fix(observability): classify RPC filesystem path validation errors as expected (Sentry TAURI-RUST-4QH) (#2795)

Co-authored-by: M3gA-Mind <megamind@mahadao.com>
This commit is contained in:
CodeGhost21
2026-05-29 01:08:25 +05:30
committed by GitHub
co-authored by M3gA-Mind
parent 7704836f06
commit e83bfd6051
+180
View File
@@ -192,6 +192,27 @@ pub enum ExpectedErrorKind {
/// state snapshots) — every one of them emits the same canonical errno
/// rendering.
DiskFull,
/// A user-supplied filesystem path failed an RPC-level validation
/// check — e.g. `openhuman.vault_create` was called with a
/// `root_path` that doesn't exist or points at a file rather than a
/// directory. The UI already shows the typed error to the user, and
/// Sentry has no remediation path (we can't `mkdir -p` a folder the
/// user hasn't actually picked yet). User-supplied paths can also
/// embed PII fragments (the home-directory segment leaks the OS
/// username), so demoting these out of the Sentry event stream is a
/// small privacy win on top of the noise reduction.
///
/// Drops Sentry TAURI-RUST-4QH (`root_path is not a directory:
/// /Users/<user>/Documents/<vault>`, observed on
/// `openhuman@0.56.0`) and preempts the symmetric
/// `hosted path is not a directory:` shape from
/// `openhuman::http_host::path_utils` once it starts surfacing.
/// See [`is_filesystem_user_path_invalid_message`] for the polarity
/// contract — the safety-guard variant in `skills::ops_install`
/// (`{path} is not a directory — refusing to remove`) is
/// deliberately not matched because that's an `rm -rf` invariant
/// violation, not user input.
FilesystemUserPathInvalid,
/// A memory-store write (document upsert or KV set) was rejected because
/// the namespace or key contained what the PII guard classified as a
/// personal identifier (national ID, phone number, formatted credential,
@@ -343,6 +364,13 @@ pub fn expected_error_kind(message: &str) -> Option<ExpectedErrorKind> {
if is_empty_provider_response_message(&lower) {
return Some(ExpectedErrorKind::EmptyProviderResponse);
}
// RPC-level filesystem path validation — explicit wire-shape anchors
// (root_path / hosted path) prevent accidental demotion of unrelated
// errors. See the variant doc-comment and
// [`is_filesystem_user_path_invalid_message`] polarity contract.
if is_filesystem_user_path_invalid_message(&lower) {
return Some(ExpectedErrorKind::FilesystemUserPathInvalid);
}
None
}
@@ -971,6 +999,44 @@ fn is_prompt_injection_blocked_message(lower: &str) -> bool {
|| lower.contains("prompt blocked by security policy")
}
/// Detect an RPC-level filesystem path validation failure from user input.
///
/// Anchored on the two known wire shapes — both emitted at the RPC entry
/// boundary when a user typed/picked a path that doesn't resolve to an
/// existing directory:
///
/// - `"root_path is not a directory: <path>"` —
/// [`crate::openhuman::vault::ops::vault_create`] when the chosen vault
/// folder doesn't exist or points at a file (Sentry TAURI-RUST-4QH).
/// - `"hosted path is not a directory: <path>"` —
/// [`crate::openhuman::http_host::path_utils`] when an HTTP host config
/// references a missing directory. Not yet observed in Sentry but
/// shares the same user-input failure mode; preempts a future ID.
///
/// Both are deterministic Err returns at the validation gate of an RPC
/// handler, BEFORE any side-effect happens. The UI already surfaces the
/// typed error and Sentry has no remediation path.
///
/// **Polarity contract** — explicit wire-shape anchors prevent accidental
/// demotion of future errors whose bodies happen to contain "path is not
/// a directory:" in a different context:
///
/// - `skills::ops_install` emits `"{path} is not a directory — refusing
/// to remove"` (em-dash separator, no "root_path" or "hosted path"
/// prefix). That is an `rm -rf` safety guard catching an UNEXPECTED
/// state, not user input — it must STAY actionable.
/// - A generic `"input config path is not a directory: /etc/foo"` from a
/// future provider/wallet/storage error would NOT match (no known
/// prefix) and would reach Sentry as intended.
///
/// All matches are substring-based against the lower-cased message so
/// the classifier survives caller wrapping (`rpc.invoke_method`,
/// anyhow context chains, …).
fn is_filesystem_user_path_invalid_message(lower: &str) -> bool {
lower.contains("root_path is not a directory:")
|| lower.contains("hosted path is not a directory:")
}
/// Detect memory-store writes rejected because the namespace or key contained
/// a personal identifier detected by the PII guard.
///
@@ -1286,6 +1352,37 @@ fn report_expected_message(kind: ExpectedErrorKind, message: &str, domain: &str,
"[observability] {domain}.{operation} skipped expected memory-store circuit-breaker-open error"
);
}
ExpectedErrorKind::FilesystemUserPathInvalid => {
// User-input validation failure surfaced at the RPC
// boundary — e.g. `openhuman.vault_create` called with a
// `root_path` that doesn't exist. The typed error is
// already shown to the user; Sentry has no remediation
// path. Demote to `info!` — same tier as
// `PromptInjectionBlocked`, which is the closest severity
// class ("user input we already surfaced a typed error for";
// not operator-actionable like `DiskFull` / `NetworkUnreachable`).
