mirror of
https://github.com/garrytan/gbrain.git
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* fix(mcp): close HTTP MCP shell-job RCE + tighten remote contract
The HTTP MCP transport in serve-http.ts inlined its own OperationContext
literal and forgot to set `remote: true`. With the field undefined at the
operations.ts protected-job-name guard (line 1391), an HTTP MCP caller
holding a write-scoped OAuth token could submit `submit_job {name: "shell"}`
and execute arbitrary commands on the gbrain host (RCE-class).
Two-layer fix:
1. F7 — explicit `remote: true` on the inlined /mcp OperationContext.
Stdio MCP at src/mcp/dispatch.ts:61 already set this; the HTTP path
was the regression.
2. F7b — fail-closed contract on the four ctx.remote consumer sites in
operations.ts (auto-link skip, telemetry x2, protected-job guard).
The protected-job guard flips from `if (ctx.remote && ...)` to
`if (ctx.remote !== false && ...)` and the trusted-marker site flips
from `!ctx.remote && ...` to `ctx.remote === false && ...`. Anything
that isn't strictly `false` now treats the caller as remote/untrusted.
3. D12 — `OperationContext.remote` becomes REQUIRED in the TypeScript
type. The compiler now catches future transports that forget the field.
The runtime fail-closed defaults are belt+suspenders for any caller
that bypasses the type via `as` cast or `Partial<>` spread.
Tests:
- New `test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts` (4 cases) pins the
fail-closed semantics: undefined-via-cast rejects, remote=true rejects,
remote=false allowed (only path that escalates protected-name jobs).
- `test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts` adds 2 cases asserting HTTP MCP
cannot submit `shell` or `subagent` jobs even with read+write scope.
- `test/e2e/graph-quality.test.ts` adds the now-required `remote: false`
to its fixture (e2e graph quality simulates local-CLI writes).
Verification: bun test -> 3742 pass / 0 fail. typecheck clean.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this trust-boundary regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): RFC 6749 hardening + serve-http defense in depth
OAuth provider hardening pass that brings the provider into RFC compliance
on auth code, refresh token, and revocation flows, and tightens the
serve-http surface around request logging and admin cookies.
Provider (src/core/oauth-provider.ts):
- F1: bind client_id atomically into the auth code DELETE WHERE clause for
exchangeAuthorizationCode + challengeForAuthorizationCode. Previous
pattern (DELETE...RETURNING then post-hoc client compare) burned codes
on the wrong-client path so the legitimate client could not retry.
RFC 6749 §10.5.
- F2: same atomic predicate on exchangeRefreshToken. The pre-fix shape
defeated RFC 6749 §10.4's stolen-token detection by letting attacker +
victim both succeed.
- F3: refresh token rejects requested scopes that are not a subset of the
ORIGINAL grant on the row. Codex C9: subset is checked against the
recorded grant, not the client's currently-allowed scopes (which can
expand later); omitted scope inherits the original verbatim and stays
distinct from explicit-empty. RFC 6749 §6.
- F4: revokeToken adds AND client_id to the DELETE so a client cannot
revoke another client's tokens by guessing the hash. RFC 7009 §2.1.
- F5: deleted_at and token_ttl column probes use a new
isUndefinedColumnError helper (extracted to src/core/utils.ts per D14)
that matches SQLSTATE 42703 or column-name-in-message. Bare catch{}
used to swallow lock timeouts, network blips, and auth failures as
"column missing" — fail-open posture in a security path.
- F6: sweepExpiredTokens uses RETURNING 1 + array length. Pre-fix
(result as any).count returned 0 on at least one engine even when
rows were deleted, and codes were never counted.
- F7c: NEW finding eva-brain missed. exchangeAuthorizationCode now folds
redirect_uri into the atomic DELETE predicate when the parameter is
provided. Stored on /authorize, never compared on /token before this
commit. RFC 6749 §4.1.3 violation. Back-compat: when caller omits the
parameter the predicate is skipped, preserving SDK consumers that
haven't adopted the parameter yet.
