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fix(i18n): complete zh-CN translations for workspace, mascot, MCP Ser… (#2440)
Co-authored-by: agent:skill-master <skill-master@openclaw>
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JAYcodr
co-authored by
agent:skill-master <skill-master@openclaw>
agent:skill-master <skill-master@openclaw>
parent
e031d85ed2
commit
013381e880
@@ -33,14 +33,13 @@ const zhCN3: TranslationMap = {
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'workspace.building': '构建中...',
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'workspace.buildSummaryTrees': '构建摘要树',
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'workspace.viewVault': '查看存储库',
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'workspace.openingVaultTitle': 'Opening vault in Obsidian',
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'workspace.openingVaultTitle': '在 Obsidian 中打开存储库',
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'workspace.openingVaultMessage':
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"If Obsidian doesn't open, install it from obsidian.md or use Reveal Folder. Vault path:",
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'workspace.openVaultFailedTitle': "Couldn't open vault in Obsidian",
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'workspace.openVaultFailedMessage':
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'Use Reveal Folder to open the vault directory directly. Vault path:',
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'workspace.revealVaultFailed': "Couldn't reveal vault folder",
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'workspace.revealFolder': 'Reveal Folder',
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'如果 Obsidian 没有打开，请从 obsidian.md 安装或使用"显示文件夹"。存储库路径：',
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'workspace.openVaultFailedTitle': '无法在 Obsidian 中打开存储库',
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'workspace.openVaultFailedMessage': '使用"显示文件夹"直接打开存储库目录。存储库路径：',
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'workspace.revealVaultFailed': '无法显示存储库文件夹',
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'workspace.revealFolder': '显示文件夹',
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'workspace.graphLoadFailed': '无法加载记忆图谱',
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'workspace.loadingGraph': '正在加载记忆图谱...',
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'workspace.graphViewMode': '记忆图谱视图模式',
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@@ -443,39 +443,38 @@ const zhCN5: TranslationMap = {
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'settings.appearance.modeSystem': '跟随系统',
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'settings.appearance.modeSystemDesc': '跟随操作系统外观设置。',
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'settings.appearance.helperText':
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'Dark mode switches the entire app — chat, settings, panels — to a dim palette. "Match system" follows your OS appearance and updates live.',
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'settings.mascot.characterPreview': 'Preview',
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'settings.mascot.characterStates': 'states',
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'settings.mascot.characterVisemes': 'visemes',
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'settings.mascot.colorAria': 'OpenHuman color',
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'settings.mascot.colorBlack': 'Black',
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'settings.mascot.colorBurgundy': 'Burgundy',
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'settings.mascot.colorGreen': 'Green',
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'settings.mascot.colorNavy': 'Navy',
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'settings.mascot.colorYellow': 'Yellow',
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'settings.mascot.libraryUnavailable': 'OpenHuman library unavailable',
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'深色模式会将整个应用——聊天、设置、面板——切换为暗色调。"跟随系统"会同步你的操作系统外观并实时更新。',
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'settings.mascot.characterPreview': '预览',
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'settings.mascot.characterStates': '状态',
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'settings.mascot.characterVisemes': '视素',
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'settings.mascot.colorAria': 'OpenHuman 颜色',
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'settings.mascot.colorBlack': '黑色',
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'settings.mascot.colorBurgundy': '酒红色',
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'settings.mascot.colorGreen': '绿色',
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'settings.mascot.colorNavy': '深蓝色',
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'settings.mascot.colorYellow': '黄色',
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'settings.mascot.libraryUnavailable': 'OpenHuman 资源库不可用',
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'settings.mascot.title': 'OpenHuman',
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'settings.developerMenu.mcpServer.title': 'MCP Server',
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'settings.developerMenu.mcpServer.desc': 'Configure external MCP clients to connect to OpenHuman',
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'settings.mcpServer.title': 'MCP Server',
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'settings.mcpServer.toolsSectionTitle': 'Available Tools',
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'settings.developerMenu.mcpServer.title': 'MCP 服务器',
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'settings.developerMenu.mcpServer.desc': '配置外部 MCP 客户端以连接到 OpenHuman',
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'settings.mcpServer.title': 'MCP 服务器',
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'settings.mcpServer.toolsSectionTitle': '可用工具',
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'settings.mcpServer.toolsSectionDesc':
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'Tools exposed via the MCP stdio server when running openhuman-core mcp',
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'settings.mcpServer.configSectionTitle': 'Client Configuration',
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'settings.mcpServer.configSectionDesc':
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'Select your MCP client to generate the correct configuration snippet',
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'settings.mcpServer.copySnippet': 'Copy to Clipboard',
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'settings.mcpServer.copied': 'Copied!',
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'settings.mcpServer.openConfigFile': 'Open Config File',
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'运行 openhuman-core mcp 时通过 MCP stdio 服务器暴露的工具',
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'settings.mcpServer.configSectionTitle': '客户端配置',
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'settings.mcpServer.configSectionDesc': '选择你的 MCP 客户端以生成对应的配置代码片段',
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'settings.mcpServer.copySnippet': '复制到剪贴板',
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'settings.mcpServer.copied': '已复制！',
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'settings.mcpServer.openConfigFile': '打开配置文件',
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'settings.mcpServer.binaryPathNotFound':
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'OpenHuman binary not found. If running from source, build with: cargo build --bin openhuman-core',
