`:
```bash
gbrain serve --http --port 3131 --bind 0.0.0.0 --public-url https://your-brain.ngrok.app
```
When `--public-url` is set without `--bind`, a stderr WARN fires at
startup so the misconfiguration ("the tunnel is up but my agent gets
ECONNREFUSED") is loud.
```bash
brew install ngrok
ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
ngrok http 3131 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
```
Your OAuth issuer URL becomes `https://your-brain.ngrok.app`. The MCP SDK's
router exposes the spec-compliant discovery endpoint at
`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`.
### 4. Scopes and localOnly
Every operation is tagged `read | write | admin`. Four operations are
`localOnly` and rejected over HTTP regardless of scope: `sync_brain`,
`file_upload`, `file_list`, `file_url`. Remote agents cannot reach local
filesystem surface area.
| Scope | What it allows |
|-------|---------------|
| `read` | `search`, `query`, `get_page`, `list_pages`, graph traversal |
| `write` | `put_page`, `delete_page`, `add_link`, `add_timeline_entry` |
| `admin` | Client management, token revocation, sweep, local-only ops |
## Legacy Bearer Token Setup
Keep using pre-v0.26 bearer tokens if you aren't ready to migrate. They
grandfather to `read+write+admin` scopes on the HTTP server.
### 1. Set up the tunnel
See the [ngrok-tunnel recipe](../../recipes/ngrok-tunnel.md) for full setup.
Quick version:
```bash
brew install ngrok
ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
ngrok http 8787 --url your-brain.ngrok.app # Hobby tier for fixed domain
```
### 2. Create access tokens
```bash
# Create a token for each client
gbrain auth create "claude-desktop"
# List all tokens
gbrain auth list
# Revoke a token
gbrain auth revoke "claude-desktop"
```
Tokens are per-client. Create one for each device/app. Revoke individually
if compromised. Tokens are stored SHA-256 hashed in your database.
### 3. Connect your AI client
- **ChatGPT:** [setup guide](CHATGPT.md) (OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, requires `gbrain serve --http`)
- **Claude Code:** [setup guide](CLAUDE_CODE.md)
- **Claude Desktop:** [setup guide](CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md) (must use GUI, not JSON config)
- **Claude Cowork:** [setup guide](CLAUDE_COWORK.md)
- **Perplexity:** [setup guide](PERPLEXITY.md)
### 4. Verify
```bash
gbrain auth test \
https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app/mcp \
--token YOUR_TOKEN
```
## Operations
All 30 GBrain operations are available remotely, including `sync_brain` and
`file_upload` (no timeout limits with self-hosted server).
**Security note on `file_upload`:** remote MCP callers are confined to the working
directory where `gbrain serve` was launched. Symlinks, `..` traversal, and absolute
paths outside cwd are rejected. Page slugs and filenames are allowlist-validated
(alphanumeric + hyphens; no control chars, RTL overrides, or backslashes). Local
CLI callers (`gbrain file upload ...`) keep unrestricted filesystem access since
the user owns the machine.
## Deployment Options
See [ALTERNATIVES.md](ALTERNATIVES.md) for a comparison of ngrok, Tailscale
Funnel, and cloud hosts (Fly.io, Railway).
## Troubleshooting
**"missing_auth" error**
Include the Authorization header: `Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN`
**"invalid_token" error**
Run `gbrain auth list` to see active tokens.
**"service_unavailable" error**
Database connection failed. Check your Supabase dashboard for outages.
**Claude Desktop doesn't connect**
Remote servers must be added via Settings > Integrations, NOT
`claude_desktop_config.json`. See [CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md](CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md).
## Expected Latencies
| Operation | Typical Latency | Notes |
|-----------|----------------|-------|
| get_page | < 100ms | Single DB query |
| list_pages | < 200ms | DB query with filters |
| search (keyword) | 100-300ms | Full-text search |
| query (hybrid) | 1-3s | Embedding + vector + keyword + RRF |
| put_page | 100-500ms | Write + trigger search_vector update |
| get_stats | < 100ms | Aggregate query |
**Note:** `gbrain serve --http` shipped in v0.26.0 with OAuth 2.1 + admin
dashboard baked into the binary. The custom HTTP wrapper pattern (see
[voice recipe](../../recipes/twilio-voice-brain.md)) is still supported for
teams that need bespoke middleware, but for most remote deployments the
built-in server is the recommended path.