- F12 (cleanup, not security): dcrDisabled constructor option replaces
the prior monkey-patch of _clientsStore in serve-http.ts. The SDK's
mcpAuthRouter only wires up /register when the store exposes
registerClient, so omitting the method via the constructor is
sufficient. Reframed as cleanup per codex C10 — the monkey-patch
happened before mcpAuthRouter ran, so the prior shape did not have
a real security regression to claim.
Dispatch (src/mcp/dispatch.ts):
- F8: new summarizeMcpParams(opName, params) intersects submitted keys
against the operation's declared params allow-list. Returns
{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}.
Closes the codex C8 leak: a naive "dump all submitted keys" summary
still echoed attacker-controlled key names like
put_page {"wiki/people/sensitive_name": "..."} into mcp_request_log
+ the SSE feed. Allow-list pattern keeps debug visibility on declared
keys while counting unknowns without naming them.
Serve-http (src/commands/serve-http.ts) + serve (src/commands/serve.ts):
- F8 wiring: mcp_request_log + SSE broadcast routed through
summarizeMcpParams by default. New --log-full-params flag bypasses
redaction with a loud stderr warning at startup. Default privacy-
positive; flag is the documented escape hatch for self-hosted
operators debugging on their own laptop.
- F9: admin cookies set Secure when req.secure OR issuerUrl.protocol
is https. Cloudflare-tunnel + reverse-proxy deployments where the
inside-tunnel hop looks like http but the public URL is https now
tag cookies correctly.
- F10: bound magicLinkNonces with NONCE_LRU_CAP. Previously only the
consumed-nonces map was capped; an attacker (or misbehaving agent)
with the bootstrap token could mint nonces faster than they expired
and grow the live store unbounded.
- F12: dcrDisabled flows through to the provider constructor instead of
monkey-patching _clientsStore after construction.
- F14: try/catch wraps StreamableHTTPServerTransport setup +
handleRequest. SDK-level throws no longer fall through to express's
default HTML error page; clients expecting JSON-RPC envelopes get a
JSON 500 instead.
- F15: error envelope unified via buildError + serializeError from
src/core/errors.ts. OperationError and unexpected exceptions both
emit the same {class, code, message, hint} shape so clients can
pattern-match a single envelope.
Tests:
- test/oauth.test.ts adds 11 cases:
* F1+F2 wrong-client cannot consume / read PKCE / burn refresh,
paired with owner-still-redeems atomically afterward (codex D6 —
proves the predicate doesn't burn the row on attacker attempts).
* F3 refresh scope subset enforced.
* F4 wrong-client cannot revoke.
* F5 non-schema SQL not swallowed by client_credentials soft-delete probe.
* F6 sweepExpiredTokens returns count > 0 after deleting rows.
* F7c redirect_uri match succeeds, mismatch rejects, omitted preserves
back-compat for callers that don't pass the parameter.
* F12 dcrDisabled constructor option exposes only getClient,
registerClientManual still works.
- test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts (NEW, 6 cases): pins the F8
privacy invariants. The codex-C8 attacker-key-name probe asserts that
a sensitive name submitted as a key never appears anywhere in the
redactor's output.
Verification: bun run typecheck clean. test/oauth.test.ts 55/55,
test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts 6/6,
test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts 4/4 from commit A. The one
unrelated unit failure surfaces on master too — environment-sensitive
test that expects ~/.gbrain/config.json to be absent in the test env.
Out of scope: F11 (auth register-client --redirect-uri flag) and F13
(serve --http argv positive-int validator) per codex C11 — operator
UX gaps, not trust-boundary fixes. Filed as follow-up TODOs.
Thanks to @ElectricSheepIO on X for the security review that surfaced
this hardening pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: file F11 + F13 as OAuth hardening follow-up TODOs
Codex C11 flagged these as scope creep on the v0.26.7 OAuth hardening
PR (operator UX, not trust-boundary). Capturing them here so the
context survives — eva-brain has both implementations and the lift is
mechanical when we want to do them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(oauth): close adversarial-review findings on F7c + F8
Two bugs surfaced by an adversarial subagent during /ship's pre-landing
review pass that the codex + plan-eng-review didn't catch.