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'settings.mcpServer.openConfigError': 'Failed to open config file',
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'未找到 OpenHuman 二进制文件。如果使用源码运行，请执行：cargo build --bin openhuman-core',
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'settings.mcpServer.openConfigError': '打开配置文件失败',
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'settings.mcpServer.clientClaudeDesktop': 'Claude Desktop',
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'settings.mcpServer.clientCursor': 'Cursor',
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'settings.mcpServer.clientCodex': 'Codex',
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'settings.mcpServer.clientZed': 'Zed',
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'settings.mcpServer.configFilePath': 'Config file',
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'settings.mcpServer.clientSelectorAriaLabel': 'MCP client selector',
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'settings.mcpServer.configFilePath': '配置文件',
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'settings.mcpServer.clientSelectorAriaLabel': 'MCP 客户端选择器',
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};
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export default zhCN5;
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@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
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# OpenHuman Security Audit — Architecture & Data Flow Analysis
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> Date: 2026-05-21
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> Author: JAYcodr (fork analysis, not an official audit)
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> Scope: Architecture overview, trust boundaries, credential flow, attack surface
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---
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## 1. System Overview
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OpenHuman is a desktop AI assistant with a **Rust core** running in-process inside a Tauri desktop host, and a **React/TypeScript frontend**. Communication between frontend and core happens via two channels:
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| Channel | Protocol | Auth |
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|---|---|---|
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| Primary | Socket.IO (bidirectional streaming) | Session-baked connection auth |
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| Secondary | HTTP JSON-RPC | Basic Auth (`WWW-Authenticate` realm) |
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**No sidecar binary** — core runs as a tokio task inside the Tauri process (`core_process.rs`).
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---
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## 2. Module Map
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### Core (`src/openhuman/`) — 66 domains
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| Category | Domains |
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|---|---|
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| Agent | `agent`, `agent_experience`, `agent_tool_policy` |
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| Memory | `memory` (stm_recall, docs), `embeddings`, `learning`, `workspace` |
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| Skills | `skills` (metadata-only), `mcp_client`, `mcp_clients`, `mcp_server`, `composio` |
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| Channels | `channels` (dispatch), `telegram`, `discord`, `whatsapp_data`, `webview_accounts` |
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| Infrastructure | `http_host`, `socket` (Socket.IO server), `runtime_node`, `runtime_python` |
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| Business Logic | `billing`, `credentials`, `vault`, `encryption`, `notifications`, `webhooks`, `approval`, `cron`, `meet`, `meet_agent`, `team`, `threads`, `todos` |
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| UI-adjacent | `accessibility`, `autocomplete`, `screen_intelligence`, `voice` |
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| Other | `config`, `health`, `heartbeat`, `doctor`, `migration`, `update`, `security`, `prompt_injection` |
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### Transport (`src/core/`)
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| File | Role |
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| `src/core/jsonrpc.rs` | JSON-RPC over HTTP, method dispatch |
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| `src/core/socketio.rs` | Socket.IO server, `WebChannelEvent` struct for streaming |
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| `src/core/auth.rs` | HTTP Basic Auth handler |
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| `src/openhuman/http_host/rpc.rs` | JSON-RPC endpoint (`list()` function) |
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| `src/openhuman/http_host/auth.rs` | `WWW-Authenticate` header, `unauthorized_response()` |
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### Event Bus (`src/core/event_bus/`)
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Typed pub/sub + in-process typed request/response:
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```text
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publish_global(DomainEvent) → fire-and-forget broadcast
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register_native_global(method, handler) → one-to-one typed dispatch
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request_native_global(method, req) → call and wait for response
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```
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**Domain events:** `agent`, `memory`, `channel`, `skill`, `tool`, `webhook`, `mcp_client`, `system`, `approval`, `cron`, `triage`
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---
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## 3. Credential & Token Flows
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### Core RPC Auth
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- HTTP JSON-RPC protected by **HTTP Basic Auth**
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- Realm: `"OpenHuman Hosted Directory"`
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- Per-launch bearer token stored in `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` env var
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- Frontend obtains bearer via `invoke('core_rpc_token')` Tauri command
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### Stored Credentials
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- `credentials` domain manages credential storage
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- `encryption` domain handles at-rest encryption
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- `auth-profiles.json` — auth data referenced by `settings.ai.apiKeysEncrypted` i18n key
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### MCP Server Auth
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- Composio API key stored via `settings.composio.apiKeyStoredPlaceholder`
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- MCP client config (Claude Desktop, Cursor, Codex, Zed) generated in settings panel
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---
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## 4. Trust Boundaries & Attack Surface
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### Boundary 1: External Channels (Telegram, Discord, WhatsApp, etc.)