//
// **Do not include the raw `message` here.** The message
// body embeds the user's local filesystem layout (username,
// project name, document directory, …) and
// `sentry_tracing_layer` in `core::logging` maps
// `Level::INFO` to `EventFilter::Breadcrumb` — so any
// formatted body would be attached as a breadcrumb to
// every subsequent Sentry event from this hub, leaking
// user paths into unrelated reports. Log only `domain` /
// `operation` / `kind` (no PII), matching the
// `LoopbackUnavailable` arm above ("metadata over raw text
// for noise demotions", per the #1719 review feedback).
// Full-path diagnostics for local debugging stay available
// via `RUST_LOG=…=debug` since `Level::DEBUG` / `TRACE`
// are mapped to `EventFilter::Ignore`.
tracing::info!(
domain = domain,
operation = operation,
kind = "filesystem_user_path_invalid",
"[observability] {domain}.{operation} skipped expected filesystem path validation error"
);
}
ExpectedErrorKind::MemoryStorePiiRejection => {
// PII guard rejected a memory-store write because the namespace or
// key was classified as containing a personal identifier. The guard
@@ -2034,6 +2131,89 @@ mod tests {
}
}
// ── FilesystemUserPathInvalid (TAURI-RUST-4QH) ─────────────────────────
#[test]
fn classifies_vault_create_root_path_not_a_directory_as_filesystem_user_path_invalid() {
// TAURI-RUST-4QH: verbatim wire shape from
// `openhuman::vault::ops::vault_create` line 37 when the
// user-picked vault folder doesn't resolve to an existing
// directory. Bubbles up as the RPC dispatcher's
// `display_message` and reaches `report_error_or_expected` —
// must classify so no Sentry event fires.
assert_eq!(
expected_error_kind(
"root_path is not a directory: /Users/zadam/Documents/SndBrainOpenHuman"
),
Some(ExpectedErrorKind::FilesystemUserPathInvalid)
);
// The same body wrapped by the JSON-RPC dispatcher's `display_message`
// prefix (`rpc.invoke_method` re-emit shape from `src/core/jsonrpc.rs`).
// Must still classify so the dispatch-site re-report doesn't escape
// the matcher even if a future caller layers more context.
assert_eq!(
expected_error_kind(
"rpc.invoke_method failed: root_path is not a directory: /Users/alice/openhuman-data"
),
Some(ExpectedErrorKind::FilesystemUserPathInvalid)
);
}
#[test]
fn classifies_http_host_hosted_path_not_a_directory_as_filesystem_user_path_invalid() {
// Preempt the symmetric shape from
// `openhuman::http_host::path_utils:23` —
// `"hosted path is not a directory: <path>"`. Not yet observed
// in Sentry but shares the same RPC validation polarity as
// vault_create's `root_path` check. Anchoring on
// `"path is not a directory:"` (with trailing colon) covers
// both without two separate matchers.
assert_eq!(
expected_error_kind("hosted path is not a directory: /var/www/static-site"),
Some(ExpectedErrorKind::FilesystemUserPathInvalid)
);
}
#[test]
fn does_not_classify_unrelated_path_messages_as_filesystem_user_path_invalid() {
// Polarity contract — the anchor requires a trailing colon
// after `"is not a directory"`, which discriminates user input
// (path follows the colon) from other shapes:
//
// 1. The `skills::ops_install:475` SAFETY GUARD —
// `"<path> is not a directory — refusing to remove"` — must
// stay actionable. It catches an `rm -rf` invariant violation
// (the target should have been a directory but wasn't),
// which is a code bug, not user input.
// 2. A narrative log line that happens to mention the phrase
// without the user-path colon suffix is not a validation
// failure and must not be silenced.
// 3. The dot-prefix variant from POSIX `EISDIR`/`ENOTDIR`
// renderings (`"Is a directory (os error 21)"`) is the
// inverse condition — different code path entirely.
for raw in [
// Safety guard — must NOT classify.
"/tmp/openhuman-cache is not a directory — refusing to remove",
// Narrative log line — must NOT classify.
"checked that path is not a directory before mkdir",
// Inverse condition (os error 21: EISDIR) — must NOT classify.
"open /etc/passwd failed: Is a directory (os error 21)",
// Bare path with no `directory` mention — must NOT classify.
"root_path must be absolute: ./relative/path",
// Generic body with the trailing colon but no known vault/http_host
// prefix — must NOT classify (future provider/storage errors that
// happen to embed "path is not a directory: ..." should reach Sentry).
"input config path is not a directory: /etc/foo",
] {
assert_eq!(
expected_error_kind(raw),
None,
"polarity contract: must NOT classify as FilesystemUserPathInvalid: {raw}"
);
}
}
// ── EmptyProviderResponse (TAURI-RUST-4Z1) ─────────────────────────────
#[test]