D15 / F7c: `exchangeAuthorizationCode` used `redirectUri ? ...` ternary
to choose the with-redirect vs no-redirect SQL. Empty string fell
through to the no-redirect branch, so a caller submitting
`redirect_uri=""` at /token bypassed the binding entirely. RFC 6749
§4.1.3 spec violation. Switch to `redirectUri !== undefined`. Test:
empty-string redirect_uri must reject when /authorize stored a real URI.
D16 / F8: `summarizeMcpParams` published exact byte length via
`approx_bytes = JSON.stringify(params).length`. Submitting put_page with
a known prefix and observing the resulting log entry across repeated
probes lets an attacker binary-search the size of secret suffix content.
Bucket to 1KB resolution. The redacted summary keeps a coarse
"roughly how big" signal for operators while making size-based
side-channel attacks useless.
Test count: 65 → 67 across the three new test files.
Typecheck clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: bump version and changelog (v0.26.9)
OAuth 2.1 hardening + HTTP MCP shell-job RCE fix.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update project documentation for v0.26.9
Annotate CLAUDE.md key-files entries with v0.26.9 OAuth/MCP hardening pass:
- src/core/operations.ts: D12 (OperationContext.remote required) + F7b
(4-site fail-closed flip), HTTP MCP shell-job RCE close
- src/core/utils.ts: D14 isUndefinedColumnError extracted helper
- src/mcp/dispatch.ts: F8 summarizeMcpParams privacy redactor with
declared-keys allow-list + 1KB byte bucketing
- src/commands/serve-http.ts: F7+F8+F9+F10+F12+F14+F15 hardening
- src/core/oauth-provider.ts: F1+F2+F3+F4+F5+F6+F7c+F12 RFC 6749/7009
hardening pass
Add new test-file entries for test/mcp-dispatch-summarize.test.ts
(7 cases) and test/trust-boundary-contract.test.ts (4 cases). Extend
test/oauth.test.ts (+14 cases) and test/e2e/serve-http-oauth.test.ts
(+2 RCE-close regressions) entries with v0.26.9 case counts.
README.md: added --log-full-params to gbrain serve --http surface.
SECURITY.md: documented mcp_request_log.params redaction default
({redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}) +
--log-full-params opt-in.
docs/mcp/DEPLOY.md: operator-facing note on SSE feed + audit log
redaction default and when to flip --log-full-params on.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
255 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
255 lines
8.9 KiB
Markdown
# Deploy GBrain Remote MCP Server
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> **v0.26.0+:** `gbrain serve --http` ships full OAuth 2.1 (client credentials,
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> auth code + PKCE, refresh rotation, optional DCR), an embedded React admin
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> dashboard at `/admin`, scoped operations, and a live SSE activity feed.
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> Pre-v0.26 legacy bearer tokens still work — `verifyAccessToken` falls back
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> to the `access_tokens` table and grandfathers tokens to `read+write+admin`.
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> Postgres-only for the legacy fallback (the `access_tokens` table is Postgres-only);
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> OAuth tables work on both PGLite and Postgres. See [SECURITY.md](../../SECURITY.md)
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> for env vars and tunable defaults.
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Access your brain from any device, any AI client. GBrain ships two transports:
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`gbrain serve` (stdio) for local agents, and `gbrain serve --http` (v0.26.0+)
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for remote clients over OAuth 2.1.
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## Three Paths
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### Local stdio (zero setup)
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```bash
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gbrain serve
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```
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Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and any MCP client that supports stdio.
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No server, no tunnel, no token needed. Works on both PGLite and Postgres engines.
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### Remote over OAuth 2.1 (recommended, v0.26.0+)
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```bash
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gbrain serve --http --port 3131
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ngrok http 3131 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
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gbrain serve --http --port 3131 --public-url https://your-brain.ngrok.app
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```
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Built-in HTTP transport with OAuth 2.1, scoped operations, an admin dashboard
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at `/admin`, and a live SSE activity feed. Zero external dependencies. This is
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the only path that works with ChatGPT (OAuth 2.1 + PKCE is required by the
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ChatGPT MCP connector). Pass `--public-url` whenever the server is reachable
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at anything other than `http://localhost:<port>` so the OAuth issuer in
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discovery metadata matches what clients hit (RFC 8414 §3.3).