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- Inbound messages from third-party messaging platforms flow through `channels/runtime/dispatch.rs`
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- Each provider scanner runs as native CDP/scraping — **no JS injection** in migrated providers
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- `ChannelInboundMessage` event published to event bus
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**Risk:** Third-party message content is untrusted. Prompt injection possible if message content is rendered or echoed without sanitization. The `prompt_injection` domain exists as a guard.
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### Boundary 2: MCP Tool Bridge (`mcp_client/`, `mcp_clients/`)
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- External MCP servers connect via stdio or HTTP
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- Tools exposed through `tool_registry`
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- `McpClientToolExecuted` events published
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**Risk:** MCP tools are external services. Tool output flows back into agent context. No obvious output sanitization in the tool execution path.
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### Boundary 3: Skill Runtime (Removed)
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- QuickJS / `rquickjs` runtime was **removed** (PR #1061)
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- `src/openhuman/skills/` is now metadata-only
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- No dynamic code execution from skill packages
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**Risk:** Significantly reduced vs. prior architecture.
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### Boundary 4: Local File System Access
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- `workspace`, `vault`, `webview_accounts` domains have file system access
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- `screen_intelligence`, `accessibility` domains capture screen content
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- Memory stored via `memory` domain
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**Risk:** Screen capture and file access are high-privilege operations. Controlled by macOS permissions (Accessibility, Screen Recording).
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### Boundary 5: MCP Server Config File
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- Settings panel generates `~/.config/openhuman/mcp.json` for external MCP clients
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- Config written via `settings.mcpServer.openConfigFile` / `writeFile`
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- Path exposed via `settings.mcpServer.configFilePath`
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**Risk:** If `mcp.json` is world-readable, token theft possible. Worth auditing file permissions on the config directory.
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---
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## 5. Data Flows
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### Agent Turn (primary AI interaction)
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```text
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External message → channels/runtime/dispatch.rs
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→ request_native_global("agent.run_turn", AgentTurnRequest)
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→ agent/bus.rs: run_tool_call_loop()
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→ tool_registry → SkillExecution events
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→ on_delta mpsc channel → WebChannelEvent (Socket.IO)
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→ frontend (SocketIOMCPTransportImpl)
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```
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### Memory Recall
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```text
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Tool call: memory.recall → memory/stm_recall/recall.rs: stm_recall()
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→ MemoryRecalled event on event bus
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→ consumed by skill/mcp_client subscribers
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```
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### Credential Setup
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```text
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Frontend settings → core RPC (JSON-RPC over HTTP + Basic Auth)
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→ credentials domain → encryption domain
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→ stored to auth-profiles.json
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```
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---
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## 6. Security Observations (Not Exhaustive)
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### Areas Worth Auditing
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1. **Prompt injection from channel messages** — `prompt_injection` domain exists; need to verify it's applied to all channel inbound paths and not just chat UI
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2. **MCP tool output sanitization** — external MCP tool output flows into agent context without obvious filtering
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3. **Config directory permissions** — `~/.config/openhuman/` and `mcp.json` permission model not reviewed
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4. **Credential encryption** — `encryption` domain used for at-rest encryption; key management model unclear
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5. **WebView CSP** — embedded webviews (Telegram, Discord, etc.) loaded under CEF — need to verify CSP headers and iframe restrictions
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6. **`OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` in process env** — bearer token in env var; visible via `/proc/self/environ` on Linux or process inspection on macOS
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7. **No rate limiting observed** on HTTP JSON-RPC endpoint
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### Positive Signals
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- QuickJS skill runtime removed — large attack surface eliminated
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- CEF webviews for migrated providers have **zero injected JS** — good isolation
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- MCP server stdio transport provides sandboxing for external tools
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- `security` domain exists — may contain hardening measures not reviewed here
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---
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## 7. Recommended Next Steps (for Maintainers)
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- [ ] Audit `prompt_injection` domain coverage — is it applied to all channel inbound paths?
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- [ ] Document `encryption` domain key management
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- [ ] Check file permissions on `~/.config/openhuman/`
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- [ ] Add rate limiting to HTTP JSON-RPC endpoint
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- [ ] Document MCP tool output handling expectations
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- [ ] Review `OPENHUMAN_CORE_TOKEN` lifetime and exposure scope
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---
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## 8. RPC Method Reference
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JSON-RPC methods follow `domain_operation` pattern:
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```text
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memory_recall_memories
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memory_recall_context
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thread_turn_state_lifecycle
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wallet_setup_round_trips_status
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tool_registry_lists_and_gets_entries
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```
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Native (event bus) methods:
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```text
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agent.run_turn → agent/bus.rs
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memory.sync → memory/bus.rs
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```
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---
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*This document is an independent analysis, not an official security assessment.*
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