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Supported clients:
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- **ChatGPT** — requires OAuth 2.1 + PKCE. Works natively with `--http`.
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- **Claude Desktop / Cowork** — OAuth 2.1 or legacy bearer tokens.
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- **Perplexity** — OAuth 2.1 client credentials grant.
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- **Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf** — can use OAuth or legacy bearer.
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See the [OAuth 2.1 setup](#oauth-21-setup-v100) section below.
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### Remote with legacy bearer tokens (pre-v0.26 deployments) — Postgres only
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```
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Your AI client (Claude Desktop, Perplexity, etc.)
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→ ngrok tunnel (https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app)
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→ gbrain serve --http (built-in transport with bearer auth)
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→ Postgres (pooler connection or self-hosted)
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```
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This requires:
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1. A Postgres-backed brain (the `access_tokens` table only exists on Postgres;
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running `gbrain serve --http` against a PGLite install fails fast at startup)
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2. A machine running `gbrain serve --http`
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3. A public tunnel (ngrok, Tailscale, or cloud host)
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4. A bearer token created via `gbrain auth create <name>`
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Pre-v1.0 tokens are grandfathered as `read+write+admin` scopes when you upgrade
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to the HTTP server, so no migration is required.
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## OAuth 2.1 Setup (v0.26.0+)
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### 1. Start the HTTP server
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```bash
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gbrain serve --http --port 3131
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```
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On first start, the server prints an **admin bootstrap token** to stderr:
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```
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Admin bootstrap token: 3a1f9c...
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Open http://localhost:3131/admin and paste it to log in.
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```
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Save this token. Open `http://localhost:3131/admin` and paste it to access the
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dashboard. The dashboard shows live activity, registered clients, request logs,
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and per-client config export.
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> **v0.26.9+:** `mcp_request_log.params` and the live SSE activity feed default
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> to a redacted summary `{redacted, kind, declared_keys, unknown_key_count, approx_bytes}`.
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> Declared param keys are kept (intersected against the operation's spec); unknown
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> keys are counted but never named, and byte sizes round up to 1KB so size-probe
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> attacks can't binary-search secret content. Operators on a personal laptop who
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> want raw payloads back can pass `gbrain serve --http --log-full-params` (loud
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> stderr warning fires at startup). Multi-tenant deployments should leave it on
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> the redacted default.
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### 2. Register OAuth clients
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Register clients from the **`/admin` dashboard**:
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1. Click **Register client**.
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2. Enter a name (e.g. `perplexity`, `chatgpt`).
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3. Pick scopes: `read`, `write`, `admin` (checkboxes).
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4. Pick grant type: `client_credentials` for machine-to-machine (Perplexity,
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Claude Desktop bearer mode) or `authorization_code` for browser-based
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clients with PKCE (ChatGPT).
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5. For `authorization_code` clients, paste the redirect URI.
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6. Hit **Register**. The credential-reveal modal shows the `client_id` (and
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`client_secret` for confidential clients) once. Copy or Download JSON
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immediately — secrets are hashed on storage and never shown again.
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Or from the CLI — faster for scripting:
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```bash
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gbrain auth register-client perplexity \
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--grant-types client_credentials \
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--scopes "read write"
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```
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Host-repo wrappers can register programmatically:
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```ts
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await oauthProvider.registerClientManual(
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'perplexity',
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['client_credentials'],
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'read write',
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[], // redirect_uris, empty for CC
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);
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```
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For self-service client registration (Dynamic Client Registration, RFC 7591),
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start the server with `--enable-dcr`. DCR is off by default.
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### 3. Expose the server
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```bash
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brew install ngrok
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ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
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ngrok http 3131 --url your-brain.ngrok.app
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```
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Your OAuth issuer URL becomes `https://your-brain.ngrok.app`. The MCP SDK's
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router exposes the spec-compliant discovery endpoint at
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`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`.
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### 4. Scopes and localOnly
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Every operation is tagged `read | write | admin`. Four operations are
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`localOnly` and rejected over HTTP regardless of scope: `sync_brain`,
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`file_upload`, `file_list`, `file_url`. Remote agents cannot reach local
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filesystem surface area.
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| Scope | What it allows |
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|-------|---------------|
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| `read` | `search`, `query`, `get_page`, `list_pages`, graph traversal |
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| `write` | `put_page`, `delete_page`, `add_link`, `add_timeline_entry` |
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| `admin` | Client management, token revocation, sweep, local-only ops |
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## Legacy Bearer Token Setup
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Keep using pre-v0.26 bearer tokens if you aren't ready to migrate. They
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grandfather to `read+write+admin` scopes on the HTTP server.
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### 1. Set up the tunnel
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See the [ngrok-tunnel recipe](../../recipes/ngrok-tunnel.md) for full setup.
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Quick version:
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```bash
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brew install ngrok
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ngrok config add-authtoken YOUR_TOKEN
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ngrok http 8787 --url your-brain.ngrok.app # Hobby tier for fixed domain
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```
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### 2. Create access tokens
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```bash
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# Create a token for each client
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gbrain auth create "claude-desktop"
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# List all tokens
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gbrain auth list
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# Revoke a token
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gbrain auth revoke "claude-desktop"
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```
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Tokens are per-client. Create one for each device/app. Revoke individually
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if compromised. Tokens are stored SHA-256 hashed in your database.
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### 3. Connect your AI client
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- **ChatGPT:** [setup guide](CHATGPT.md) (OAuth 2.1 + PKCE, requires `gbrain serve --http`)
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- **Claude Code:** [setup guide](CLAUDE_CODE.md)
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- **Claude Desktop:** [setup guide](CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md) (must use GUI, not JSON config)
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- **Claude Cowork:** [setup guide](CLAUDE_COWORK.md)
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- **Perplexity:** [setup guide](PERPLEXITY.md)
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### 4. Verify
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```bash
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gbrain auth test \
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https://YOUR-DOMAIN.ngrok.app/mcp \
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--token YOUR_TOKEN
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```
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## Operations
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All 30 GBrain operations are available remotely, including `sync_brain` and
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`file_upload` (no timeout limits with self-hosted server).
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**Security note on `file_upload`:** remote MCP callers are confined to the working
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directory where `gbrain serve` was launched. Symlinks, `..` traversal, and absolute
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paths outside cwd are rejected. Page slugs and filenames are allowlist-validated
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(alphanumeric + hyphens; no control chars, RTL overrides, or backslashes). Local
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CLI callers (`gbrain file upload ...`) keep unrestricted filesystem access since
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the user owns the machine.
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## Deployment Options
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See [ALTERNATIVES.md](ALTERNATIVES.md) for a comparison of ngrok, Tailscale
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Funnel, and cloud hosts (Fly.io, Railway).
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## Troubleshooting
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**"missing_auth" error**
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Include the Authorization header: `Authorization: Bearer YOUR_TOKEN`
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**"invalid_token" error**
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Run `gbrain auth list` to see active tokens.
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**"service_unavailable" error**
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Database connection failed. Check your Supabase dashboard for outages.
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**Claude Desktop doesn't connect**
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Remote servers must be added via Settings > Integrations, NOT
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`claude_desktop_config.json`. See [CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md](CLAUDE_DESKTOP.md).
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## Expected Latencies
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| Operation | Typical Latency | Notes |
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|-----------|----------------|-------|
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| get_page | < 100ms | Single DB query |
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| list_pages | < 200ms | DB query with filters |
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| search (keyword) | 100-300ms | Full-text search |
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| query (hybrid) | 1-3s | Embedding + vector + keyword + RRF |
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| put_page | 100-500ms | Write + trigger search_vector update |
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| get_stats | < 100ms | Aggregate query |
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**Note:** `gbrain serve --http` shipped in v0.26.0 with OAuth 2.1 + admin
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dashboard baked into the binary. The custom HTTP wrapper pattern (see
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[voice recipe](../../recipes/twilio-voice-brain.md)) is still supported for
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teams that need bespoke middleware, but for most remote deployments the
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built-in server is the recommended path.
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